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ABSTRACT 
In the recent past a number of technologies have been imported into The Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia. This experience has affirmed the conviction that technology can make an 
invaluable contribution to the growth of The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. However, in 
doing so, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, like other nations, faces some questions of 
possible obstacles, trials and errors during the course of industrial development and 
technology transfer, that can be addressed by utilising science and technology efficiently 
to develop many sectors, improve output of industry, develop standards and -status of 
national manpower and its utilisation. This study analyses issues related to successful 
technology transfer in Saudi industry 
As such, the purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between industrial 
development and technology transfer in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the important 
role that modem technology can play in development of the oil and petrochemicals 
sectors. The aims are to provide a better understanding of the linkage between technology 
transfer and industrial development strategies in general, with special emphasis on the 
performance of the Saudi oil and petrochemical industry in particular. As such, to avoid 
failures on technology transfer, it becomes an imperative to analyse technology transfer 
by considering various approaches, as follows: 
Technology and industry is a key to future growth in Saudi Arabia - The main 
objective here is to locate, attract and keep industry. The concept of technology 
and industry deals with role of technology and the dynamics of Saudi's industry 
environment to excel in markets. 
Strategy at the functional level - this relates to the various activities assigned to 
different departments in the organisational structure. The concept means that all 
functions must be conducted in accordance with industry, technology and strategy. 
Strategy and technology - this means how to transfer an already existing 
technology to Saudi industry. 
Strategy for research and development - The concept deals mainly with how to 
plan, finance and implement R&D for products, security, environmental protection 
etc. Where to draw the line between general and specific objectives in R&D. 
The chosen method to study these issues is case study analysis of SABIC (Saudi Basic 
Industries Corporation) and Saudi Aramco (Saudi Arabian Oil Company). SABIC has 
been established for two main strategic objectives that go together in two parallel lines. 
The first objective aims to develop human resources and to turn them into a trained 
category that has the capability to transfer, assimilate and develop the most sophisticated 
technologies. The second objective aims to develop the natural resources and convert 
them to industrial products, helping to diversify the domestic income sources and open 
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the doors for building up processing industries to satisfy the local and external market 
requirements. The first case study (SABIC) provides an overview of the phenomenon of 
technology transfer to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. For comparative purposes the 
second case study involves a case study of Saudi Arabia's largest oil firm (Saudi 
Aramco). These two case studies have been selected for their: 
i role in technology transfer in Saudi oil and petrochemical sectors, 
ii approach and access to greater resources in technology transfer, 
iii exposure of firm behaviour in the Saudi industrial sector, 
iv contribution to Saudi economic development and realisation of additional income 
through improved operations. 
The two case studies, typical of large companies not only in Saudi Arabia but also in 
the world, will address the obstacles in learning, committing and increasing performance 
through technology transfer. These cases highlight a range of choices available in 
technology transfer, which provide a wide range of means for technological learning 
through transfer. They offer different opportunities for further innovation and technology 
development. 
Although Saudi Aramco and SABIC claim 80 percent and 73 percent " Saudisation", 
respectively, the survey indicates that native Saudis need more participation and 
involvement in technology process in order to raise their technological know-how. 
As a result of this study, a common approach to technology transfer into Saudi Aramco 
and SABIC may be developed and applied by industry, per its requirements to address 
existing and prospective problems. At present Saudi Arabia has the capacity to absorb 
new technologies in its growing industrial sector. This is required to meet its desired 
objectives of becoming industrialised and self-sufficient in required technologies. 
The real test of effective technology transfer in this study is the need to build Saudi local 
technological capability supported by an effective learning strategy. The ultimate aim is 
to expand the scope of this study beyond the academic level towards the practical 
challenges of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of inward technology transfer for 
future Saudi industrial development. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effectiveness of technology transfer in the 
Saudi oil and petrochemical industry. The study involves two elements. The first is the 
transfer of advanced technologies from industrialised countries, and also the various 
options and strategies through which a company may seek to build up technological 
capabilities. The second concems the Kingdom's strategy for the technological 
development of Saudi industry. 
1.1 Study background 
During the past decade, Saudi Arabia has transformed its economy and society. In 
doing so, the Kingdom has laid special emphasis on importing technology to implement 
more complex and sophisticated projects, such as oil, gas, petrochemical projects, electric 
power plants, telecommunication, construction, medical services and commercial air line 
support services. Technology has been transferred in the following ways: joint 
partnerships/alliances; license agreements; co-operation with various research and 
development (R&D) centres worldwide; and offset programmes. 
Whilst this study is concemed with evaluating outcomes from the Saudi Arabian 
experience in technology transfer from industrialized countries, it also examines the way 
Saudi Arabia has attempted to minimise dependence. on imported technology, seeking 
self-sufficiency. The Kingdom is actively searching for the most modem imported 
technology as well as developing its own technology. Specifically, this study examines 
the viability and performance of Saudi Arabia's past and present technology transfer 
mechanisms, particularly in the oil and petrochemical industry. It explores in detail the 
processes of development and adaptation of technology in these two sectors. 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) has developed its education and training 
programmes to match its needs and future industrial growth. The numbers of schools and 
colleges have increased from 3,283 in 1980 to 23,435 in 2000, the number of teachers 
from 23,100 in 1980 to 363,100 in 2000, and numbers of students from 547,000 in 1980 
to about 4.8 million in 2000.1 The number of students enrolled at technical schools and 
institutes rose from 840 in 1970 to 38,893 in 2000; an increase of around thirty-five fold 
during the period. 2 The number of trainees graduating from vocational training centres 
also rose from 417 in 1970 to 6,689 in 2000.3 
American, European and Japanese firms have played an instrumental role in Saudi 
development by supplying the needed machinery, equipment, expertise and know-how, 
together with management services for large projects in the Kingdom. In particular, joint 
venture arrangements have offered Saudi industry an important mechanism for the 
transfer of technology and technical know-how. Foreign partners of Saudi businesses are 
leading industrial manufacturers. They have also played a vital role in introducing Saudi 
firms and Saudi products to world export markets. 
Table 1.1 Foreign investments in Saudi industry 
Country Industrial projects Capital ($ bn) 
Foreign share 
_USA 
68 10.0 48.1 
_Japan 
05 2.7 49.9 
Italy 09 1.4 30.8 
Taiwan 03 0.7 49.9 
UK 31 0.5 46.9 
S. Korea 07 0.5 18.8 
Germany 24 0.3 27.0 
France 11 0.2 Z-8-8 
Source: Ministry of Industry, Internal Report, p. 17, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 1999 
Saudi Ararnco and SABIC are prime examples of the success and strength of 
industrialisation in the KSA. Through joint venture (JV) partnerships, 10 of SABIC's 16 
manufacturing affiliates are joint ventures formed with leading international companies. 
Partners have been chosen on the basis of their proven record in the industry and on their 
willingness to provide advanced technology and training to develop Saudi manpower. 4 
By using foreign partners' expertise in creating marketing outlets overseas, joint ventures 
have also helped to ensure that such industrial projects have not become a commercial 
failure. Joint ventures represent a two-way street in commercial benefits. 
Figure 1.1 Saudi joint ventures: a 'two-way street' in commercial benefits 
I> 
<I 
Saudi Arabia gains 
from the opportunity 
to share in the vital 
know-how and 
technological 
experience of partners 
Foreign partners gain 
from both access to 
the Kingdom's vast 
resources and the 
geographical 
proximity of serving 
local growth markets. 
The apparent growth of joint ventures around the world is a reflection of increasingly 
competitive business conditions. Joint ventures are not acquisitions or mergers, rather 
they are mutually agreed arrangements to achieve something specific together by 
combining technological capabilities, human resources and other respective strengths. In 
the competitive global marketplace, even very large companies sometimes need to 
collaborate with other businesses. 
American firms constitute by far the most important industrial partners in the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia. The oil and hydrocarbon sector in the Kingdom has historically been 
dominated by pioneering US industrial firms, such as MobilExxon and Shell. It is logical 
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for many American petrochemical companies to reach out for global markets and 
customers. The important role US participation plays in Saudi manufacturing is due to the 
strong influence that the national petrochemical sector wields over Saudi Arabia's current 
and future growth trends. 
American technological partnering, however, is not confined to the petrochemical 
industry but also covers other manufacturing branches e. g. food and beverages, paper, 
fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment. In Saudi Arabia, international joint 
ventures are arguably efficient and viable conduits for technology transfer and business 
co-operation, gaining wide acceptability amongst partners. The 1989 Saudi Industrial 
Survey clearly revealed the vital role foreign joint ventures played in the early 
development and growth of Saudi Arabia's industrial sector. The JVs are even more 
important in the first decade of the new Millennium. In production, sales, profitability, 
value-added, and exports, JV companies out-perform the average industrial unit. It is the 
government's intention to use the private sector to transfer technology to Saudi Arabian 
industry by strongly encouraging joint ventures with foreign partners. In this process, the 
Saudi government seeks to facilitate co-operative business relationships and joint 
ventures between Saudi and foreign enterprises. 
The Saudi industrial sector has played an effective role in diversifying the base of the 
national economy in order to reduce dependenc 'e 
on oil as the major source of income. 
The first major industrialisation effort was the development of SABIC's industries in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. The other principal area of industrial growth has been 
manufacturing. By 2002, there were more than 3,300 manufacturing units operating in 
Saudi Arabia, including more than 200 downstream chemical and plastics industries, 
which relý on SABIC, as a major growth pole within the industry to supply raw 
materials. 
In 2000, capital investment in Saudi industries exceeded $80 billion, and production 
was valued at more than $25 billion annually. 6 The Saudi government has publicly stated 
that it wants to provide the appropriate economic infrastructure for industrial growth. 
Provision of the necessary infrastructure includes investment incentives for both Saudi 
and international investors, the encouragement of foreign technology transfer, and the 
transfer of technology from existing industries to smaller downstream industries. 7 
With regard to the oil and petrochemical industry, Saudi Arabia already offers 
advanced infrastructure for industrial development. For instance, two industrial cities - 
Jubail on the Gulf and Yanbu on the Red Sea - encompass between them more than 1000 
square kilometers of airports, roads, deep-sea ports, housing, schools, and commercial 
support centres. There are also vital public utilities, including electricity, potable water, 
industrial waste treatment and sewage. Additionally, well-developed transport and 
communication networks link Jubail and Yanbu with six other regional industrial cities 
located throughout the Kingdom. 
This modem industrial infrastructure provides Saudi Arabia with a competitive advantage 
to promote itself to overseas investors. Rents on building sites are nominal, as are the 
costs for water and electricity. And the government is eager to see the industrialisation 
process increasing via continued foreign investment. Many joint ventures have been 
established to develop downstream industrial projects. West European, Japanese and US 
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firms are all playing a major role (as evidenced by 10 SABIC foreign projects in Jubail 
and Yanbu)s as joint venture partners, technology licensors, suppliers and construction 
contractors. 
Transfer of advanced technology to the Saudi oil and petrochemical industry has had a 
positive impact on Saudi economic growth, as well as also improving living standards 
and skill levels. In the industrial sector, Saudi Arabia has considered technology transfer 
to be an important part of its industrial development strategy fostering the establishment 
of manufacturing facilities. For instance, the number of industrial projects including joint 
ventures, rose from 199 factories in 1970 to 3,418 manufacturing plants in 2002.9 The 
total employment in these factories increased from 14,000 to 319,000 workers over the 
same period, representing around $64 bn worth of investments, including 360 
international joint ventures from 27 countries. 10 Joint ventures account for a total 
investment of US $ 36 billion, with 60% of these investments in petrochemicals, 15% in 
steel and machinery, 9% in the food sector and 7% in transportation machinery. " Saudi 
Aramco refining production in the Kingdom grew at an average annual rate of 4.7 
percent, from 225.3 million barrels in 1970 to 600.6 million barrels in 1996, and oil 
consumption increased by 25% over the last five years. 12 
The industrial report from the Ministry of Industry and Electricity (1998) shows that 
Saudi industrial non-oil sector added value (wages, salaries, services, profits and capital 
depreciation) was US$12 billion. 13 Saudi oil and petrochemical industry has played a 
very important contributory role in the creation of this value-added. SABIC's production 
climbed to an all-time high of nearly 40.6 million metric tons in 2002 and sales revenues 
were up by an impressive 5.0 per cent, at US $8 billion. 14 Apart from new and expanded 
plant operations, product diversification and increased production, Saudi oil and 
petrochemical industry enjoyed particularly strong growth in Saudisation. In 2002, Saudi 
Aramco and SABIC achieved more than 79 percent Saudisation from total employment 
of 68,887.15 Output growth of this industry has been consistently strong primarily 
because it has been able to increase product sales across all its -major markets. 16 Saudi 
Aramco and SABIC, are examples of the success of Saudi industrial and technological 
development strategy. 
In 2003, SABIC represented: the largest petrochemical producer in the Middle East; a 
producer of all five essential commodity petrochemicals; one of the largest petrochemical 
producers in the world with a market share of more than 7%; the largest steel producer in 
the Middle East; a benchmark for the development of Saudi commercial downstream 
industrial sector; and a success story for the application of state-of-the art technology. 
SABIC enjoys several competitive advantages, including access to abundant supplies of 
natural feedstock; proximity to the marketplace (being centrally located between Europe 
and Asia); state-of-the-art manufacturing plants, with considerable economies of scale; 
and a well supported and integrated global marketing network backed by research and 
development facilities. 17 
For Saudi industry, effective technology transfer depends on company supplier links, 
industrial integration and also policy emphasis on education, training, and basic and 
applied scientific research. In this regard, Mr. Yotaro lida, Chairman of Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries (MHI) Ltd and SABIC's partner on the First Joint Japan GCC Business 
Conference (November 7,1994 in Tokyo), remarked that: 
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"Technology transfers require a certain fi=ess, to avoid merely handing 
technology over to the purchaser. The equipment supported by the 
technology must be seen to work well and to produce acceptable 
goods... " In the case of electrical power plants, Mr fida went on to state: 
"... along with our main product, we used to build the machines and 
equipment and deliver them to the customer, and that was that. These 
days, however, planning begins at the stage when construction of the 
entire plant is examined. Refining the plans' and undertaking the 
designing, manufacturing, installation and construction are now a matter 
of course. 18 
MHI undertakes all aspects of engineering, including organization of plant operation, 
management of security systems, and personnel training, to meet its customers' needs. 
MHI often transfers a part of its technology. In addition, other Japanese and Asian 
producers in Saudi Arabia introduce production technology in a gradual fashion. 
Typically, these firms begin by exporting products not yet available in the recipient 
country. Next, they create joint venture companies and dispatch specialists from Japan to 
train local personnel. Beginning with products that are relatively easy to manufacture, 
these firms begin producing locally. Mr Iida noted that local personnel could learn the 
production technology gradually. If the process goes further, personnel from the recipient 
country may be invited to the company's factory in Japan for training and education. 
This suggests that mre investment in industries by a country does not necessarily 
equate to the acquisition of certain technological capabilities, particularly if this means 
depending completely on foreign technological resources. However, the transfer of 
technology along with local adoption must be economically and socially viable, enjoying 
comparative advantages. Therefore, the selection of a foreign technology should proceed 
with a detailed study to determine its need, cost involved, the extent of its ultimate local 
application and optimisation of the benefits through the development of national 
capabilities. The process of setting up an industry and selection of a given technology 
must be evaluated carefully, in terms of its suitability, effectiveness, and impact on 
productivity and quality as well as the potential for local development. 
The two main goals of the Kingdom's industrialisation programme have been to reduce 
dependence on oil income through economic diversification and by the adding of value to 
the country's abundant hydrocarbon oil and gas resources. This is achieved by the 
establishment of downstream industries through import substitution. The Saudi 
government believes it can pursue oil and petrochemical development by the 
establishment of verticallý integrated industrial structures, as has been done by other 
multinational companies. ' Since the early 1970s, the Saudi government has used a large 
part of its development spending to establish an industrial infrastructure and also certain 
basic industries. The Second Five-year Development Plan (1975-1980) called for total 
public spending of US$142 billion, six times the actual spending between 1970 and 1975, 
with the aim of diversifying away from oil. 20 
The Third Five- ear Development Plan 1980-1985 called for a total public spending of 
US$390 billion. 1 This plan placed more emphasis on diversifying the economy by 
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developing large-: scale industrial and agricultural projects, accelerated investment in 
infrastructure, health, education and social services. The Fourth Five-year Development 
Plan (1985-1990) placed further emphasis gn economic diversification, export expansion 
and import substitution to reduce the growing public account deficit. The Plan also placed 
emphasis on private enterprise. 
Government spending remained the main source of economic growth, and dependence 
on oil increased despite large public investment into mainly industry and agriculture. 
Although the main goal of Saudi development policies during the extended 1970 - 1990 
period was to diversify the economy away from dependence on oil-export revenues, the 
indirect and direct subsidies needed to achieve this goal, increased the government's 
short-term dependence on oil. 
As oil export revenues account for over 90% of Saudi foreign trade earnings, there is a 
significant relationship between the Saudi economy and exports of crude oil, refinery and 
petrochemical products. However, Saudi industry faces enormous constraints and 
problems in achieving indigenous and diversified industrial development. Long standing 
problems stemming from the failings of industrial strategy, weaknesses in the policy of 
education and training and misunderstandings in the process of technological innovation 
are still there, while new problems associated with the impact of the changing world 
economy, including increasingly competitive, globalized and changing business 
conditions, all represent major challenges for Saudi industrial development. 
1.2 Study aim 
In pursuit of Saudi industrialisation, the Kingdom has laid special emphasis on both 
inward transfer of industrial technology and indigenous technological development, not 
only to achieve self-sufficiency but also to implement more complex and sophisticated 
projects. Thus, the purpose of this study is to examine and evaluate the effectiveness of 
technology transfer in Saudi industry. In particular, the research will explore the transfer 
of technology from industrialized countries to the Saudi oil and petrochemical industry 
with emphasis on the nature and extent of technological absorption in this industry. This 
study has the following enabling objectives: 
" Assessment of the impact of technology transfer on the development of Saudi 
capabilities in the oil and petrochemical industries 
" Identification and description of the strategies Saudi firms have followed to support 
technological development, particularly with respect to: 
- businesses (development strategies) 
- product and process technologies (technology strategies) 
analysis of the contribution of the Saudi oil and petrochemical industry to the 
national economy 
Analysis of the models adopted by SABIC and Saudi Aramco in the development 
of technological capability 
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Investigation of the costs and benefits of technology transfers to the Saudi oil and 
petrochemical industry. Identification of possible improvements to be achieved in 
enhancing the technology transfer process, highlighting areas where Saudi Arabia 
might become more self-sufficient in the operations of the oil and petrochemical 
industry. 
There is a need to identify all opportunities and establish a series of appropriate science 
and technology strategies for the long and short-term development of Saudi industry. 
This study stresses that the development of appropriate strategies depends on an 
understanding of not only the external environment but also internal corporate strengths 
and weaknesses. 
1.3 Study value and contribution to knowledge 
This study examines, for the first time, the effectiveness of technology transfer in the 
Saudi oil and petrochemical industry. Saudi Arabia is seeking to deploy modem 
technology as the primary engine of growth for developing the oil and petrochemical 
sectors. Partnering and joint ventures have become the prevalent strategy for technology 
transfer in Saudi industry. Therefore, in broad terms, this study will critically evaluate 
partnering as a strategy for technology transfer in Saudi Arabia with a particular focus on 
Saudi Aramco and SABIC. 
1.4 Conceptual framework 
'Effectiveness', in terms of technology transfer strategies, is screened by employing 
case study analysis of SABIC and Saudi Aramco. The costs and benefits of JVs will be 
identified and analysed by reference to the performance achieved in the key areas of 
sharing, development and indigenisation of technology. SABIC and Saudi Aramco have 
been selected to test specific assumptions underlying the key factors characterising the 
technology transfer and technology development process in Saudi Arabia.. Choice of the 
mode of technology transfer represents the start point in the push towards achieving the 
long-term goal of self-sustaining growth (indigenisation). Various stages can be 
identified in the process of technology transfer. These stages can be grouped into four 
overlapping parts as shown in Figure 1.2. 
Figure 1.2 sets out all the factors affecting the transfer mechanism and shows the 
interrelationships between them. The transfer starts with government and company policy 
for technology transfer. Then the vehicles of inward technology transfer leading to 
industrial and technological development, with due consideration of investment and 
employment trends, is determined. Once inward technology transfer has been effected, 
resulting in improvements/ innovation and diffusion of knowledge, the prospects for 
eventual outward transfer/export are identified and the search is then on for 
competitiveness. This figure classifies the mechanism of technology development. These 
mechanism and stages are important for the technology transfer. Therefore it will from 
the basis for the analysis in Chapter 6. 
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Figure 1.2 Technology transfer: mechanism for technological development 
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1.5 Research methodology 
1.5.1 Primary Data. 
The aim of this study is to explore the technology transfer process and the manner in 
which technological capabilities are acquired in the Saudi oil and petrochemical industry. 
Empirical research will be based on interviews using semi-structured questionnaires (see 
Appendix 1). Due to the considerable amount of data necessary for analysing business 
and technology and due to the confidential nature of most of this data, the chosen method 
is that of case studies. A case study of Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC), 
which is responsible for the development of basic industries in Saudi Arabia, will be 
considered along with another case study, for comparative purposes, of the largest firm in 
the Saudi Arabia, Saudi Aramco. The List of Saudi Aramco and SABIC affiliate 
companies included in the survey is shown at Appendix 2; the response rate for the 
former was 68% and for the latter, 63%. The survey coverage includes all Aramco and 
SABIC affiliates in the Kingdom, but not the SABIC Steal Plant (Hadeed) because it 
does not fo ' rm part of 
the oil and petrol-chemical sector. The survey does not include 
Saudi Aramco and SABIC joint ventures and subsidiaries outside the Kingdom. 
The case study method: 
is useful in the exploration of unknown or poorly understood areas. This is certainly 
the case of technology transfer in the context of Saudi Arabia. The case study 
approach is descriptive and based upon logical and causal connections 
permits the use of multiple research methods so that the complexity of technology 
transfer and the specificity of the context of the KSA are reflected, gathering data 
through different routes, i. e. triangulation of data 
helps to discover relationships and structures, providing an opportunity to become 
familiar with the process in detail, and the patterns of organisation and management 
that occur in practice 
allows a close relationship with firms and easy access to privileged and confidential 
information especially in the Kingdom's industrial sectors where access to corporate 
information is difficult to obtain 
is research-oriented in which feedback and modification of information and 
interpretation are important. 
The major criticism of the case study approach is that it can be unrepresentative, and 
that the possibility for generalising is minimal. The extent to which generalisation may be 
made from case studies depends upon the adequacy of underlying theory and the whole 
corpus of related knowledge on which the case is analysed, rather than on the particular 
instance itself. 
Case studies undertaken in this dissertation employ a data triangulation approach to 
ensure as far as possible the validity of the research findings. The case study data sources 
include: 
interviews with a questionnaire addressed to company managers, engineers and 
technology providers 
9 documentary sources at firm and government levels, and, 
*physical observation of equipment types, in-house sUls, organisational 
structure/changes, manpower training policy, adaptability of organisation systems to 
local conditions, and policy application by SABIC and Saudi Aramco with respect to 
technology transfer. 
1.5.2 Secondary Data 
Specific data sources in KSA and UK: 
- Ministry of Finance (MF) 
- Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals (MPM) 
- Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) 
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I, 
- Ministry of Planning and Economy (MPE) 
- Public Investment Fund (PIF) 
- Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF) 
- Saudi Aramco 
- Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) 
- Economic Offset Committee (EOC) 
- Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu (RCJY) 
- King Abdul Aziz City for Science and Technology (KACST) 
- The Research Institute of King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals 
(KFUPM) 
- King Saud University (KSU) 
- Saudi Consulting House for Industrial Development 
- Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF) 
- Multinational enterprises and firms, which have been involved in the development 
efforts of the country in the following fields: 
- Engineering firms 
- Equipment suppliers 
- Contractors 
- Partners: mainly ExxonMobil, Shell, Mitsubishi 
- Consultant firms 
- UK Universities 
" Sussex 0 Bristol 
" Oxford * Aston 
" Cambridge . Birmingham 
" East Anglia 0 Leeds 
" Manchester 0 St Andrews 
" Glasgow 0 Aberdeen 
" Edinburgh 0 Durham 
" Exeter 0 York 
Research visits to numerous UK universities led to an understanding of the 
concepts of technology and technology transfer. A particular focus here is on role of 
the multi-national as the primary means of technology transfer. Theoretical analysis 
derives from the theory of innovation, exploring in detail the processes of 
development and adaptation of technology by undertaking a review (primarily 
reflected in the discussion of chapter 2) of the technology-based literature. This 
includes books, periodicals and publications, emphasising the transfer of technology, 
in particular, and industrial development, in general. Emphasis is on the range of 
advanced studies conducted in the industrialising world and also more specifically, 
the developing Arab countries, together with the studies and debates conducted and 
recommendations made by UN organisations, such as UNIDO and the World Bank. 
Moreover, the review of technology transfer bases (Chapter two) has been 
referenced to the experiences of international companies, so as to form a more 
accurate and precise view of the concept of technology transfer. The later case study 
analysis of the specific experiences of the oil and petrochemical industry in 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia builds upon this theoretical analysis. 
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The visits were concerned with meeting expert people in specialized companies 
involved in technology transfer, such as The Industry Technology Facilitator (ITF) 
in Aberdeen and in Teaching Company Scheme (TCS), Faringdon, Oxfordshire. 
Also visited were technology parks at Cambridge University and Loughbourough 
University which are strong in the field of technology transfer. 
1.6 Study structure 
There are three parts to this study. Part 1, the background to the study consists of 
three chapters. Chapter One outlines the scope of the research, and flags the 
importance of technology transfer to Saudi industry. It describes the research design 
and methodology of this project, including the process of fieldwork. In Chapter 
Two, the literature on industrial development and technology transfer studies is 
reviewed and evaluated. This forms the basis of the theoretical framework, where 
basic concepts important to the main themes of this study are defined and explored. 
Within this theoretical framework, the presumptions and research questions are 
highlighted, to be examined later in this thesis. Chapter Three describes the key 
elements of Saudi industrial development. It identifies and explains Saudi industrial 
policy, and the technology development that has resulted from technology transfer to 
Saudi Arabia. 
Part Il moves from the (theoretical and practical) contextual backdrop to the 
focused empirical fieldwork. Part Il is concerned with two case studies and has two 
chapters devoted to the examination of the technology transfer and technology 
development processes within the two largest oil and petrochemical companies in 
Saudi Arabia. To set the scope for case study analysis, Chapters Four and Five 
analyse in detail the background development of Saudi Aramco and Saudi Basic 
Industries Corporation (SABIC). 
The case studies explore the effectiveness of the process of technology transfer in 
the Saudi oil and petrochemical industries. The case studies address several aspects 
of the process of technological innovation (adaptation and improvement) and 
changes related to government technological and industrial Policies. Acquisition of 
technological capabilities, along with identified problems, represents the core area of 
investigation. 
Part III is concerned with lessons learned and has two chapters. Chapter Six 
analyses the lessons of oil and petrochemical technology transfer and development 
by reference to both the indigenous and technology transfer processes exposed in the 
two case studies. Finally, Chapter Seven presents conclusions of this study. It draws 
policy recommendations that recommend themselves, including areas for further 
research. 
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CHAPTERTWO 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND INDUSTRIAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter critically evaluates the literature on technology transfer, particularly 
the issues relating to technological development, and industrial development. The 
sources used, and the frameworks presented reflect the thrust and particular concerns 
underpinning the research. 
2.1 Concept of technology transfer 
This section explores the concept of technology transfer through two perspectives: 
the first deals with the commercial aspect of technology transfer and the other 
focuses on technological adaptation. These perspectives highlight the effectiveness 
of technology transfer (fTom transferor to transferee), ensuring that the receiving 
party can employ, utilise, maintain and develop the technology. 
Technology transfer can be defined as the diffusion and adaptation of new 
technology, equipment, practices and know-how. ' The definition of technology 
transfer seems straight forward, but the process is complicated. Successful 
technology transfer needs attention to the following aspects, affordability, 
accessibility, sustainability, relevance and acceptability. 2 
Multinational enterprises have a number of options for technology transfer. These 
include contractual arrangements, such - as technology licensing agreements, joint 
ventures, technical assistance and management contracts, turnkey projects and direct 
foreign investment in wholly-owned subsidiaries or affiliates. Transfers also occur, 
for example, through education of students abroad and through trade in capital 
goods between unrelated parties. Technology transfer can be understood as the 
process by which technology moves from one physical or geo 
_Fýphic 
location to 
another for the purpose of application towards an end product. Transfer can take 
place either domestically from one sector to another, or from one country to another 
covering the required knowledge, experiences and skills. 
Technology transfer may comprise some or all of the following: fabricated 
materials and capital goods such as machines, instruments, equipment and the rest of 
the technology and its necessities such as design and execution works; preparation 
of feasibility studies for projects, including technological experiences and skills 
comprising knowledge relating to production, patents, documents, drawings, 
operation programmes, maintenance instructions, training and education activities. 
Figure 2.1 identifies technology transfer as a progressive process. The process might 
be mixed with the concept of technology trading, importing or the purchasing of 
technology products. A technology chosen, installed and operated by others without 
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performing an active role in such operations may nevertheless involve technology 
transfer via the transfer of. - 
* capital goods and engineering management and administrative services 
e operation and maintenance skills and, 
technological knowledge and experience to acquire new and productive 
capabilities through local manpower acquiring the knowledge and ability to 
produce ongoing technological change. 
Figure 2.1 Development stages in technology transfer 
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Developing countries suffer from technological dependence on advanced 
industrialised countries, as they import all technology from abroad. There are 
historical causes for this dependence. The most significant is that advanced countries 
have experienced and overcome industrial isolation earlier, but in the developing 
world this experience is a serious constraint to technological development. Despite 
serious attempts by some developing nations, there is still a big gap between 
advanced countries and developing countries. 
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Amongst many theoretical approaches in the literature on developing countries, a 
central theme is that developing countries should simply repeat the industrialisation 
process of the advanced economies. What the less developed countries must do is to 
compress an essentially linear process into the shortest possible time-scale. The way 
to become "less backward" is to borrow, buy or copy those corresponding features 
of the rich countries felt to be instrumental in bringing about economic growth. 4 
However, the largely fiustrating experiences of developing countries in the 1960s 
and 1970s and comparatively successful more recent experiences of the newly 
industrialized countries, have challenged these classical perspectives and opened 
new territories for development studies. Today, it has been by and large 
acknowledged that development is not purely an economic phenomenon, rather a 
multidimensional process involving the reorganization and reorientation of entire 
social as well as economic system. In particular, technological transfer has come to 
play an increasingly important role in the life of both developed and developing 
countries. 
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The negative consequences of technology transfer from industrialized countries, is 
given particular attention in the literature. A leading role has been played by 
Schumacher's publication, "small is beautiful". Schumacher argues that: 
many western technologies are inappropriate to local conditions in developing 
countries 
2. there is a huge imbalance in technology trade between richer and poorer 
countries 
3. technology transfer has reinforced dependencies of all kinds 
4. the values of less developed countries -are being manipulated and people are 
being mobilized to support goals re-imposed from the external metropolitan 
economies of industrialized countries. 5 
Intermediate technology is supposed to be appropriate for local conditions in less 
developed countries and regions, and to meet certain criteria, e. g., being easy to 
access, easy to learn, and being suitable for small scale regional or district 
production with local resource supplies. Technology transfer appears to provide a 
promising model of technological development in development countries, by 
encouraging indigenous technological capabilities. 
2.1.1 Definition of technology 
Analysts have defined the term, technology, in various ways. Baranson 
conceptualised technology in the following terms "... Industrial technology consists 
of product designs, production techniques and managerial systems to organise and 
carry out production plans". 6 
Peno and Wallender, by contrast, define technology as "... knowledge embodied in 
products, processes, formulae and techniques needed for managing operations". 7 
Hall and Johnson distinguish not only between product-embodied, process- 
embodied and person-embodied technologies, but also between general-, system- 
and company- specific technologies. The United Nation Conference on Trade and 
Development, UNCTAD, also provides a comprehensive description of technology. 
According to UNCTAD, technology "as an essential input to production" is bought 
and sold as capital goods, human labour and information of technical and 
commercial character. 8 The UNCTAD study also suggests the following as elements 
of technology: 
feasibility studies, market surveys and other pre-investment services 
determination of the range of technologies and the choice of technology 
industrial processes 
engineering designs and detailed engineering 
plant construction and installation 
training of technical and managerial personnel 
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" management and operation of production facilities 
" marketing information 
" improvements to processes and product designs. 
There is some disagreement over the meaning of the term 'technique. In most 
cases, it denotes only the material aspects of technology-, that is the machinery, 
equipment and tools that are used by human beings in the production process. As 
for the term 'technology', it includes such non-materialistic aspects as technical 
knowledge, management and work organisation. For the purposes of this study, the 
term technology denotes both the material and non-material aspects. Thus, it may be 
argued that technology is the method of doing things. However, to use any definition 
of technique, three factors must be present: 
information about the technique 
ways and means to implement the technique, and 
understanding how the technique works. 
Information and implementation flows and methods can be transferred. However, 
understanding technology may only be . acquired by training, education, 
experimentation, research and previous experience. There are two approaches to 
technology transfer: vertical and horizontal transfer. Vertical technology transfer is 
transference from general to specialised levels or transference from the scientific 
level to the final product form. Horizontal technology transfer is transference from 
one country to another, or from one application to another, e. g. uses of warfare 
technology to the civilian sector. There are many forms of horizontal technology 
transfer, including the following: 
licensing agreements to use patents or trade marks 
know-how agreements 
technical cooperation agreements 
importation of machinery, equipment and primary and intermediate materials 
agreements 
training of personnel to raise their skill levels and efficiency. 
Moreover, there is a close relationship between science and technology, 
particularly in the field of development. On the one hand, science provides the 
required basic knowledge to understand the origins and dynamics bf the problems, 
measure their strength and direction and find out solutions. Technology, on the other 
hand, is the applied science that depends on scientific knowledge and that provides 
the scientific means for tackling the problems and implementing the results. 
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2.1.2 Technology transfer objectives 
The main objectives of technology transfer may be summarised as follows: 
1. Productive capacity: the capacity to operate a particular technology 
2. Investment capacity: the capacity to establish new production units and to 
expand existing ones 
3. Innovation capacity: the ability to develop new techniques to achieve certain 
objectives. 
It should be noted, however, that importation of technology does not imply the 
immediate availability of production capacity. To make use of it, therefore, the local 
population must take part in the process by trying to understand the technology, 
identify how it works and adopt the scientific and practical methods it uses. Thus 
local people will be able to improve productivity and adapt the technology to the 
changing conditions. Gill Wilkins noted that technology transfer should assist local 
people in developing the skills to choose appropriate technology, adapt it to local 
conditions and service requirements and integrate it with existing indigenous 
technology. 9 
Productive capacity influences investment and innovation capacity. For example, 
production engineers might acquire engineering and spare parts manufacturing 
experience. In addition, they might also acquire the ability to adapt the technology 
because of knowledge in maintenance of machinery and solving production 
bottlenecks. However, this type of experience is usually not enough to acquire the 
ability to design new production units or invent new technology. Such experience is 
acquired in specialised scientific and technological institutions and machinery and 
equipment plants. Moreover, the increase in local productive capacity in a particular 
field will lead to the development of other sectors and industries, and could result in 
the establishment -of specialised ipstitutions for the transfer and development of 
technology. 
2.2 Process of technology transfer 
Possession of technological capability and the absorption of the appropriate 
technology necessitates the setting of programmes and activities and the gathering of 
available technological information and analyses in order to utilise it within the 
following frames: 
development of existing production techniques in general and those used in the 
military activities field in particular 
preparation of the system and terms of receiving and amending imported 
production techniques and selecting the most suitable to achieve national 
development objectives 
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" formation and development of national centres and offices for research, 
feasibility studies, engineering design and consultancies 
" setting of programmes that guarantee the minimum limit of industrial structure 
as a basis for joint industrial efforts 
" setting of programmes for new industries to serve other industries, based on 
industrial integration 
9 contribiltion in providing technological independence 
Coordination of the manufacturing programmes with technology selection 
programmes and human resources programmers. 10 
Saudi Arabia has exerted efforts to accelerate the economic development process, 
and such efforts have comprised the growth of a number of elements that directly or 
indirectly contribute in developing local technological capability. This has resulted 
in spreading education by preparing enough numbers of specialists, especially in 
higher education, for scientific research, organisations building productive units in 
different economic active sectors, setting basic structures, as well as the provision of 
services with differing grades of success in developing appropriate technological 
self-capabilities. 
Thus technology transfer is a complex process comprising distinct components 
and a multitude of attributes. It is, furthermore, a relationship not only between 
various elements (human beings, machines, and rules), but also between the supplier 
and recipient. There are several important steps to be followed: 
Policy decision: government should be committed to establishing local technology 
and such decisions should be taken with full awareness of requirements and the 
resulting rational change in all aspects 
Provision of necessary resources: once the decision is taken and priorities are 
defined, a detailed study should be carried out in order to define the necessary 
resources and make it available in reasonable time 
Direction of information: information is the most effective means in directing people 
and technology conduct 
Direction of education: expenditure on education should be given high priority. The 
objective of education is to create individuals who are acquainted with all fields, 
such as social sciences, mathematics, science, engineering and technical skills 
Supporting scientific research: scientific research as an application of that known 
which needs research and eiverimentiriR 
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Transfer of science and knowledge: science and knowledge is not only transferred 
from outside the country borders only but also from inside, i. e., from universities, 
research centres, industry as well as between different institutions 
Training: ca abilities of the society and the capacity to innovate and decrease 
dependency. ' 
The forms, objectives and features of technology transfer are shown in Table 2.1, 
below. 
Table 2.1 Forms, objectives and features of technology transfer 
Forms Objectives Features 
Within the company Technology production Monopoly of technology 
ownership by parent company 
Enhancing the competitiveness Risk of weakening monopoly 
of affiliates power of parent company 
Intercompany Royalty gains Technology markets 
Direct technology transfer Licences 
Utilising outside elements Least degree of transfer effect 
Utilising supplementary assets Technology transfer through 
contact with others 
Exchange licenses, cooperative 
R&D and joint ownership of 
technologies 
Operation and maintenance 
and exchange of 
supplementary assets and 
professions through joint 
venture companies, etc 
Within the government Technological assistance Political aims 
Technology joint development Joint use of technologies 
and uses allocated to public good 
Human resources development 
The technological success of newly industrialized countries, notably Hong Kong, 
Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan has attracted the attention of scholars from a 
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variety of backgrounds. 12 Interpretations drawn from these countries' experiences 
are often highly controversial. For instance, classical economists see their laissez faire model in the successes of Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore; 
others attribute this to the role of government intervention. 13 
It is commonly recognized that governments in Taiwan, South Korea and 
Singapore have played a substantial role in provision of macroeconomic policies and infrastructure, such as directing capital investment and technological development, 
issuing restrictions on imports for industrial promotion, etc. The market is guided by 
the long term national plans for investment and industrial development formulated 
by government officials; the content and pace of industrialization is not left entirely 
to the aggregate decisions of individual businessmen. 14 The extent of government 
intervention at the industry level varies according to perceived necessity. Some 
industries have accordingly been highly subsidized and directed by the government, 
others have experienced policy intervention only intermittently, the rest have been 
more or less left to take care of themselves within a broad framework of 
regulation. 's One of the main areas of debate among different schools concerns 
whether these interventions have played a positive role in economic development in 
these countries. 
East Asian countries attach considerable importance to the accumulation of 
technological capabilities. Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan have 
attained technological competencies in such areas as consumer electronics, semi- 
conductors along with a range of manufacturing technologies in traditional industrial 
sectors. Moreover, in this process, these experiences show the feasibility and indeed 
necessity for dual technological development, transferring advanced technologies 
from developed countries on the one hand and facilitating the adaptation of foreign 
technologies into local conditions on the other. 
The success of East Asian countries invites detailed research on the contribution of 
technological dynamism of national institutional structures and strategies (and how 
these have changed over time). In these countries, industrial policies of import 
substitution and export orientation are not contradictory-, both have been applied in 
the process of industrialization. It is commonly recognized, for instance, that South 
Korea, Singapore and Taiwan began their industrialization drive with high levels of 
protectionism, and gradually became more export-oriented. 16 
An important observation from the studies of the East Asian countries' 
development experiences concerns the uniqueness of the development process in 
individual countries, reflecting their specific characteristics in terms of cultural, 
economic and political development. East Asian countries shifts the focus of 
development studies from generalized issues to more specific ones, such as the role 
of state and government policies on industrialisation, foreign trade, and science and 
technology. 
More importantly, this new shift suggests that contemporary technology transfer 
can effectively promote economic development in developing countries. For Saudi 
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Arabia, it is tempting to try to follow the experiences of East Asian countries in 
achieving technological development and economic growth. 
2.3 Vehicles of technology transfer 
Technology may be transferred between two or more countries through 
international organisations. Technology transfer can be performed in a commercial 
or non-commercial exchange between the private and public sectors. Technology 
transfer channels include licensing, direct foreign investment, commodity 
reciprocity and strategic alliances. Likewise, technology transfer can be performed 
within the company or through mutual transfers between companies and the 
government. 
Technology transfers are diverse due to the fact that technology is not merchandise 
to be sold and purchased in the market. Technology comprises a mixture of material 
and conceptual elements that cannot be separated. Several mechanisms exist for 
transferring technology; namely: 
foreign investment 
technical cooperation agreements 
Economic offset programmes 
licensing agreements 
international subcontracting 
joint ventures 
research and development cooperation 
2.3.1 Foreign investment 
According to Jose de Cubas, the foreign investment package, in most circumstances, 
is the most effective and cheapest way for technology to be transferred. 17 Foreign 
investment, by definition, implies ownership of capital by the foreign firm and the 
power to exercise control over operations of the entity in which such investment 
takes place. It is different from portfolio investment, as the latter involves only the 
acquisition of foreign securities by individuals or institutions without any control 
over or participation in management of the companies concerned. The most clear-cut 
case of foreign investment occurs where a firm sets up wholly-owned subsidiaries or 
affiliates abroad, where the operating control and usually the majority ownership of 
capital rests in the hands of the foreign firm. These subsidiaries may be established 
by the take-over of existing local firms or they may take the form of new green field 
ventures. These subsidiaries need not be wholly foreign-owned. Foreign investment 
may involve a joint venture agreement where a foreign based firm has a majority 
share, an equal share, or even a minority share, in the ownership of the enterprise 
abroad; the important requirement, as noted earlier, is that the foreign company has 
operating control. 
Vernon noted several reasons why firms established subsidiaries abroad. 18 A 
subsidiary may be established as a meaningful business unit within the multinational 
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system. However, a subsidiary may also be established to facilitate a learning 
process from which the system as a whole hopes eventually to profit. Other 
subsidiaries may be responsible for a data accumulating process intended to protect 
the system from risk. Some subsidiaries exist to reduce the system's tax burden. As 
Caves has noted, foreign investment and the multinational firm are often identified 
with each other. 19 
Another way of viewing a multinational enterprise, is as an economic institution 
that owns, in whole or in part, controls and manages income-generating assets in 
more than one country. In doing so, it engages in international production as a bY- 
product of the imperfections in goods and factor markets across the globe. In a 
perfect market, no advantages can accrue to the prospective enterprise. However, 
normally MNCs possess some advantages enabling them to produce and compete 
successfully in an unfamiliar foreign environment. Theorists have suggested 
numerous ownership-specific advantages deriving from possession of technology 
and marketing skills, market structure and behaviour, and location-specific factors 
like trade barriers and host government policies. Several authors have noted the 
different kinds of enterprises and associated forms of foreign investment. For 
example Caves grouped foreign investment into the following categories: 
horizontally integrated enterprises, which are multi-plant firms that have 
established plants in different countries to produce the same or similar goods. 
Teece noted that the horizontal kind of investment directed at producing goods 
and services abroad, constitutes a significant portion of the world's stock of 
investment. 20 Horizontal enterprises internalise markets for intangible assets 
(covering the knowledge that represents new products, processes, proprietary 
technology and the like). The reasons behind such investment may include the 
following: 
possession of an intangible asset such as technology on which the multinational 
firm can extract the maximum rent through foreign production rather than 
licensing technology to some foreign producer 
high tariffs protecting national markets and/or supporting exchange rates may 
make production more desirable for the asset-holding firm than producing at its 
base location and servicing foreign markets through exporting 
vertically integrated enterprises - which are international multi-plant enterprises, 
producing outputs in some plants and supplying inputs to other plants. Vertical 
integration is an efficient method of achieving supply reliability of intennediate 
products 
An international multi-plant firm whose outputs are neither horizontally nor 
vertically integrated is termed a conglomerate. The effectiveness of foreign 
investment as a mechanism of technology transfer and by implication, its role in the 
development process, has, long attracted attention. For instance, Lewis and Caves 
have argued that the benefits of foreign investment include the generation of exports 
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and foreign exch rp, e, tax revenues, employment, accumulated capital and 
entrepreneurial skills. 1 But transferred technology can have benefits of various sorts 
to the recipient countries, including the reduction of product costs and processes. 
There are also negatives associated with foreign investment. One possible downside 
is that multinational companies may transfer inappropriate technologies. 
Should production on host country territory be equated with transfer of 
technology, capital and management to the host country? This question reflects the 
effect - of firm-entry on technological capabilities. Even if it is expected that 
enterprises transfer the best production technology, they do not necessarily transfer 
the capability to generate new technology to their affiliates. In some cases, they 
transfer know-how (production engineering) but not know-why (basic design, 
research and development). National companies that are subsidiary to foreign 
companies depend on technology presented by the central organisation for research 
and development. Research and development activities performed by the subsidiary 
companies are considered as extremely limited if not absent. Research and 
development activities necessitate only limited adaptation of products to suit the 
local conditions such as the climate, transmission network and certain usage. 
2.3.2 Technical cooperation agreements 
A technical co-operation agreement'is a generic term encompassing a wide variety 
of contractual agreements between a foreign firm and a local firm for effecting 
technology transfer. These might include the following: 
Technical assistance agreements 
These are agreements between a foreign firm and an entity created under local law 
and owned by local public or private interests, in which the foreign firm provides 
management services, technical information, or both, and receives payment in 
money. As later chapters will reveal, these agreements are widely used to transfer 
technology to the KSA. 
0 Management contracts 
These are arrangements under which operational control of an enterprise is vested by 
contract in a separate enterprise. This latter enterprise performs the necessary 
managerial functions in return for a fee. Management contracts emphasise the 
increasing importance of services and know-how in international trade. The know- 
how transferred under such contracts usually involves the training of personnel. A 
crucial distinction may be drawn between a technical services agreement and a 
management contract: the former presupposes the presence of a functioning 
enterprise at the recipient's end, whereas the latter creates and maintains it. 
Although training of Saudi personnel by foreign experts is quite common, these 
'training schemes' may or may not be part of the management contracts. 
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2.3.3 Turnkey operations (production in-hand method) 
A turnkey operation involves the construction under contract of a project up to the 
point of operation, at which point it is turned over to the customer. The contractor, 
usually a manufacturer of some segment of the project equipment, undertakes full 
responsibility not only for providing the equipment, but also engineering and even 
project financing, as well as arranging the supply of complementary equipment, 
ensuring successful operation as a whole upon completion. The contractor also 
undertakes to provide the corporate skills required by the customer to operate and 
. maintain the system following its completion. In such cases the foreign party not 
only builds the plant but also commissions it to the point of commercial operation. 
The contractor also provides technical experts, administrators and all other required 
manpower. 
2.3.4 Direct purchasing of technology 
Here, the technology transferee company will bear the full cost of the project 
together with the management of the operations relating to design, supply, 
installation and operation. The host firm will select the consultative direction and 
will assume responsibility of the supply and installation of machines and equipment. 
This form of technology is characterised by the local firm's ability to choose 
technologies that are compatible with the development strategy and also its direct 
participation in most of the operations that are necessary for establishing new 
projects. According to this form, the local firm could ask for the help of a consultant 
expert to advise the best way of taking decisions about the proposed choices. 
2.3.5 Economic offset programme 
Saudi Arabia is trying to maximise the benefits associated with defence offsets, and 
the Kingdom's large volume of arms purchases have provided it with a wealth of 
opportunities in this area. The Saudi government is aware of the value of defence 
contracts to Western arms vendors and has exploited this leverage to a measured 
extent by extracting offset investment compensation. The Saudi approach to offsets 
has several novel features. The Saudi government views defence-offset agreements 
as partnerships in which business entrepreneurs, not the Saudi Government, should 
be the driving force behind viable offset investment activity. The authorities view 
offsets as a way of achieving economic diversification, particularly in high 
technology fields exhibiting long-term business potential. Saudi Arabia has always 
measuredthe value of offset arrangements in terms of the long-term partnership 
which can be built: a standpoint stemming from the recognition that offsets act as a 
driver of industrial and technological development. However, Saudi - 
offset 
programmes do not follow a conventional format since they reflect neither the 
dictate of government nor provide business with the prospect of guaranteed 
government purchases. Instead, the thrust of offset policy is to foster economic 
diversification by nurturing private sector joint venture projects in the civil and 
defence sectors. The authorities believe that this policy will stimulate industrial 
linkages and lead to further investment outside the formal offset structure. The 
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importance of offset programmes to Saudi Arabia is evident from the following two 
statements. The first is from HRH Prince Sultan Bin Abdulaziz, 2nd Deputy 
Premier, Minister of Defence and Aviation, who stated: 
"The Saudi economic offset programme is an important cornerstone for the 
future industrial development of Saudi Arabia. It creates additional 
investment opportunities for the private sector and employment opportunities 
for university and technical institute graduate". 22 
The second statement is an excerpt from the Ministerial Committee 
recommendations, which state that: 
"The economic offset programme has strategic significance for achieving 
Saudi Arabia's industrialization objectives. These objectives necessitate 
expanding the programme to include major civil contracts in technology- 
oriented sectors as well as defence. Government agencies should implement 
procedures to ensure the programme achieves its goals". 23 
The Saudi offset objectives are ambitious, but not out of line with the goals of 
other countries' offset guidelines. The Saudi economic offset programme objectives 
are: 
industrial diversification 
employment growth 
technology transfer 
private sector growth 
import substitution 
utilisation of local raw materials 
To achieve these objectives, establishment of profitable joint ventures between 
foreign and Saudi companies are encouraged and facilitated to diversify the 
economy and provide local investment and employment opportunities. Approved 
projects enjoy substantial investment incentives and support from senior government 
representatives. However, 'diversified' offset projects are more likely to cover risky 
ventures rather than straightforward business ventures, which would probably 
already have been implemented. Also export prospects can only be a long-term 
goal, once the more immediate competitiveness issues have been addressed. While 
offset ventures may provide access to modem technology, this will act against the 
creation of substantial amounts of Saudi jobs (indeed even older technology will not 
create jobs for Saudis, as these will probably fall to foreign workers from the Asia- 
Pacific region). 
Despite all the hopes and apparent opportunities for progress, defence offsets in 
Saudi Arabia have followed a slow and tortuous path. The pedestrian progress in the 
formation of joint venture offset commit 
, 
tees (JVOCs) stems from a number of 
factors. In reviewing the performance of Saudi Offset programmes, Ron Matthews 
emphasises that "... in line with the offset programme requirements seeking to 
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combine local Saudi interests with the broader principles of economic development, 
the acceptable offset ventures should: facilitate the inward transfer of technology, 
make good use of Saudi national resources; provide appropriate training for Saudi 
staff; support short-term import substitution and long-term export promotion in the 
manufacturing sector; and stimulate growth-promoting linkages with existing Saudi 
industries. 24 Viewed from almost any angle, defence offsets have had only a 
marginal impact on the development of the Saudi nation. To date, Peace Shield is 
the only offset programme, which has achieved its offset target. Any assessment of 
the impact of offsets must go beyond a simple accounting approach. It should 
address also the effects of inward investment on the recipient's development. For 
offset projects to support Saudi Arabia's economy, not only should the JVOCs 
employ significant numbers of Saudis but they should lie within strategic industrial 
sectors. It is at this point that Peace Shield's apparent success becomes questionable: 
Of the approximately 1,400 jobs created so far only around 300 are held by 
Saudi nationals and of the existing JVOCs only AEC seems to be taking the 
issue of Saudization seriously. 25 
Saudi offset policy has a training policy aimed at developing the skills of Saudi 
nationals and management policies designed to help some Saudi nationals to become 
competent managers in the Western mould. Offset commitments of American, 
British, and French companies, including Hughes Aircraft, Lucent Technologies, 
Boeing, British Aerospace, McDonnell Douglas, General Electric, General 
Dynamics, United Technologies, and Thomson-CSF are among the key participants. 
The 1997 expansion of the EOP to include major civil as well as defence contracts 
has dramatically increased its size and breadth. Additional joint ventures involving 
power, desalination, health care, communications and other government civil 
contracts are emerging. Enhanced Saudi government emphasis on compliance with 
offset commitments is accelerating the pace of venture development. Greater 
flexibility, innovation, and commercialisation are characterising the offset process. 
The Saudi Offset Limited Partnership (SOLP) is an example of this increased 
innovation and commercialisation. This dynamic development vehicle identifies, 
develops, finances, and implements profitable business ventures satisfying offset 
investment obligations. The SOLP combines the structure of a venture capital 
limited partnership with the operating methodology of a merchant bank. Offset 
contractors of all nationalities may invest in this partnership, which is managed by 
Dev Corporation International LLC as the general partner. 
2.3.6 Licensing agreement 
This is the most common of technology transfer vehicle, in which the receiver 
country will have the right to use the patent registered with its owner company in 
manufacturing certain merchandise. The license could be obtained against certain 
fees or as part of a complete deal or contract. Contractor has described licensing 
agreements as "... agreenients which call for the transfer of patent and trademark 
rights from the licensor (supplier) to the licensee (recipient) on either an exclusive or 
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non exclusive basis, or otherwise limited in various ways to reflect the territorial and 
marketing strategies of the patent holder in return for an agreed payment". 26 These 
agreements may also involve the transfer of technical know-how, as in Saudi 
industry the policy objective is to reproduce in the licensee firm the complete 
technological capabilities of the licensor. Such agreements will often specify 
separate provisions and payments for know-how. In the case of Saudi industries this 
agreement might take the form of a once-and-for-all transfer or a continuous transfer 
of knowledge depending on the nature and complexity of the operation. There may 
be two broad reasons why a foreign firm is prepared to license abroad. Firstly, to 
substitute for controlled direct foreign investment, if licensing proves to be more 
profitable. In this case, licensing to a non-controlled entity provides an alternative to 
entering foreign production with a controlled investment. Secondly, to gain access to 
technology from other firms through reciprocal grants or licenses. In this case, 
access to other firm's technologies provides an alternative to in-house R&D. From 
the perspective of the technology recipient, there may be a number of reasons why a 
firm may prefer to acquire technology externally through technology licensing rather 
than make it in-house. Sen and Rubenstein have compiled twelve reasons justifying 
such a decision, namely: 
reducing risk in product and process development 
saving resources to develop the technology in-house 
gaining time by increasing the speed of entry into the market 
gaining advanced know-how quickly 
ability for in-house development 
in-house work reaching a stage where it is worthwhile obtaining a license 
up-grading in-house technical skills 
existence of more reliable estimates on probable commercial and technical 
success 
availability of a proven cost saving process 
adoption of industry product standards providing compatibility to the in- 
customer 
house ability better suited to improving existing technology rather than 
creating own know-how. 27 
Licensing of technology is used by some companies as an alternative to direct 
investment, especially in situations where the host government restricts FDI. Most 
of the foreign licensing agreements occur between related organisations. According 
to Frances Stewart, intra-firm agreements accounted for about 82% of US receipts 
from royalties and management fees as far back as 1976 . 
28 Intra-firm licensing is 
often used to enhance control . 
29 In an inter-firm licensing agreement, the licensee 
undertakes capital investment; the licensor simply agrees to provide technology in 
exchange for a fee, which may be in the form of a percentage of sale of the product. 
J. P. Killing provides a distinction between licensing agreements involving 
technology in use at the time of the agreement and that in which, in addition to 
current technology, future developments in the technology are included as part of 
the agreement. 30 
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In his definition, there is a significant difference between these agreements, both 
in cost to the licensee and in the process of technology transfer. In future and current 
technology agreements with Saudi companies, a more efficient and effective transfer 
of information between the licensor and licensee is achieved when compared with 
current technology agreements. However, current and future technology agreements 
are usually more expensive and restrictive. Here, the licensee is prohibited from 
exporting the product especially to the licensor's market. Moreover, such products 
are those that have been long established in the licensor's market. 
According to Blumenthal, licensing is often favoured as a means of technology 
transfer because it allows a company to purchase the required technology without 
implications on foreign ownership. 31 Japanese companies are often cited as a typical 
example, in that they have been able to use licensing agreements to achieve a 
successful technology transfer at a lower cost through isolating and purchasing the 
specific technological component that is required. Some writers have argued that in 
a licensing agreement package, the licensee is more concerned about the 
transformation of technology as rapidly as possible into an efficiently working and 
marketable form. Thus, relevant working knowledge and any associated rights, 
which can help assure the transfer process, are clearly sought. The licensor is more 
concerned about wrapping up the technology information, which may be the basis of 
a transfer in the use of Saudi Arabia, into a secure package which will encompass 
aspects of marketing and managerial know-how as well as marketing rights. In this 
way, the licensor is assured of maintaining its proprietary rights over industrial 
property. Marketability of the package is therefore improved and the basis of income 
generation extended. A licensing agreement package may have the following objects 
incorporated into the agreement: 
patents 
technical know-how 
trademarks 
marketing know-how 
managerial know-how 
designs 
In addition to this list, the package may incorporate new aspects as the relationship 
develops. For instance, exports to the licensee, items such as plant and equipment, 
component parts or even raw materials. 
Patents are an important aspect of a foreign licensing package, although studies by 
Helleiner, Pengulley, Carstains and Welch, reveal that technology recipients find the 
unpatented know-how more useful in the technology transfer process. 32 According 
to Helleiner, patents on their own do not contain sufficient information to permit 
efficient working of licensed technology. 33 However, patents do affect the process of 
technology acquisition and in some ways patents could be beneficial to both licensor 
and licensee. For the licensor, patenting remains the principal means of establishing 
proprietary rights to a firm's technology. Patents enable the licensor to test foreign 
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markets at minimum expense and risk. It may also allow penetration of foreign 
markets obstructed by either high duties or import restrictions. 
The other component of a licensing agreement package is know-how, which 
enables production to occur without repeating many of the leaming costs associated 
with development. In addition, it allows the licensee to get the product to market 
more rapidly through utilisation of managerial and marketing experience and this 
may be incorporated by the licensor into the licensing agreement. Trademarks as 
part of the package may provide market penetration needed by the licensee, because 
the trademark of the licensor may have already received worldwide acclaim. There 
are several constraints, however, in the realisation of technology transfer objectives 
using licensing agreements. Diagnosis of these constraints is often made in the light 
of the technological competence of the recipient licensee, the transfer costs, and 
secrecy of the information exchange process. 
In the case of some industries, it has been noted that foreign li cense agreements 
have possibilities as a medium for technology transfer. 34 This is true only where the 
licensee has achieved a certain level of industrial experience and sophistication, 
local infrastructure is adequate, and available markets are large enough to enable the 
licenser to recoup costs and make profits within a reasonable time. For the 
technology recipient, the first two conditions may be lacking and therefore 
technology transfer using licensing agreements may prove difficult. Contractor 
noted that the importing firm emphasises organisational and production management 
assistance in licensing agreements. 35 Moreover, in a study of Canadian firms 
manufacturing under a licensing agreement, P. J. Killing observed that licensing is 
not a viable long run growth option for firms lacking their own R&D base, and that 
licensing of technology breeds dependence upon the foreign licensor unless the 
licensee uses the knowledge acquired to build up an in-house R&D capacity. 36 
Killing's findings help to strengthen the assertion that there is a need for a sound 
industrial base for successful technology transfer through the licensing route. 
In addition, there may be a range of continuing maintenance costs, which will 
include the cost of updating technical know-how, and other implicit costs, such as 
managerial time spent either during negotiation or consultation after the agreement 
is established. The licensor may not release all information necessary for effective 
evaluation of the technology by the licensee. The licensor may be suspicious that the 
licensee could use the technology without signing the agreement if all information is 
released before the agreement is signed. 
Thomas argues that a major disadvantage of a licensing agreement is that the 
licensed technology may be found to be obsolete or too expensive at an advanced 
stage of the agreement, when down payments may not be recoverable. 37 He also 
contends that accepting a license from one source may forestall access to other 
licensors, and the licensee may have chosen the wrong technology or licenser. 38 
Another danger of licensing agreements is the possibility of unexpected unlicensed 
competition in situations where the licensor's patent is weak. 
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In spite of all the advantages and constraints of licensing agreements, the increasing 
complexity of its packaging, and a more demanding technology transfer process, 
Welch insists that foreign licensing agreements enable effective technology 
acquisition if the parties involved, i. e. licensee and licensor, can establish more 
interaction and information exchange in the short run as well as the long run. 39 This 
strategy would require a high degree of commitment by both parties, particularly the 
licensor. 
2.3.7 International sub-contracting 
This usually involves a firm that has contracts with one or more others to assemble 
Ii th or manufacture parts. Firrns may establish linkages with local sUPP ier f rms bo 
because of business considerations and government regulations. Business 
considerations include evaluation of potential costs of vertical integration against 
supposed benefits. Vertical integration may be an expensive way to acquire most 
commodity products but may be cheaper for some specialty products. 
Thus the multinational firm might create linkages with local supplier firms to 
procure complementary but technologically dissimilar products. Backward linkages 
may be categorised into three distinct stages, the: 
decision to make or buy, i. e. whether a specific item is made by the firm or 
purchased from an independent supplier will depend on whether transaction 
costs are lower than internalisation costs 
decision 
, 
to procure locally and give rise to the possibility of local linkage or 
import and the creation of national and international linkages 
linkage decision, i. e. what form of direct relationship has to be established with a 
supplier to overcome the deficiencies of pure market relationships. 
Subcontracting, by definition, is an interrelationship between enterprises to 
provide not only an outlet to production by the suppliers, but also to establish a 
relationship between linked enterprises whereby long-term contracts are entered 
into, product information is exchanged, prices are negotiated, technology shared and 
other forms of assistance made possible. The term subcontracting may be used to 
encompass all purchases including the processing of parts and materials undertaken 
by one firm for another, but excluding the purchase made off-the-shelf, or those 
purchases'of raw materials where no specifications are laid down. It is deficiencies 
in the market mechanisms with regard to inter-industry requirements that induce 
firms to deal directly with each other in what are referred to as extra-market 
relationships. These relationships can extend from simple information exchanges via 
collaborative informa tion, planning, technical arrangements, to more dominant 
relationships where one firm virtually controls the linked enterprise without owning 
it. The common types of linkages may be noted as follows: 
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" informational: this involves exchange of information on demand, future 
investment and market conditions 
" technical: this involves assistance given/received on innovation and product 
design, process know-how, production costs, quality control, training, testing 
and tooling 
" financial: this involves loans on terms, grants, special prices or allowances 
" procurement: this involves help in purchasing of materials 
" location: this involves advice to suppliers to set up a plant in the country or 
location 
Managerial: this involves advice on better financial, accounting, inventory and 
other control procedures 
Pricing: this covers contractual and bargaining procedures for deciding on prices 
other: these may involve, for example, sales to other parties or on the open 
market, policies for diversification, assistance in exporting. 
Subcontracting is one of the channels through which technology is transferred to 
Saudi industries. Several forms of backward linkages have been used between 
affiliates operating in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and supplier firms. The benefits 
of the various types of linkages established in a sub-contracting relationship are 
summarised in Figure 2.2 below. 
FigUre 2.2 Common types of enterprise linkages ft 
Supplier Enterprise Lead Enterprise Economy level 
This has linkages with a buyer, who The benefits to the lead The benefits to the 
can receive several benefits from enterprise in setting up economy as a whole from 
the relationship, depending on its linkages with suppliers the establishment of a 
relative size and specialisation, depend on whether the wide network of inter- 
information flows enabling it to linked enterprise can enterprise linkages arise 
plan current activity and longer- supply a given product at from the stimulus given to 
term investment, technical a lower cost than if the the investment, the 
assistance to improve its products lead enterprise produces it increased diffusion of 
and processes, introduce new itself. This can be the case technology and skills, the 
technology train its staff, achieve a when the linked enterprise savings inherent in better 
higher degree of specialisation and pays lower wages, is more planning, the more 
lower its costs, and enhanced specialised, has lower economical use of capital 
financial assistance terms overheads or is more and labour, and a well- 
improving its profitability and so flexible to fluctuations in balanced pattern of 
on. demand. growth of small versus 
large plants. 
2.3.8 Joint ventures 
The term joint venture has been explained in different ways by different sources. 
In industrial economics, joint ventures are commonly understood as operations 
where a legally independent and autonomously managed enterprise is set up by two 
or more partners to run a clearly defined set of activities in the common interests of 
the founding firms. Some earlier definitions ofjoint ventures are also in similar vein. 
One source puts it as ". .. a joint venture where there is a commitment for more than 
a short duration, of funds, facilities and services by two or more legally separate 
interests, to an enterprise for their mutual benefit". 40 
In one UNCTAD report, joint ventures are defined as all forms of agreements 
through which the operations of two or more firms are partially, but not fully, 
functionally integrated in order to carry out activities in one or more areas: buying or 
selling, natural resources exploration, development and/or production operation 
manufacturing, R&D engineering and construction. 41 This wide definition, 
encompasses, in reality, a series of agreements such as none-equity co-operation 
research agreements, technology sharing agreements, and customer-supplier 
agreements including the following forms of firm agreements underjoint venture: 
joint-equity-venture 
comprehensive R&D, manufacturing and marketing consortia 
university-based co-operation research projects 
government-industry co-operative national and international projects 
research corporations 
agreements involving the use of corporate venture capital which are used by 
large firms to identify innovative processes within smaller organisations 
non-equity co-operative research agreements. 
Defined by the United Nations, joint venture is a broad term designating an 
association between companies usually through a joint subsidiary company 
involving to varying degrees co-management, co-ownership of capital and sharing 
of I profits and risks. 42 When no co-ownership is involved, joint ventures are 
sometimes referred to as contractual joint ventures. In a joint venture agreement 
involving a corporation and a local partner, the local partner essentially provides 
part of the capital in the form of an equity share. The capital share provided by the 
joint venture may have associated with it, advantages similar to those offered 
through direct foreign investment. 
Whilst admitting to the complex and probably difficult utilisation of joint venture, 
its advocates argue that JVs are the linking bridge between business organisations, 
which have reached a mature stage of technical competence, and those with lower 
levels of technology, or between those who have marketing resources, business 
expertise and financial muscle, and the innovators. 43 There exist a number of 
advantages that will accrue to partners by going into joint ventures. In the case of 
Saudi firms, these advantages include improved: 
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" local market potential 
" penetration of the market by utilising the domestic partner's knowledge and 
local customer service and local market capability 
" customer appeal and greater sales for the patented product since the JV would 
build up an identity as a domestic producer 
" sales to third-country markets to which it has limited access. 
Unlike a licensing agreement, an executive of the technology-supplying firm may be 
on the board of directors of the joint venture. This way, access to technical 
information from the parent company in the case of a subsidiary as a partner can be 
retrieved with relative ease. In a licensing agreement, there is no such advantage to 
the licensee. Advocates of technology transfer through joint ventures further argue 
that joint ventures marry together basic needs of both partners and establishes a joint 
commitment to change the working environment. The expertise of the technology 
supplier, preplanning, mutual support and understanding between the partners in a 
joint venture, assists in the technology acquisition process. 
There are a number of ways in which a joint venture may be established. P. J. Killing 
has suggested two types of joint ventures, for ensuring successful technology 
transfer: 
one type is the 'dominant parent joint venture', in which the local partner may 
have the majority equity share, while the technology supplying firm is the 
passive partner 
the other type of joint venture is where the partners enter into a shared 
management venture, where both the local partner and the foreign firm have a 
say in the management of the venture. 44 
In the dominant parent venture, where the local partner has more control, Killing 
notes that the cost of transferring the technology may be higher compared to the 
other type, because here, equity is given in exchange for the technology. 45 However, 
the commitment on the part of the technology supplier may be considerably higher 
in the dominant parent JV. In a shared management venture, even though there are 
more tendencies towards failure, Killing further observes that the prospects for 
personnel transfer from the technology supplier and effective technology transfer is 
questionable. Unlike with a dominant parent, the control of the venture by the local 
partner in a shared management venture may be substantially limited. According to 
Gurprit the dominant parent joint venture type is common. 46 The equity share may 
even be on a 50: 50 basis. However, the exact distribution of shares may be 
determined by each partner's contribution in the areas of technology, capital, 
machinery, managerial skills and the host government's policies on foreign 
investments. 
Several constraints may interfere with effective use of the joint venture as a medium 
for technology transfer. Dependency theorists have argued that because of the need 
to provide continuing technical assistance, foreign firms, can have managerial 
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leverage, which enables them to have explicit control by placing people in key 
managerial positions. This enables the joint venture to relate operationally to the 
foreign partner and can integrate their objectives into the JV's activities. Further 
criticism highlights the possibility of the foreign partner creating avenues for adding 
costs to the local partner through inflated transfer prices, or royalties for a licensed 
technology, of which the parent firm of the subsidiary partner has proprietary rights 
and management fees. Also, in certain situations, especially where the venture is for 
a relatively short period (3-5 years), the foreign partner may not have commitment 
in providing the technology. This criticism often emanates from those who see 
foreign partner firms as putting profit maximisation as the primary objective in any 
venture. As joint holders of the equity, the local company shares in the monopoly 
rent without having to incur any costs or risks in generating the technology 
embodied in the business venture. This may be an area of potential conflict since the 
foreign partner may have problems convincing the local company to buy the 
technology at a fair price. Another possible problem in joint venturing, according to 
J. S. Parker, is that decisions on production, sales and probably technology in use in 
the venture may not be taken at the local subsidiary partner level and the local 
partner may feel grieved at its lack of authority in these areas. 47 
2.3.9 Research and development cooperation 
Another aspect of technology transfer is the establishment of offshore R&D centres 
by partners. Although the economics of R&D location dictate that basic design and 
development work by firms be highly centralised in the home country, they do 
perform R&D in host countries. Further, global R&D outlays of multinationals are 
positively linked to the extent to which foreign markets are served by their 
subsidiary's local production. According to Ronstadt -a number Of US 
multinationals have established different types of R&D units abroad; both for the 
adaptation of existing technology and the generation of new knowledge. 48 These 
units specialise in: 
technology transfer 
indigenous technology 
global technology 
corporate technology 
There has also been a growing tendency among enterprises to place R&D facilities 
in the industrially advanced countries, and technology development within a 
subsidiary is often identified by its performance in R&D. In industry, technology 
development may be simplified into the following categories: 
Know-how, including assimilation, operation management, quality control, 
improved plant layout, and production practices 
Know-why, involving understanding of the underlying process and product 
technologies, leading to adaptation, improvement, and even replacement by new 
products and processes 
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Applied research, involving application of given scientific knowledge to the process 
of commercial innovation 
Basic research, comprising the ability to undertake basic scientific research, pushing 
back the frontiers of knowledge without regard to specific commercial application. 49 
The relationship of foreign affiliates and local firms is two-fold: firstly, local firms 
which supply inputs to the affiliates and, secondly, local firrns that compete with 
affiliates in their product market. As far as the former group of firms [supplier firms] 
is concerned, enterprises may transfer technology [skill, know-how, product designJ 
to supplier firms by establishing backward linkages. These basic propensities to 
create linkages remain more or less the same from company to company. 
As far as competing firms are concerned, the debate is conducted at a more general 
level. Competition from technologically efficient foreign firms induces local firms 
to improve their own technology, and the presence of affiliates lead to more rapid 
diffusion of technology by imitation and contagion. On the other hand, a strong 
company presence inhibits local firms from understanding risky and costly research 
activity. The two apparently contradictory views can be reconciled: local firms may 
well be induced to upgrade production technology by a much greater reliance on 
technology licensing when faced with competition with frontier technologies, and in 
the process independent know-how development may suffer. A strong company 
presence may be associated with better local know-how and shallower local know- 
why. 
2.4 Technology transfer vehicles: a comparative evaluation 
In this section, it is useful to focus on comparisons between the various modes of 
technology transfer. Comparison will be between direct investment and technology 
licensing and between technology licensing and joint ventures. 
2.4.1 Licensing agreement Vs direct investment 
As Caves has argued "... if the foreign firm holding licensable intangible assets 
could negotiate licensing terms to extract the local firms entire rent, it would always 
license and never choose direct investment". 50 He has further noted several 
empirical studies especially that of Baranson which have examined the factors 
governing the choice between licensing and foreign investment. These studies 
suggest that companies do contemplate direct investment and licensing as direct 
alternatives, preferring direct investment for its greater rent-extracting potential, 
51 turning to licensing only if that potential cannot be realised. 
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From the perspective of a recipient company the following factors emerge: 
Licensing is encouraged: 
- when entry barriers deter the firm from direct investment 
- when the licensor lacks assets needed for investment 
- because the time required licensing an established producer is less than to 
start a subsidiary from scratch 
- by possibilities of reciprocity and co-operation 
- where there is risk of expropriation. 
Licensing is discouraged: 
- when licenses are difficult to arrange 
- if the opportunity cost of capital is higher in the recipient country than in 
the country of the potential licenser 
- where the relevant knowledge is subject to much lower transfer costs 
within the enterprise than between independent firms 
- when the risk of leakage of a technology into the hands of competitors 
deters a firm from licensing its core technology 
- where government regulations forced them to choose between licensing 
and joint ventures. 52 
From the perspective of a local firm, recipient acquisition of the technological 
element through a licensing agreement may appear a tempting prospect. it provides 
cheaper technology, not only under the control of the supplier but also more 
amenable to local adaptation and subsequent development. However, this analysis is 
valid only in certain circumstances. In industries, with relatively stable and mature 
technologies, the local firm with some industrial experience may do better by 
licensing the needed technology. In more complex areas of industry, however, the 
cost advantage of obtaining licensed technologies is not so obvious for several 
reasons: 
* some leading-edge technologies are simply not available on license 
transfer may be less efficient, slower and less continuous under a series of licensing 
agreements than with an affiliate 
a licensee may be subjected to greater restrictive business practices than a 
subsidiary, simply because a parent company appropriates a greater proportion of 
profits in the latter case than the former. 53 
2.4.2 Licensing agreement Vs joint venture 
It is easy enough to transfer hardware-blueprints, specifications, price lists, product 
samples but much harder to ensure transmission of the intangible know-how, which 
is in the minds of those who use the hardware. Effective transfer of know-how 
37 
requires a strong personal relationship between sender and receiver. The strength of 
the relationship between sender and receiver are two functions of the amount of 
contact between personnel of the two firms, and the degree of commitment on the 
part of the technology-supplying firm to ensure that real learning takes place. Both 
of these factors, contact time between the firms and the level of supplier 
commitment, will be a function of the type of licensing agreement or joint venture 
chosen. In this discussion, the licensing agreement may be classified into: 
current technology agreements, which gives the licensee access only to 
technology that is in existence at the time the license agreement is signed 
cur-rent and future technology agreements which states that new development 
work is done by the licensor in a specified product area during the life of the 
agreement as well as current technology which be transferred to the licensee. 54 
It is apparent that this latter category offers a much greater contact between licensor 
and licensee, as meetings between personnel from each firm may take place over a 
number of years, in contrast to the one time contact of the former agreement. Joint 
ventures may also be categorised into the majority joint venture in which the 
technology dependent firm owns 70% or more of the voting stock and the 50-55 
percent joint venture in which the technology dependent firm owns 50% to 55% of 
the joint company. In general, there may be more motivation and opportunity for 
contact between firms in joint ventures than exists in license agreements. Davies 
found that 78% of joint ventures made use of personnel from the technology- 
supplying V arent to supervise plant construction versus 26% for license 
agreements. 5 He noted that the number of cases of technology transfer within the 
"package supplied" by British firms were greater through joint venture than in 
licensing agreements. If a weak relationship with a technology supplier is all that a 
firm requires, it should try for a current technology license agreement. As the 
strength of the relationship increases, which is not without cost implications, the 
target should be a current and future technology license agreement, or a majontý 
joint venture, and where the strongest link is needed, a 50-55 percent joint venture. 5 
2.5 Partnership in technology transfer 
One of the main points to be considered in technology transfer is evaluating the role 
of the partners, particularly their contribution to enhancing the scientific and 
technological capabilities in manufacturing. In this regard, a key issue to be 
considered is the availability of numbers of highly qualified scientists, researchers, 
engineers and technicians. Research and training facilities such as laboratories, 
engineering organizations, the educational system, industrial structures should be 
studied on the basis of the technology it depends upon. 
These basic elements should be well managed and connected by the partners and the 
local company. By using this simplified objective, it is possible to determine the 
contribution that partners and the local company can render in order to exchange 
national scientific and technological capabilities that may affect technology transfer 
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through various relationships between the two partners. The relationship between 
the subsidiary and the local company may be maintained through relations with the 
local labour market, local public and private research centres, and local suppliers 
and competing firms. Further, transfer of any technology to a new location entails 
substantial transmittal and receiving costs. Technology is more than just a stock of 
blue prints immediately accessible to all. Very often considerable resources have to 
be deployed by both the transferor and the transferee to ensure the success of a 
project. These costs arise regardless of whether or not the recipient is an affiliate or 
an independent firm. 
Technology transfer is the primary reason for industrial development through a 
variety of mechanisms such as technology licensing agreements, joint ventures, 
technical assistance and management contracts, turnkey projects etc, or through 
direct investment in wholly-owned subsidiaries. Technology is a rather broad-based 
concept and has both tangible (e. g. capital goods) and intangible forms (e. g. 
technical know-how contained in the minds of the people who use the equipment). 
Production and distribution of industrial knowledge and development has three 
phases: invention, innovation and diffusion. Technology transfer may be understood 
as the process by which technology is moved from one physical location to another 
for the purpose of application toward an end p roduct. Transfer can take place either 
domestically from one sector to another or internationally from one country to 
another. The profit motive is the prime impetus for transfer, both in the supplier and 
recipient environments. 
There are relative merits and demerits of the different mechanisms of technology 
transfer. These merits and demerits will depend on the perspectives of the 
technology supplier and the recipient. This chapter has aimed to provide a 
familiarity with some aspects of the phenomenon of technology transfer including 
the various channels through which technology gets transferred. Thus it serves as a 
background to examine the effectiveness of technology transfer in the Saudi oil and 
petrochemical sectors. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
SAUDI ARABIAN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
3.1 Development of the Saudi economy 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the policy and process of technology 
transfer in Saudi Arabia's oil and petrochemical industry. To meet this objective, the 
chapter is divided into four sections, as follows: 
1. An overview of the Saudi Arabian economy, focusing on industrial 
development 
2. industrial development which has helped to transform sectors of Saudi 
Arabia into diversified manufacturing operations, with advanced technology, 
products and processes 
3. Saudi joint-ventures, both industrial and non-industrial 
4. future industrial strategies and technology transfer between Saudi Arabia and 
developed countries. 
A major discussion theme is Saudi development planning. In this context, the 
Kingdom's Five Year Planning approach involved the development of a technology 
transfer regulatory framework. The chapter identifies, describes and analyses the 
principal charatteristics of Saudi Arabia's technology policy, including the recent 
science and technology plan. Discussion closes with an examination of the sector's 
technology strategy. Although this has been bounded by the government's 
investment and technology transfer regulations, the Saudi oil and petrochemical 
industries have developed their own focused technological strategies to ensure rapid 
growth through both indigenous and international strategic collaboration. An 
associated purpose of this chapter is also to explore the impact of joint ventures on 
the development of Saudi Arabia in general; in so doing, it will examine the Saudi 
way of acquiring technology through joint ventures. Saudi joint ventures are the 
preferred channels of technology transfer, because they are the cheapest and fastest 
way to obtain technology. The broad thrust of discussion on the Kingdom's 
industrial and technology transfer policies provides the contextual backdrop to later, 
more focused analysis on the effectiveness of technology transfer mechanisms 
operating in the Saudi oil and petro-chemical sectors. 
Table 3.1 summarizes 5 years of Saudi economic development from 1989-1993 and 
the most important aspect is the change in oil sector, non-oil sector and private 
sector which shows a bigger increase than the government sector. These years are 
very important in Saudi development because of the GDP growth from 81.5 in 1989 
to almost 120 in 1993. The other significant aspect of this growth has been the 
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confidence in the Saudi economy, as expressed by the private sector. While 
government expenditures declined in 1990, the growth rate of private sector GDP 
grew from 1.6% in 1989 to 4.4% in 1991 and 3.4% in 1993.1 This growth of activity 
was accompanied by large repatriations of private -capital and commercial bank 
inflows, which together amounted to over $50 billion between 1991 to 1993.2 
Table 3.1 Saudi Arabia's economic development 1989-1993 
Indicator 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
GDP in current prices ($ 
Billions) 
81.5 103.2 113.9 119.6 120.8 
Oil Sector 19.3 25.4 24.8 24.9 23.5 
Non-oil Sector 47.0 41.5 42.1 42.1 43.5 
Private Sector 28.6 24.1 23.3 23.6 24.5 
_ Government Sector 18.3 17.3 18.7 18.6 18.9 
Consumer price inflation 
N 
0.7 1.4 3.14 -0.3 1.2 
National growth in GDP 
N 
6.5 17.8 6.9 3.4 0.7 
Oil Sector GDP 20.9 41.1 5.1 3.3 2.9 
_ Non-oil Sector GDP 1.8 7.9 8.0 3.4 '2.8 
Private Sector (%) 1.6 4.6 4.4 4.0 3.4 
_ 
_Government 
Sector 1.9 13.0 13.1 2.6 2.0 
Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, (SAAIA) "Statistical Summary". different issues 
1990-1994 
Over the last nine years, 1994-2002, Saudi Arabia made major advances in 
expanding the role and importance of the private sector as a major influence on 
overall economic development. Table 3.2 shows progress in this respect. 
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Table 3.2 Key economic data 1994-2000 
Billion US $) 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Nominal GDP 117.80 125.52 136.49 146.00 130.10 140.92 152.00 
% Change 1.39 4.4 8.00 6.6 -12.2 7.70 7.30 
Real GDP (% change) 0.10 0.00 1.40 1 1.90 1.60 0.50 4.00 
Population (million 
persons) 
18.20 19.10 0.00 21.00 21.40 21.40 21.80 
Saudi 13.20 13.60 14.00 14.50 15.00 15.40 15.80 
Non-Saudi 5.00 5.50 6.00 6.50 6.00 6.00 6.00 
GDP/Capita (US$) 6,472 6,571 6,820 6,952 6,195 6,584 6,972 
Oil Price ($/barrel) I 
West Texas 
Intermediate 
17.25 18.30 21.57 1 21.00 14.00 20.50 22.00 
Saudi Average 14.50 15.65 19.00 18.25 11.50 17.45 19.00 
Current Account -10.40 -5.30 0.70 0.30 -13.10 -3.90 0.00 
As percent of GDP -8.83 -4.29 0.45 0.21 -10.10 -2.77 0.00 
Government Budget 
Balance 
-9.28 -7.31 -5.07 
I 
-4.21 -12.27 -9.07 -7.46 
Revenues 34.40 39.07 47.76 54.80 38.13 39.20 41.87 
Expenditures 43.68 46.37 52.83 59.01 50.40 48.27 49.33 
Budget balance as 
percent of GDP 
-7.9 -5.9 -3.8 2.9 -9.4 -6.4 -5.0 
Government Domestic 
Debt (billion SR) 
336 384 422 468 566 608 639 
As percent of GDP 76 83 84 87 116 115 114 
Official Foreign Assets 68.51 67.94 75.66 85.92 82.29 77.00 73.99 
Central Bank 47.50 46.10 51.42 59.05 53.09 46.00 43.71 
Government Pension 
Funds 
21.00 21.84 24.24 
I 
26.88 29.20 31.00 30.28 
Cost of Living (% 
1change) I 
0.60 
I 
4.80 1.30 0.00 -0.20 
I 
-1.20 
I 
0.00 
Sources: Ministry of Finance & National Economy "National Centre for Financial and 
Economic Information Reports" 1998-2000 and Saudi Arabian Monitory Agency" 
Statistical Summary" for the years 1995-2001 
3.1.1 Saudi national development plans, objectives and strategies 
For the past 40 years, Saudi economic development has been broadly governed by 
the implementation of Five Year Plans. The first five of these plans emphasized the 
development of the Kingdom's infrastructure, with later plans focusing on human 
resource and private sector development. During the 1960s, Saudi Arabia embarked 
on an ambitious economic plan to exploit and use its oil resources to create a full- 
blown industrial economy. 
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By 1970 the development plans had been refined, with the 1970-1975 plan aimed at 
quickening the pace of economic and social development. In the second Five Year 
Plan 1975-1980, apart from increased defence spending, a key component of this 
plan was the creation of industrial cities at Yanbu and Jubail. The growth of heavy 
industries could not have succeeded without a highly advanced industrial 
infrastructure in place, so linkage to sea, port, rail, highway systems and their 
proximity to energy sources were the main criteria for selecting Jubail and Yanbu as 
cities for heavy industries. Whilst there have been changes in emphasis since 1970, 
Saudi plans have highlighted the same four underlying themes, listed in Box 3.1, 
below. 
Box 3.1: Saudi development planning themes and industrial objectives 
Planning themes: 
0 Maintaining the religious values of Islam 
0 Ensuring the defence of religion and the country and to maintain internal security and 
social stability within the Kingdom 
0 Continuing balanced growth by developing the country's resources, specifically by 
increasing income from oil and by conserving depleting resources 
8 Reducing dependence on the production of crude oil as the primary source of national 
income 
Industrial objectives: 
" Widening and diversifying the productive base 
" Developing income sources other than oil 
" Raising the level of self-sufficiency 
" Offering job opportunities outside customary labour markets 
" Participation in a balanced economic build-up. 
Sources: Ministry of Planning, Five-Year National Development Plans, 1985 - 1995 
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However, the Sixth Plan, which began in 1995, called for a broadening of the 
technical skills of the Saudi population, and an even stronger emphasis on economic 
diversification of the industrial and agricultural sectors by increasing the private 
sector's role in the economy. The highlights of the Sixth and Seventh Plans are 
listed in Boxes 3.2 and 3.3, respectively. 
Box 3.2 Key Aspects of the 6 th Five-Year Plan, 1995-2000 
Limiting government spending on development programmes and projects to 
actual revenues 
Relating government loans and support facilities provided to individual 
private firms to the implementation of Saudization commitments 
Deepening the dialogue with the private sector through adoption of suitable 
institutional mechanisms, through organising regular meetings with private 
sector representatives at the secretarial level and expanding utilization of 
private capital in the financing of many government projects 
Improving the financial conditions for small-scale enterprises and expanding 
the Saudi credit bank's activities 
Increasing efficiency and utilization of non-conventional water resources, 
such as desalinated water, treated waste water and agricultural drainage 
water in order to maintain natural water resources 
Developing necessary measures to encourage small industries, as well as 
studying the possibility of establishing an agency responsible for their 
development 
Achieving full privatisation of electric utilities over the medium to long term 
Establishing new industrial parks in locations with favourable growth 
potential 
Establishing a national system for the adoption of environmental impact 
assessments, particularly in industrial, agricultural and urban projects 
Meeting the increasing demand for modem infrastructure facilities in 
addition to safeguarding existing facilities through routine maintenance. 
Sources: Ministry of Planning, the 6'h Five-Year Plan, 1995-2000,2001 
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Box 3.3 Key Aspects of the 7 th Five-Year Plan, 2000-2005 
" Safeguarding Islamic values by duly observing and endeavouring to confirm, disseminate and 
defend the faith and the Nation, by improving the services provided to Hajj and Umrah performers 
" Developing human resources to ensure an increasing supply of manpower and also to promote 
cultural and informational activities to keep pace with the Kingdom's development 
" Enhancing the private sector's participation in socio-economic development, diversify sources of 
national income and expand the productive base of services, industry and agriculture 
" Promoting integration among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and strengthening 
the Kingdom's relations with Arab, Islamic and friendly countries 
" Consolidating the presence of a protective defence and security system, and furthering the 
continuous development of the Kingdom's intrinsic defence capability 
" Encouraging the private sector to increase its investments in the fields of education, training, 
support and develop the research centres to undertake field studies for diagnosing the motives of 
voluntary work in the community 
" Promoting the role of women in voluntary services in the context of Islamic values, and encourage 
women to participate in such services, ensure that all government departments which administer 
public services make economic efficiency fundamental to their operations by adopting the 
following basic principles: 
i. total cost of producing such services to the Saudi Community should be reduced 
ii. prices of such services should not be less than their production costs 
iii. removal of monopoly and promotion of competition whenever possible 
" Continuing the exploration and development of natural resources such as mineral and marine 
resources, achieving horizontal and vertical expansion of petrochemical industries, as well as the 
production of gas and petroleum derivatives, through private sector or joint venture companies 
" Increasing the share of Saudi manpower in total employment of the various economic sectors, 
particularly in sectors with a high concentration of non-Saudi manpower 
" Adopting a fiscal policy that aims at balancing government revenues and expenditures, reducing 
government expenditures and increasing government revenues along with the raising of 
performance efficiency in government agencies, reducing government expenditure in non- 
development sectors, increasing non-oil revenues 
" Establishing a national science and technology base capable of innovating and inventing as well as 
adapting technology through: - provision of basic services, infrastructure and systems necessary 
for the development of science and technology; enhancing scientific and technological awareness 
by society and students at all levels of education, along with providing appropriate incentives in 
this respect; provision of opportunities for specialists and researchers to undertake scientific and 
technological research 
Encouraging technological invention and development by individuals and national institutions 
along with enhancing their innovative capabilities, and also fostering national industries to 
establish laboratories for research and development, quality control and the strengthening of 
relations between industry and these laboratories 
Developing and upgrading national human resources to meet changing needs of the population, 
diversifying skills of the citizen, increasing his productivity, and encouraging investment in 
human development fields, providing more health and social care and preparing the economic 
conditions to meet the increasing number of population. Placing emphasis on training and re- 
training of manpower to raise productivity, thereby achieving optimal utilization of technology 
and equipment used in development activities, through attention to cooperative training and on-the 
job training, giving priority to development of manpower through expansion of technological and 
technical education as well as vocational training programmes, developing means and mechanisms 
necessary for qualifying and training of national manpower in collaboration between both public 
and private sectors. 
Source: Ministry of Planning, the 7" Five-Year Plan, 2000-2005,2001 
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Saudi Arabia has pursued development planning over the last 30 years and to date 
the Kingdom has so far completed six development plans with the 7"' plan now 
nearing completion. Implementation of these plans has contributed to the 
development of the Saudi Arabian economy. Figure 3.1 shows the expenditure in 
the Seven Saudi National Development Plans. The planning objectives support and 
encourage advanced technology flows to meet the Kingdom's development needs. 
Figure 3.1 Expenditure of the Saudi development across the I" to 7"' National 
Plans 
(SR. Billions) 
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Sources: Ministry of Planning - Achievements of the Development plans, Facts and Figures, 
20"' issue, 2002 
3.1.2 Saudi National Development Plans and industrial development 
Industrial development has taken place in accordance kvith the country's National 
Development Plans, focused on local industries producing crude oil and natural 
gases, available in abundance in the Kingdom. Dynamic growth of both oil- and gas- 
based industries together with tion-oil industries have transformed the country from 
a crude exporter to a highly diversified economy producing advanced material and 
goods for captive use as well as for export. 
The importance of industrial development has increased gradually and attained 
fourth rank in the gross domestic product. Industries, including oil refineries have 
increased from 5.1 % in the GDP in the year 1983 to about 9. in the year 1993.3 
The average share of the sector to gross product amounted to 6.51, o dUring 
4 1975-199 Table 3.3 shows the data revisions in the Saudi ecollonly fi-on) 19()S -- 
2002 indicating that whilst the oil sector output value has decline(] across tills 
period, the non-oil private sector shows a strong trend ofincrcasc. 
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1st Plan 2nd Plan 3rd Plan 4th Plan 5th Plan 6th Plan 7th Plan 
Table: 3.3 Data revisions -2 001 to 2 002 
Macro-economy 2001 2002 
GDP (SR Billions) 698.4 685.5 
GDP (US$ Billions) 186.2 182.8 
Real GDP growth 1.2 0.2 
Oil Sector (%) -1.2 -5.8 
Non-oil private sector (%) 3.5 4.2 
Government (%) 1.7 1.0 
GDP per capita -US$ 1 8.691 8.309 
Sources: Ministry of Planning - Achievements of the Development plans, Facts and Figures, 
20'h Issue, 2002 
The non-oil industrial sector, the electricity and gas sector, are estimated to have 
grown by 6.3 and 3.9 percent respectivel Y. 5 This indicates continued expansion of 
the private sector, an increase in its efficiency and less dependence on government 
spending. In particular, as mentioned above, the non-oil industrial sector has 
witnessed robust growth for several years. Týe Tbird Plan 1980-85 was aimed at 
developing the Kingdom's agricultural sector and also manpower, encouraging more 
private investment into the economy. The Fourth Five Year plan 1985-90 was 
published in mid-1985, to improve education and health services, encourage private 
investment in industrial and manufacturing projects and develop defence in the 
Kingdom. Saudi Arabia emphasizes co-operation in its f6reign policy, maintaining 
strong relations with the West. Due to its history as an oil exporter, Saudi Arabia has 
pursued free market economic policies and economic integration with the outside 
world. 6 
3.2 Oil and natural gas represent the main source of Saudi income 
Oil and associated products account for much of Saudi Arabia's export value, 
constituting the major part of government revenues. Hence, it has been important to 
deal with hydrocarbon resources on a modem technological basis to achieve the 
maximum level of efficiency. Oil's contribution to the provision of present 
requirements, meeting the future needs, as well as investing in the elements of the 
sustainable development will compensate for any decrease in the contribution of 
such non-Fenewable resources in the long run. Utilization of hydrocarbon resources 
takes place according to a comprehensive strategy. The aim of this strategy is to 
maximize oil reserves through intensive exploration and programming of production 
in accordance with domestic conditions and the needs of the world oil market. This 
takes into consideration the role of the Kingdom as a major oil producer and an 
influential exporter, and the consequences of such a role on price stability. 
The Saudi oil strategy also concentrates on increasing the valued-added of crude oil 
and natural gas through refining, production of pharmaceuticals and export of 
refined products instead of crude oil. This strategy has contributed to boosting the 
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Saudi economy and averting the many adverse impacts of price fluctuations in the 
world market. It has also been responsible for channelling oil revenues towards the 
achievement of socio-economic development, supporting the Saudi budget, 
restructuring the economy, and building a non-oil economic base. 
The Kingdom's proven oil reserves by the end of 1970 stood at 138.7 billion barrels 
(bb) and as a result of new discoveries and a reassessment of known reserves has 
brought the Kingdom's oil reserves to 262.8 bb in 2000.7 Accordingly, the country's 
reserves now account for 25% of the world oil reserves. 8 Exploration efforts have 
doubled the Kingdom's oil reserves over the past six Five Year Plans. Crude oil 
production in Saudi Arabia for the period 1998 - 2002, is shown in Table 3.4, below. 
Table 3.4 Saudi crude oil production and revenuel998 to 2002 
Saudi oil industry 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Saudi oil production 8.28 7.65 8.09 8.02 7.4 
(mbpd) 
Benchmark price, North 12.76 18.25, 28.96 24.4 24.50 
Sea Brent (US$) I 
Average price Saudi 11.50 17.45 27.00 221.50 21.75 
Crude oil (US$) 
Oil revenue for Govt. 21.33 27.86 57.17 49.33 47.5 
budget (US$ billions) I I 
.I 
I 
Source: Ministry of Planning "Achievements of the Development plans, Facts and Figures", 
different issues 1998 -2002 
With increased proven oil reserves, the Kingdom's crude oil production rose sharply 
from 3.8 million barrels per day in 1970 to 8.5 m b/d in 1974 reaching a peak of 9.5 
in 1979.9 However, as a result of world oil market developments, the entry of new 
producers such as the North Sea countries, and increased production in the former 
Soviet Union, production gradually declined to 4.1 m b/d in 1984 and 3.2 in 1985. In 
1986 production increased to 4.9 m b/d, but once again dropped to 4.2 m b/d in 1987 
before rising again to 5.1 in 1989.10 Due to the conditions of world oil market and 
after the Gulf War, roduction rose to 8.3 m b/d in 1992 and maintained almost the 
same level in 1998. However, in 1999 as a result of OPEC's policies to overcome 
the sharp decrease in crude oil prices through control of production rates in the 
member countries, the Kingdom decreased its production to 7.56m in 1999.12 Saudi 
Arabia increased the level of production to 8.1 in 2000 due to world demand and the 
requirements for world price stability. 13 Table 3.5, below, shows the global oil 
supply from OPEC and non-OPEC countries from 1998 to 2001. 
53 
Table 3.5 Global oil supply (mbpd) 
. 
Year OPEC Non OPEC Total global 
. 
1998 30.79 44.88 75.47 
. 
1999 29.43 44.69 74.12 
2000 30.82 45.86 76.68 
12001 30.12 46.6 76.72 
Source: International Energy Agency Reports, 2001 
The short term and long-term objectives of government intervention in the oil 
industry are aimed at maximizing the management, control and direction of Saudi 
Arabia's hydrocarbon resources. Saudi oil policy objectives-have been in line with 
the development stages characteristic of the oil industry, as identified in many of the 
important oil producing countries, and listed below in Box 3.4 
Box 3.4 Oil industrialisation 'Stage' development model 
Stage I- This first stage is characterized by the offer of maximum incentives to oil 
exploring companies by the host country. The objective is to attract the 
oil companies' capital and know-how, which the host country lacks. 
After the initial discovery of oil in commercial quantities' and its 
production establishes the country as a proven oil producer, the second 
stage sets in. 
Stage 11- Here, generous incentives given for exploration are gradually and 
progressively modified and replaced by new exploration agreements. 
Meanwhile, the host country -increasingly gains insight into the nature 
and operations of the oil industry. 
Stage III - The third stage depends on the attainment of adequate know-how in 
exploration and production, access to sources of equipment and 
knowledge of actual costs. At this stage, the country uses service 
contracts and bears all the exploration risks instead of granting 
concessions or production-sharing contracts. In the course of stage one 
through three, the country acquires know-how. 
Stage IV - The fourth stage starts when the country on its own is able to undertake 
exploration, production, refining and marketing. However, the country 
may still depend heavily on foreign partnerships especially in the areas 
of technology. 
Sources: Ministry of Planning, "objectives and strategies of the Development Plan", 2000 
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Implementation of the Saudi Five Plans has boosted the production base of the non- 
oil sectors, increasing their growth rates. Exports have also expanded. Oil exports 
form a crucial element in the balance of payment situation for the Saudi economy. 
They exhibit tremendous volatility in line with fluctuating oil prices and production. 
Nearly 90% of exports comprise oil, and hence oil export movements will be the key 
to estimating the current account balance. In order to maintain oil price stability, as 
shown in Table 3.6, OPEC has cut its production drastically during 2001 and 2002. 
OPEC hopes to maintain a price of $20/b to $ 22/b for OPEC Basket, which 
translates to a price of $ 17 to $ 19/b for Arab light. 14 
Saudi economic and fiscal performances were much improved in 1999. The strong 
rebound in oil prices has reversed Saudi Arabia's growth prospects for that year. 
Table 3.6 OPEC Countries crude oil production 
000 b/d 2002 % change 
2000 2001 Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jan-May 
02 
rr 
Algeria 808 821 785 775 790 
' 
802 829 27 
Indonesia 1279 1 1216 1142 1145 1143 1151 1130 21 
Iran 3671 3665 3353 3324 3359 3359 3353 -6 
Iraq 2551 2385 2255 2447 2431 1193 1718 525 
Kuwait 2101 2032 1859 1826 1846 1862 1878 18 
Libya 1405 1361 1262 1268 1292 1296 1310 14 
Nigeria 2031 1 2097 1987 1947 1949 1951 1917 -34 
Qatar 698 1 683 598 589 606 619 638 19 
Saudi Arabia 8247 7918 7228 7159 7293 7378 7398 20 
UAE 2251 2163 1944 1957 1956 1972 1954 -18 
Venezuela 2897 2830 2577 2559 2584 2466 2670 204 
Total 27939 27171 24990 24996 25249 24049 24795 
Source: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries OPEC, Annual Statistical Bulletin 
(ASB), 2001 
On the whole, Saudi Arabia expects production to average 7.5 million barrels a 
day 15 during 2002 including leakage and therefore exports at 7 million barrels a 
day. The price strength allowed OPEC members, including Saudi Arabia to 
gradually exceed production quotas without causing a price collapse. 16 
Because of declining oil production in the subsequent ears, production of 3 ý7 
associated natural gas declined to about 32 bem in 1987 . Thereafter, it rose 
gradually to 54.3 bcm in 1994, and then declined to 48.7 in 1999. The Kingdom has 
made significant progress in utilizing the produced quantities of natural gas in an 
economic manner. In 1970, only 2.3 bcm or I I% of the produced natural gas was 
effectively utilized, but the rate of natural utilization reached 94% of the total 
production in 1999.18 
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3.2.1 Refined products 
Saudi Aranico refined production has increased substantially and consequently so 
has the value added from crude oil. Refineries now represent an important industry 
In the Kingdom. The installed capacity of Saudi Aramco's refineries in Jeddah, 
Riyadh, YII1bLI, Jubail, Ras Tanura and Rabigh rose by more than threc-fold, from 
5 12000 barrels per day in 1970 to about 1.74 mbd in 2000.19 Refining operations 
2( increased at an average annual rate of 3.6% during the same period. Figure 3.2 
shows the total production of refined products for the period covering 1970 to 2000. 
Fig, ure 3.2 Total production of Aranico's refined products, 1970 to 2000 
I DMillion US barýrels 
soorce: Millistry of Planning, ". Achievemews of the Deýelopnient piins, Facts and Figures", 
19(h issue 2001 p. 9-5 
3.2.2 Gas: a new strate, (. Yy 
A potential source of' Future income in Saudi Arabia is from gas, and hence 
development plans to the extent of US$ 25 billion over the next 5 to 10 years, are in 
place. The development of'thc upstream gas sector is the most profitable portion of 
the proposal and is likely to make derivative projects in water desalination, 
petrochemicals and power generation more viable. The Kingdom signed a 
preparatory agreement to develop gas in June 2001. According to a press release 
issued Crorn the Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals 21 , the authorities unveiled a Gas stratcgy called 'Gas Initiative' aimed at achieving tile following object' II vcs: 
rapid penetration of' supply to the underserved regions of the Kingdom; 
displacement ol' oil and NGL burning in power generation and dcsalination 
I'licilitics, optimal deployment Of Current and future NGI-s into petrochemical use; 
and rapid cxpallsion of, powcr and dc. salination production capacity. 
The initiative open.,,, the Kingdom to f'Orcign oil companies flor domestic production 
and COIISLIIIIptI0II OfgaS in three core ventures Valued at $25 billion. 22 Not only will 
the implementation be cxpcctcd to generate about $25 billion III LIP-front in,, cstment 
but May ZIISO attraCt additional Investments through associated projects and related 
l6reign Investment. Power and water projects arc associated with the core ventures 
o1* the gas initiative. In 2001, the Saudi Glovernment selcctcd CQ'ht Companics split 
into three consortia, two lcd by Exxon Mobil and one by Shell, and were tasked with 
56 
1970 1979 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 
bringing a gas on stream and also building facilities that will use production as 
feedstock for electricity, water desalination and petrochemical plants. However, 
finalizing of the agreements has remained deadlocked over the terms of the 
investments required from the companies. 
3.2.3 Interaction between Saudi oil policy and industrial policy 
Oil is the lifeline of the Saudi economy. Oil plays an important role both in the 
context of the national economy and international economy. From the national side, 
since 85% of total revenues accrue from oil, any change in oil prices and production 
will directly impact on the performance of the domestic economy. Similarly with the 
world economy, if Saudi oil production is disrupted. Saudi Arabia, however, has 
been keen to diversify its economy away from dependence on oil. Industrial 
development, for instance, has lessened the degree of dependence on crude oil 
production and has also helped to expand and diversify the non-oil production base. 
This has led to an increasing degree of industrial self-sufficiency and to a larger 
amount of exported products. 
The general objective of Saudi oil policy is s, ecurity and stability, and this can be 
translated into three sub-goals: first, is to secure the long-term health of the oil 
market, which follows from the fact that Saudi Arabia's reserves make it the biggest 
oil producer with potentially the longest life. This requires the long-term health of 
customers, which in turn requires that supplies of oil are available at adequate 
levels/reasonable prices; second, is to diversify the economy away from its virtual 
total dependence on crude-oil exports. This implies moving down-stream in the oil 
industry, which in turn suggests the need for greater control over the industry both 
domestically and internationally-, and, third is to use oil as the leading development 
sector to secure real economic development. Apart from reducing export 
dependence, and for that matter import dependence, real structural change in the 
economy would also, in theory at least, help to diffuse the benefits of oil down 
through the population, thereby forestalling instability arising from economic 
conditions. 23 
3.3 Saudi industrial development 
In a move to diversify and develop the economy, and particularly its industrial base, 
the Saudi Government in 1961 created two new departments, namely: the 
Department of Industrial Affairs and the Department of Electricity, both under the 
Ministry of Commerce. The purpose was to formulate appropriate infrastructure 
plans and create proper environment for industrial development. Then, in 1974 the 
government issued a new industrial policy to accelerate the process of industrial 
development. Due to the growing importance of the industrial sector the Saudi 
Government set up an independent Ministry of Industry and Electricity in 1975 to 
oversee industrial development programmes. 
To facilitate economic and industrial growth, the Saudi Government also set up 
industrial areas in Riyadh, Dammam, Jeddah, Jubail and Yanbu. These industrial 
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areas were provided with the essential infrastructure requirements like ports, road, 
airports, power and water etc. The Government provided various incentives to 
attract investments in the Basic Industries such as government Loans, Tax holdings, 
cheap raw material and free repatriation of profit by the foreign partners. The Saudi 
Government also embarked on developing manpower to support this industnal 
growth. As a result of joint efforts by the public and private sector, the industrial 
sector grew rapidly during the 1990s. Most industry is concentrated in just three 
regions: Riyadh, Jeddah, and the Eastern region where there is as relatively high 
population density. These policy measures have led to a trend of increase in Saudi 
inanul'acturing Output, as shown in Figure 3.3, below. 
Figure 3.3 Saudi industry output, 1992-2001 
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Sources: Ministry of Industries, Internal Report, 2001 
Saudi industrial development strategy aims to decrease dependence on crude oil as 
the only source of revenue, diversify the productivity base of the economy, and 
accelerate progress and economic growth. Saudi industrial strategy also aims to 
encourage and widen the Kingdorn's industries whereas oil revenues have been 
UtIlIZCd aiid invested during consecutive development plans to develop infrastructure 
facilities such as roads, scaports, airports and other means of transport. Most of these 
projects have now been completed. With the infrastructure in place, Saudi Arabia 
has promoted industrial cities and the associated factories. Plots of land in such 
cities arc allotted on nominal prices (8 halalah) in 
2/ year. 24 The industrial cities 
establishment began in the Kiiigdorn in 1970. The total area of industrial cities 
amounts to (55315) in2 and about SR (2885) millions had been spent on their 
dcvc1opinent Up to the end Of' 1999.25 
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The objectives of industrial development are summarized in Box 3.5, below. 
Box 3.5: Objectives of Saudi industrial development 
" increase economic productivity and diversify it through utilization of available 
natural resources by producing a variety of low cost products that are 
competitive at the local and international markets. This, however will not only 
increase growth rates of industrial annual output, but also increase the sharing 
of industry in gross domestic product (GDP), and increase income from value 
added, hence increasing national income 
" exploit resources and local raw material, encouraging projects that depend on 
local raw materials, making use of the advantages of energy availability at 
competitive prices, including petroleum and its by-products; additional 
exploitation of available agricultural, mineral, and fish resources 
" encourage utilization of private sector industry potentialities so as to increase 
industry's role in execution of projects 
" widen the transfer of modem technology and sustain its relation with the 
Kingdom through encouraging the establishment hi-tech projects 
" attain balanced industrial development between the Kingdom's regions 
" increase industrial productivity by encouraging the establishment of factories 
with ideal production capacity 
" develop the national labour force to reduce dependence on foreign labour 
through promoting national skills, education and training potentialities 
" increase integration and co-operation between various industries by 
encouraging more horizontal and vertical overlapping of industries, and the 
establishment of allied and supporting basic industries to increase industrial 
inter-relationships and integration. 
Source: Ministry of Planning, "General Objectives and strategies base of the Seventh 
Development Plan, 2000-2004", Ministry of Planning, Saudi Arabia, 2000 
A comparison between the scale and nature of Saudi industry in 1970 and that in 
2002 reveals the positive impact of industrialization. This is why all developing 
countries are so anxious to industrialize. Saudi Arabia is determined not to remain 
an economy that exports just crude oil and imports everything else. 
As one Minister of Industry and Electricity on his 1985 visit to European 
Countries in stated: 
"... Saudi Arabia has invited trading partners to become industrial partners 
encouraging them to participate in the growth of the Saudi market. Saudi 
Arabia has tried the system of foreign investment through joint ventures 
and has found that it works. Saudi Arabia gains the benefit of value-added, 
the linkages, and the multiplier effect on other sectors of the domestic 
59 
economy, by the local production of goods and services, all of which 
strengthen the whole economy and acceler * ate 
the trends to diversification. 
Industrial partners also gain the benefits of participation - their joint 
ventures win a greater share of the local market, they gather all the 
benefits of profitable business without hindrance on the flow of capital . 
26 
The benefits of foreign investment in Saudi Arabia are considerable. Fully serviced 
sites are offered at attractive rates on industrial parks provided by the government. 
The Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF) offers finance for up to 50% of the 
capital cost of a project. Imported raw materials are exempt from customs duties. 
There are grants provided for the training of Saudi staff. There are no restrictions on 
the repatriation of profits or on currency transactions. There are no personal income 
taxes on expatriate staff, and ten-year tax holidays for industrial projects. 27 As a 
result, industrial license applications are increasing. At the start of this decade they 
were 30% higher than in the 1980s. In 2001 licenses were issued to thirty foreign 
joint ventures. 28 Capital-intensive production systems are also vital for Saudi 
industries to remain competitive, with state of the art technology to sustain efficient, 
relatively small-scale production systems. Saudi Arabia has emphasized the 
importance of investment in advanced technology. This is needed to develop the 
industries and services, and if necessary, wait until the necessary technology can be 
deployed efficiently within the country, rather than encourage industries which are 
already obsolescent but which might still be profitable in the short term. 
Saudi experience with advanced technology in the armed services, in petrochemicals 
industries, and in airlines suggests that Saudi labour can absorb the technology. For 
example, Saudi Airlines now carries out all its own maintenance, and has been 
awarded full certification by the US Federal Aeronautics Agency. The military 
purchase offset programme has successfully identified a very wide range of over 50 
potentially viable high technology projects that could be introduced . 
29 There is also 
scope for the development of computer software, and adapted hardware and system 
architecture. However, many of the systems, which have been developed in the US, 
UK and Japan, need adaptation and modification before they can be successfully 
introduced to the Saudi market. 
3.3.1 Saudi industrial structure 
The importance of the Saudi industrial sector can be shown by an impressive array 
of statistical indicators about factory activity. For instanc6, the number of licensed, 
operating factories increased 63% between 1984 and 1993 and by the middle of 
2002 totalled 3,418 . 
30 During the same time period, growth in technology and 
capital intensity was even more impressive as shown by the fact that factory capital 
investment increased 130% to nearly $65 billion. 31 Total industrial employment also 
increased nearly 40% to 319,000 workers by the end of 2001. 
The early structure of Saudi industry also changed due to the growing importance of 
joint venture industrial projects with nearly 60 countries. By the end of 1992, there 
were over 350 such projects and their capital investment totaled nearly $21 billion. 32 
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The Saudi government attaches great irriportance to foreign joint venture projects 
since they provide one of the major ways of transferring technology and technical 
expertise educating and training Saudi employees, utilizing donicstic raw materials 
and generally helping to implement the Kingdom's industnial development policy. 
Several Saudi industnial sectors, which have benefitted from foreign joint venture 
projects, are noted in Figure 3.4. 
Figure 3.4 Saudi joint ventures by sectors 
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Sources: Ministry of Planning, Saudi Committee for Economic Review, "Liberalized Foreýxpl 
Investment Rides conte into Force, Special Report- May, 2000 
A significant aspect of Saudi industrial development has been the large increase ill 
the number of locally produced products, which now number more than 2,000. '3 
Many of these products were originally imported; however, their local production 
has now become sufficient to meet all or a large share of domestic demand. A 
growing number of these products are also exported to nearly 90 countries 
throughout the world, indicating that Saudi products have become internationally 
competitive in many industrial sectors. Included in this list are various petroleum- 
based products, which are manufactured by the Saudi Basic Industries Corporation 
SABIC; the largest and most technologically advanced petrochemical company ill 
Saudi Arabia. In addition, exports from other industrial sectors have increased 
dramatically in recent years. 
Basic industries consisting of the petrochemical and Metals industries arc 
characterized by their intensive use ofcapital and clici-gy resources, as well as the 
advanced technologies they apply. The largest portion ofproducts of. such Industries 
arc exported after local market demand is nict. The Industrial sector has effectively 
made use of government support and encouraged industrial development. The 
following econornic indices show the achievements during 1970-1 99S. In 1970 there 
were only 61 ') factories in the Kingdom. In 2001 there were 3,418, an annual 
growth rate of 10.5%. 34 Capital invested in establishing Eactorics during 1980 was 
approximately SR 21.1 billion. In 2001 such investment reached nearly SR 240.1 
billion, an annual increase rate of 16.9%. 35 
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Numbers of existing projects operating according to foreign capital regulation 
amounted to 344 and employed 48,918 workers. 36 As already mentioned, protection 
and encouragement of national regulations was issued in 1961 and industrial policy 
in 1974. This was followed by foreign capital investment regulation in 1979.37 Table 
3.7 clearly shows the extent of investment in industry by major countries as well as 
country investment trends over a period of 6 years, from 1990 to 1995. 
Table 3.7 Major countries' investments in Saudi industry 
Country Based on the number of licenses 
issued 
Based on the number of actual 
op tions 
No. of 
investments 
Amount 
million $ 
No. of 
investments 
Amount million 
$ 
U. S. A. 79 5,222 44 2,885 
U. K. 31 218 15 53 
Germany 24 87 13 50 
France 10 59 03 23 
Japan 04 1,505 04 1,505 
Sources: Ministry of Industry and Electricity, Internal Report, Department of Industrial 
Development, 2000 
Technology is extremely important to Saudi industry in sustaining production of 
distinct goods capable of competing in domestic and international markets. As a 
consequence, Saudi regulations include incentives and custom exemption for foreign 
investors. These are aimed at transferring industrial technology to the Kingdom in 
the form of modem production means and methods through joint ventures between 
national and foreign capital. Saudi Arabia has promoted industrial co-operation 
programmes with many industrial countries. Table 3.8 sets out the expenditure 
involved in Industrial contracts, transferring technology to Saudi industries between 
the years 1999 - 2001. Moreover, Saudi Arabia is currently formulating a 
mechanism for the utilization of research facilities to major companies, such as 
SABIC and Saudi ' 
Aramco as well as in specialized research centres such as King 
Abdul Aziz City for Science and Technology. The figure 3.5 shows the value of 
Industrial contracts that brought new technological innovations from the developed 
countries to the Saudi industrial sector during the period 1992 to 2001. 
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Figure 3.5 Value of industrial contracts proN iding technolo-N 
to Saudi industries from 1992-2001 
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The Saudi Government initiated a plan to utilize hydrocarbon and mineral resources 
for the production of various petrochemicals and fertilizers, by establishing the 
Saudi Basic Industries Corporation. The Saudi petrochcrnical industry has developed 
rapidly since creating SABIC in 1976. Due to the heavy development programmes 
initiated by the Saudi Government, the petrochemical rnanufacturcrs played a crucial 
role in introducing Saudi petrochemical industries to the world market. Growth in 
this industry has reinforced the Kingdom's position on the global industrial map 
while building long-term relationships with its custorricrs. The Saudi industrial 
export sector has experienced sound growth and has contributed significantly to 
achieving national economic development objectives. 
Table 3.8 Percentagcs of technology transfer contracts 
to Saudi industry, by sectors 1999 to 2001 
Sectors 
Oil & gas 43 
Petrochemicals 24 
Power 7 
Cement & glass 6 
Metallurgical 6 
Water 5 
Waste management 
Fertilizers 2 
Food I 
Electronics I 
Other 3 
Sources: MEED Issues 1999-2001 
Table 33.8 is an indicator of the different percentages accounted For by technology 
transfer contracts in Saudi I'MILIStry Airing the years 1992 to 2001. The oil and gas 
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1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
sectors and the petrochemical sector stand above all others, with an over all share of 
43% and 24% respectively of all industrial contracts that had taken place in Saudi 
Arabia during this period. 38 
3.3.2 Saudi economic diversification: the mining sector 
The mining sector occupies a prominent position in the Saudi government's strategy 
to diversify the Kingdom's economic base. Saudi Arabia is home to the largest 
mineral deposits in the Gulf, including about 20 million tons of gold ore, 60 million 
tons of copper, 10 billion tons of phosphates, and a large spectrum of industrial 
minerals. 39 Saudi Arabia's objectives for this sector include reaching out to the 
private sector and foreign investors -to establish industries for extracting and 
processing those minerals, providing the Saudi manufacturing sector with its 
requirements in raw materials, as well as becoming a leading exporter of minerals. 40 
The mining sector in the Kingdom is expected to become the second largest source 
of government revenue within the next decade. The Saudi Arabian mining sector 
presents a high-growth potential. The Kingdom's sixth Five-Year Development Plan 
(1995-2000) anticipates the sector to grow at a rate of 9.9 percent per annum. 41 TO 
date, according to the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, over 920 
licenses have been given to companies for the exploration of mineral resources. 42 
The incentives the Saudi government has granted private investors have made 
investment in this sector highly profitable. 
A further catalyst for private sector investment in mining has been the creation of 
the Saudi Arabian Mining Company ("Ma'aden") in 1997, with an initial capital of 
more than $1 billion. Ma'aden is responsible for regulating the mining sector, 
consolidating the mining projects wholly or partially owned by the government, and 
rebuilding them on a commercial basis in partnership with private investors. 
Ma'aden is also involved in the revision of the mining code, with the goal of 
streamlining administrative procedures, and making the sector more appealing to 
private investors. The Saudi government has also been working on building the 
infrastructure necessary for the development of the Kingdom's mining industry. The 
Ministry for Mineral Resources has located 1,273 sites of precious metals and 1,171 
sites of non-precious metals. 43 Over 30 minerals have already been identified in the 
Kingdom, with at least 15 industrial minerals that could be successfully, exploited by 
investors. The Ministry for Mineral Resources has identified more than 64 mining 
projects that offer investment opportunities for private investors. The Kingdom has' 
moved beyond the mere extraction of the minerals, into the creation of a well- 
integrated mining industry. 
3.3.3 Import substitution for Saudi industrialization development 
Import substitution is the industrial development strategy adopted by many 
countries. It is expected to ensure rapid industrialization and export competitiveness 
of locally manufactured goods. Import substitution is based on the principle of 
importing semi-finished 'knocked down' components in place of finished goods, 
such that the local entrepreneur could assemble the unfinished goods and sell locally 
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or export if the market condition was right. This way local entrepreneurs can gain 
manufacturing experience as well as technological experience. Unfortunately, 
though, the Saudi experience of import substitution strategy resulted in cheaper and 
better-imported finished goods rather than the assembled 'made in Saudi Arabia' 
goods. Import substitution strategy, however, has had little impact in the Saudi oil 
and petrochemical industry as government had the strategy targeted only on 
manufacturing goods. 
3.3.4 Industrial incentive programme 
Saudi Arabia has a full range of internationally competitive industrial investment 
incentives for investors wishing to engage in technology transfers and joint ventures 
with Saudi companies. The range of incentives are listed in Box 3.6 below. 
Box 3.6: Saudi investment incentives 
0 no currency restrictions and unlimited movement of capital into and out of the 
country 
0 low-cost land for factories and related facilities located at various industrial 
cities around the Kingdom 
0 low-cost electricity and water for industrial use 
0 exemption from all duties for imported raw materials, machinery and 
equipment used by industry 
0 10 year 'tax holiday' for all industrial projects with 25 percent or more Saudi 
capital. Recent changes to this provision also allow for further 10 year "tax 
holidays" for additional invested capital from outside investment or 
undistributed profits 
9 tariff protection from competing imported goods for certain critical 
manufactured products 
0 eligibility for no-interest industrial loans for up to 50% of project cost 
9 pre ference for national products in government purchases. 
Source: Ministry of Industry and Electricity, "Doing Business in Saudi Arabia", Published by 
- AIIE, Riyadh, KSA, 2000 
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3.4 Human resource development and Saudisation 
High rates of investment in human resources in Saudi Arabia have resulted in an 
impressive improvement in human and social indicators in the past three decades. 
Saudi Arabia has paid much attention to establishing linkages between industrial 
development and manpower development. The industrialization concept is not 
limited to technical and economic aspects only, but also has a connection with 
organization and managerial aspects which depend on qualifying and training of 
Saudi labour force 
* 
so as to participate in production process and acquire industrial 
behaviour. However, the Saudi labour force represents about 75% in SABIC and 
. 
44 about 80% in Saudi Aramco Yet, the Saudi employment proportion is still low in 
the private sector industries, i. e. 8 %. 45 For this reason the Saudi government has 
initiated a number of policy measures, as listed in Box 3.7. 
Box 3.7: Key Saudization policy issues 
" take necessary procedure and measures to *attract Saudi employment in projects 
and industries 
" encouraging industrial private sector to be responsible for achieving national 
objectives of Saudization 
" linkage of industrial incentives to industrial establishment efforts towards 
Saudization 
" developing more intensive vocational and technical training programmes 
" adoption of industrial apprenticeship by establishing technical institutes whose 
programmes includes theoretical studies as well as providingjob training 
" granting incentives and taxes exemption for industries that offer training to 
technicians 
" establishing industrial training institutes and centres in the Kingdom together 
with formulating curricula that keep pace with real needs of factories. 
Sources: Ministry of Planning, "2h National Development Plan" MP, Saudi Arabia, 2000 
Manpower is important for Saudi Arabia and hence the Saudi Govermnent has been 
investing considerable monies and time into developing human resources. Labour 
growth in Saudi manufacturing industry is shown in Figure 3.6, below. 
66 
Figure 3.6 Labour (,, roNNth in Saudi industry 1992-2001 
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Riyadh, Oct. 2002 
Saudi Arabia emphasises the linkage between industrial development and manpower 
development. The industnalization push is not limited to technical and economic 
aspects only, but also has a connection with the organizational aspect that depends 
on qualifying and training of Saudi labour force so as to participate in the production 
process and acquire industrial behaviour. The focus on managing perf'ormance 
improvement throughout the year requires top perforniaricc from trainees as a key 
responsibility. 
3.4.1 Expatriate labotir 
The Saudi Government's Central Department of' Statistics (C'DS) prm ides detail on 
the size and makeup of the expatriate labour force in Saudi Arabia. According to the 
CDS, in 1999 there was a total non-Saudi population of 5.0 million, of which 3.0 
million both comprised the labour force and were employed. 46 , Fhe remaining are 
largely family members of expatriate workers. The expatriate Population includes 
some 1.4 million children, 19 years old and under. Most of' the non-Saudi workers 
are employed by the private sector. Of the 3.0 million non-Saudi workers, only 
about 89 thousand worked for the government. The government also employed 579 
thousand of the 2.8 million Saudis working, according to the Ministry of civil 
service. 47 It is worth noting that private sector compensation is generally lower than 
compensation in government. There is generally a view that the _government 
has 
better pay and bencfits for Saudis than the private sector, and this is born out by the 
wage and coin pcnsatj on data that wcrc also published by the CDS for the year 2000. 
3.5 Technological development and King, Abdul Aziz City for Science and 
Technology 
The Kingdom's development plans have placcd ilia .J. or emphasis on 
implementation of many influential projects in the domain of' technological 
development. Among these projects are educational, academic Institutions as well as 
training and research centres foremost aniong which comes King Ab(ILII Aziz Citv 
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for Science and Technology (KACST). KACST was established in 1977 as per 
Royal Decree NV60 as an autonomous scientific body reporting to the Prime 
Minister. Its main objective is concentrated in supporting, encouraging and 
implementing scientific research for applied purposes, coordinating the various 
activities of research centres and institutions as well as setting national priorities and 
policies pertaining to science and technology. The main objective of The Saudi 
National Strategy for Science and Technology is to develop science and technology 
in the Kingdom mainly to meet the needs and objectives listed in Box 3.8, below. 
Box 3.8: Needs and objectives of Saudi science and technology strategy 
Needs: 
0 to ensure the safety and national security of the Kingdom 
0 using all the. national resources 
0 support the improvement of living standards in the Kingdom 
0 support Saudi developments in general 
0 secure opportunities for the new generations 
0 develop a human culture with Islamic principles 
Objectives: 
0 manpower development for Science and Technology 
research and Development activities to meet general requirements 
support development capability of national technologies in all sectors 
and make them capable to accommodate technology transfer 
continue development of regulations for Science and Technology 
to encourage Scientific innovations 
develop activities to support Science and Technology on information/ 
communication / patents, office consultancy 
invest in information technology as per the needs of the Kingdom 
develop national sources for environmental protection through science 
and technology 
create national awareness of the importance of science and technology and 
its effects on national security and development of the economy. 
Source: King Abdul Aziz City for Science and Technology "Saudi National Strategyfor 
Science and Technology ", KACST, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 2000 
3.5.1 Saudi national policy for science and technology 
In collaboration with the Ministry of Planning and agencies concerned, King Abdul 
Aziz City for Science and Technology (KACST) - see Appendix 3 for Organisation 
Chart, has completed the third phase of the long-term national - master plan for 
science and technology concerning the preparation of The National Policy for 
Science and Technology in the Kingdom. It has finalized all elements related to this 
policy including general objectives, strategic bases and the implementation approach 
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based on the outcomes of phase I and 11 of the plan for approval by the agencies 
concerned. 
Both King Abdul Aziz City for Science and Technology (KACST) and the 
Ministry of Planning have jointly developed a national policy for science and 
technology in the Kingdom through scientific methods as a result of comparison of 
studies locally and internationally. This policy has two parts: 
Science and Technology focusing on all scientific and technological 
long-term innovative programmes in the Kingdom as a framework for 
general strategies including objectives and visions. The Saudi Cabinet 
has approved The Saudi National Policy for Science and Technology and 
this makes Saudi Arabia the I" Arabian country that has developed a 
national policy for science and technology, according to KACST. 
ii, This considers the methods of implementation of the policies and 
strategies of the different sectors which link science and technology with 
projects and programme efforts and operation plans. 
The Kingdom considers the Saudi National Policy for Science and Technology as a 
national project aimed at developing of science and technology on a long-term basis. 
King Abdul Aziz City for Science and Technology and the Ministry of Planning, all 
Saudi public sectors and the important private sector institutions have been invited 
to share their needs and opinions on this project. The study itself has been a huge 
effort with more than 150 Saudi scientists and engineers and I 10 Saudi specialists 
representing 45 Ministries and Government and public institutions participating in 
basic studies and information gathering. 43 
3.5.2 Importance of R&D for Saudi industry 
Research and development is the means by which an economic establishment 
secures its position in modem technical industries. The petrochemical industry, 
although it is relatively mature, is fast changing especially in the fields of new 
developments and applications of its products. Economic studies have indicated that 
the effect of human resources dealing with the processes of production, 
maintenance, machinery and utilization of R&D activities is far more than the effect 
of capital investment in securing continuing progress of an establishment. Today a 
successful economic establishment is one that has a mutual relationship and 
cooperation with R&D and technology producing centres. An applied study 
executed in Saudi Arabia, aimed at analysing the role of spending in R&D and 
training of manpower in the Saudi industry, has indicated that an increment of one 
percent in spending for R&D resulted in a positive and progressive change in the 
sales volume by about 31 per cent. 49 
Technology and activities intensive industries need to invest in R&D more than 
manpower intensive ones. The petrochemical industry is a capital and technology 
intensive activity. It should be emphasized, however, that manufacturing processes 
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of the modem petrochemical industry based on imported technology are susceptible 
to loss of effectiveness in a competing international market unless these processes 
are supported by R&D activities. Resolution of this problem cannot be realized 
without effective interaction with local R&D institutions. However, whilst Research 
and Development is an important aspect of industrial development in any 
developing or industrialized country, the Saudi Government's progress in this 
direction has been minimal. No Saudi Government policy emphasised R&D 
development until the 7 th Plan. Significantly the contributions of SABIC and Saudi 
Aramco have been the main stay in the field of research and development to date. 
3.5.3 The importance of R&D to expand domestic technology 
Arab countries rank first in crude oil reserves, with around 65% of world known 
total reserves and their natural gas reserves are around 22% of the worlds total. 50 In 
spite of these reserves, petrochemical production in the Arab world does not exceed 
5% of the world output. 51 One of the reasons for this weakness is the fact that the 
Arab countries have not paid attention to R&D. This fact is reflected in the low: 
" number of the scientists in the Arab world (equal to 1.5% of the world total 
number) while Europe enjoys 21% and North America 18% 
" total Arab expenditures on R&D (0.7% of the world total compared with that of 
North America's 43 %). 
The need of the Saudi Petrochemical Industry for R&D became obvious after 
starting production in the early 1980s. In addition to the R&D activities that are 
conducted at different departments within Saudi universities in the fields of the 
petrochemical industries, there are three research centres that have separate divisions 
in their structures for petrochemical research: King Saud University (KSU); King 
Abdul Aziz City for Science and Technology (KACFST); and, the King Fahad 
University for Petroleum and Minerals (KFUPM). 
In order for the petrochemical industry to break through the dependency on foreign 
technology and new products/materials, it focused research on chemistry and 
chemical engineering to create new materials, industrial chemicals, and chemical 
processes. Advances in this area expanded markets when mature products were 
unable to meet customer requirements for custornization, specialization, and 
segmentation. It has been reported that new products generated 26 percent of sales 
revenues or products in growth stage, as compared to 62 percent from products in 
the mature stage. 52 This suggests that incremental changes in m, ature products has a 
positive contribution to sales revenues. As competition between companies became 
intense, companies began to give more focus to product quality. Market leaders were 
emphasizing product innovation and responsiveness to customers. Chemical 
companies have involved their customers in product development by partnering with 
them to get early feedback and to better understand complex requirements. Major 
chemical companies were also using Internet technology to link business processes 
directly with customers in real time to improve services, responsiveness, and 
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delivery. The recent growth of national, regional and international competition has 
resulted in great pressure on the operating profitability of many companies. 
Management has challenged the cost effectiveness and ability of R&D to be of value 
to the corporation. R&D has been mostly driven by technology rather than pure 
science. 
Saudi Arabia has pursued an ambitious B rogramme, which early on called for 
expenditure of over $235 billion by 1990. These vast sums provided the country 
with a modem infrastructure, to diversify an economy which essentially rests upon 
oil, and ultimately to transform the country into a modem society. In this effort 
technology was explicitly accorded a major role and, since Saudi Arabia possesses 
little indigenous technological capability, the emphasis is currently upon the transfer 
of technology from abroad. 
3.6 Transfer and adaptation of strategic technology in Saudi Arabia 
Adaptation of high technological sectors relating to the oil and petrochemical 
industries has had a direct impact on Saudi national security as well as the Saudi 
Economy. Table 3.9 shows the percentages of. technology imported to Saudi Arabia 
by different sectors between the years 1999 and 2001. 
Table 3.9 Technology imported to Saudi Arabia by different sectors 
1999 to 2001 
Sectors % 
Infrastructure 24 
Services 15 
Transport 6 
Defence 6 
Tourism I 
Agriculture & fishing 0.3 
1 Industry 48 
Sources: MEED Issues 1999-2001 
There are also other promising activities such as communication, information and 
electronics that support future developments in the fields of oil, gas and 
petrochemicals. Expansion of Saudi gas and petrochemical industries is the most 
important for the development and future growth of Saudi economy. These two 
sectors require new science and technology cooperation in the areas listed in Box 3.9 
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Box 3.9: Science and technology cooperation in the Saudi oil, gas and 
petrochemical sectors 
" research to develop technology that can help increase production capacities and 
reduce costs of production 
" develop research to introduce new practices 
" develop projects to reduce the local consumption of petrochemicals and gas, 
which represents 1% of world consumption, with a population that represents 
only 0.3% of the world population 
" increase capacities of the local refineries in the Kingdom and support their 
position in the oil market 
" add value to the oil and refined products through expansion of vertical and 
horizontal activities in the Kingdom 
" develop more cooperation opportunities between Saudi Aramco and SABIC in 
the integration of oil industry. 
Sources: Ministry of Planning, "7h National Development Year Plan", MP, Riyadh, KSA, 2000 
Science and technology, considered to be the backbone of the success of Saudi 
industry, enjoys advantages from oil price increases. Therefore, additional finance 
has the potential of raising the Kingdom's investments to ensure creative 
innovations and improvements to the products and process of industry, mainly in 
technology and operations through joint ventures. Research and development 
activities in the Kingdom can be developed in Saudi Aramco and SABIC in order to 
improve their capabilities to own new technologies and minimize raw materials and 
operational costs. The other areas that can be considered as requiring further 
improvement are re-design of the existing refineries and petrochemical plants in 
order to reduce the cost of operation and maximize production. Research and 
Development activities should be concentrated in the technologies that provide low 
costs and better quality products, and also give other alternatives in raw materials. 
One of the successful examples of Research and Development within SABIC is the 
new technology of acetic acid which was developed through SABIC's own scientists 
and engineers. This is the first time that such new technology has been developed in 
the Middle East and SABIC is aiming to build a commercial plant for acetic acid 
using the new technology. 54 SABIC's Research and Development activities provide 
another example of successful development of new technology to produce Butane-I 
leading to better quality and lower cost production. This has been scientifically 55 
undertaken jointly through SABIC and the French Petro Institute collaboration. 
3.6.1 Saudi industrial cooperation with the developed countries 
Cooperation between Saudi Arabia and developed countries has developed and 
prospered for many years. In the area of foreign trade, Saudi Arabia has maintained, 
an overall trade surplus with most of the developed nations. For instance and 
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presumably imports of Japanese goods to Saudi Arabia, Saudi exports to Japan 
exceeded Japanese imports largely due to large exports of Saudi mineral fuels to 
Japan. However, although Saudi Arabia enjoys an overall trade surplus, it has a 
substantial trade deficit with Japan in the manufactured product sector, particularly 
machinery and equipment. The imbalance in trade with Japan relative to mineral 
fuels and manufactured products is shown in Table 3.10 below. The trade deficit 
with Japan for manufactured products shows that there is a substantial market for 
products in this sector and indicates the potential for new joint-venture industrial 
projects which can benefit- Saudi manufacturers and lessen Saudi Arabia's 
dependence on foreign imports. 
Table 3.10 Value of top Saudi imports from Japan in 1992 
Industrial sectors Billion yen 
Electrical machinery and equipment 567.5 
Automotive vehicles 456.0 
Machinery and equipment 362.3 
Iron and steel products 47.9 
Man-made filaments and fibres 25.4 
Textiles and apparel 17.5 
Paper and paper products 1.9 
Source: Ministry of Finance, "Import Statistics" , MF, Saudi Arabia, 1995, p. 123 
Besides trade, there are a number ofjoint venture projects between Saudi Arabia and 
developed countries. In 1994, there were a total of 31 Saudi joint venture projects, of 
56 which 8 are industrial and 20 are non-industrial. The industrial projects are the 57 largest in terms of capital investment and represent 98% of total invested capital. 
However, nearly all invested capital in these industrial projects is from two SABIC 
affiliate projects (Eastern Petroleum Corporation and Saudi Methanol Company). 
The Composition and variety of products, which are produced under Saudi-Japanese 
industrial joint venture, are petrochemical products; methanol, glycol, and 
polyethylene comprise most of the value of production from these joint venture 
projects. As noted earlier, recent structural changes in Saudi industry and expanded 
product markets have opened up new opportunities in sectors such as, food, wood 
and paper products, machinery manufacturing, consumer goods, mineral resources, 
and certain 'high technology' in which Saudi Arabia has encouraged new 
development. Thus, in order to move positively towards expanded Saudi industrial 
cooperation, a stronger industrial partnership needs to be considered which takes 
account of Saudi Arabia's market strengths, its emerging industrial sectors, and new 
opportunities for innovative, high technology forms of industrial cooperation 
between Saudi Arabia and other countries. Table 3.11 shows the major country 
investment in Saudi industrial projects. 
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Table 3.11 Major top Developed Countries investment in Saudi industry, 1999 
Country Industrial 
Proiects 
Capital (B. US$) Foreign share 
M 
USA 68 10.0 48.1 
Japan 5 2.7 49.9 
Italy 9 1.4 30.8 
Taiwan 3 0.7 49.9 
U. K. 31 0.5 46.9 
S. Korea 7 0.5 18.8 
Germany 24 0.3 27.0 
France 11 0.2 28.8ý:: ý 
Source: Ministry of Industry and Electricity,, tnternal Report, KSA, 2000 
The Saudi market, in general, has changed considerably over the past years both in 
terms of its size and composition. Some of the important changes from the 
standpoint of future Saudi joint ventures are listed in Box 3.10, below 
Box 3.10: Key aspects of Saudi joint ventures 
the Kingdom's population growth rate is one of the fastest in the world and a 
recent population census showed that the population more than doubled during 
the last 25 years 
" household incomes are among the highest in the world and consumer spending 
as a percent of total income is growing 
" recent industiial surveys indicate that Saudi manufacturers are using more 
products made by other Saudi manufacturers rather than importing these from 
abroad 
" 'state of the art' telecommunications, transportation, and utility systems have 
reduced the cost of business operations compared to other countries 
" advanced technology products and process are being used in Saudi Arabia that 
were not possible several years ago. This 
, 
has created a much-improved market 
for high technology products or for products, which use high technology 
production processes 
due to its overall investment climate, Saudi Arabia is a logical choice for 
establishing a regional production base for exports throughout the Gulf and 
Middle East region. 
Sources: Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu, "Annual Reports", Saudi Arabia, 1988 
3.6.2 Saudi Arabia and technology transfer 
Today, science and technology has become a prime determinant of a nation's status. 
Therefore, if a country wants to acquire development, it must build its indigenous 
technological capability. This capability represents an essential prerequisite for 
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modernization, which can be demonstrated through a consideration of different 
kinds of technology transfer. Thus, since its establishment in 1976 SABIC has been 
responsible for the kingdom's petrochemical industry, which has become an 
internationally competitive, technologically sophisticated company, ranking among 
the world's top ten petrochemical manufacturers. The most successful of the import- 
substitution projects promoted by the government since 1977, SABIC has succeeded 
in reversing the position of Saudi Arabia from that of a nation almost entirely 
dependent on petrochemical imports to a major exporter of petrochemical products. 
Saudi Petrochemical products now flow to many advanced countries. Economically 
speaking, the Saudis have opted for the most rational long-term industries, those of 
petrochemicals, which are downstream of oil production. The question is can Saudi 
Arabia exploit its comparative advantage of having an abundance of the necessary 
raw materials, gas and oil. Petrochemical industries are by definition energy and 
capital intensive and are thus seemingly tailored for Saudi Arabia, which has an 
abundance of everything except labour. 
SABIC exemplifies the progress that Saudi Arabia has made in reducing 
technological dependence and foreign control over key industries through a new 
strategy of national development. Previously, Saudi Arabia allowed national firms to 
license foreign technology and import capital goods and foreign investment without 
providing countervailing protection for national technological industries. Since the 
late 1970s, Saudi Arabia has challenged the traditional modes of direct foreign 
investment in a determined effort to achieve technological independence. Saudi 
Arabia's strategy has been to expand national industries through a new pattern of 
rules governing technology-acquisition agreements. Instead of just licensing 
technology, Saudi Arabia has sought to acquire it indirectly through joint ventures 
whose terms have been clearly more favourable to Saudi firms than to foreigners. 
Moreover, by limiting foreign investment in joint ventures, Saudi Arabia has 
ensured national control of key industries, particularly those producing petro-related 
products. 
SABIC's particular approach to overcoming technical problems has been to develop 
a partnership formula, whereby international oil and chemical companies would be 
invited to take a stake in Saudi heavy industries, and to share in the profits, in return 
for providing the technology, management, and marketing know-how. Competitions 
in the construction industry and cheap government financing have been used to keep 
down production costs. 
3.6.3 Saudi joint venture strategy and the criteria for partner selection 
Instead of ttýrning to advanced countries to import foreign investment and to license 
technology, Saudi Arabia offered them joint-venture agreements. Saudi Arabia has 
chosen outside partners to share the risks and the profits. This approach has 
benefited the economy of Saudi Arabia so much that today every other newly 
established company is a joint venture. To seek out foreign firms interested in 
setting up joint ventures and to better coordinate petrochemical production in Saudi 
Arabia for both domestic and foreign sales, the Saudi government agreed that joint 
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ventures would allow for expansion of the petrochemical industry, facilitate the 
transfer of technolog to Saudi Arabia, and enhance Saudi Arabia's status in the 
international market. 
Foreign firms were put on notice that they must undertake co-production with a 
Saudi partner to qualify for bidding on petrochemical industry contracts in Saudi 
Arabia. The new conditions required that the foreign investor be the ' minority shareholder in any new joint venture with a Saudi firm, with 40% participation by 
Government capital, 30% by the foreign firm, and 30% by Saudi private 
enterprise. 59 SABIC adopted a policy of establishing joint ventures with foreign 
firms as the principal means of acquiring technology and, development support 
manufacturers for petrochemical industries. American companies realized that joint 
ventures with the Saudis would be a means to gain better access to the Middle East 
petrochemical market and reduce production costs by using relatively cheap Saudi 
petroleum. This association has enabled Saudi Arabia to acquire advanced 
technology gradually, and in the process to attain increasing self-independence in 
petrochemical industries. 
SABIC is aware that the selection of joint venture partners requires care. Since 
partnerships are long-term relationships, five criteria are used to judge overseas 
companies in the course of making joint venture partner- selection: proven 
experience; record of profitable operations; ability to market products from proposed 
projects; possession of the required technology; and a willingness and ability to train 
Saudi manpower. 60 SABIC's first important joint venture in the petrochemical field 
was a 10 year contract signed with Exxon in March 1978. This contract resulted 
from a joint-venture competition with two Japanese companies to produce and 
market 'polyethylene' at SABIC plants. Although Japanese petrochemical 
companies held a high percentage of the Saudi market, Exxon won the contract 
because it was more willing to accommodate the Saudi's new set of conditions. 61 
Other joint ventures in the heavy industry projects were 10-year contracts signed 
with several companies. 
With the signing of the SABIC-Exxon agreements, the Saudi Government 
proceeded to provide the promised protection for the new cooperative venture. In 
1982, it imposed a 30% tax on imported petrochemicals. In 1983, the government 
closed the door to further imports of petrochemical products and started exporting its 
production. Therefore, joint-venture agreements illustrate the Saudi way of 
acquiring. foreign technology. The contracts with these MNCs bind them to be 
responsible for supplying the necessary manufacturing know-how and assisting in 
such areas as quality control, handling materials, and manufacturing. 
The agreements called for the production capabilities of these MNC models to be 
transferred to SABIC in different stages, including importation of complete 
equipment, building factories, producing petrochemical products, marketing the 
products, and training the Saudi firms' workers to replace these MNCs at the end of 
the contracts. The first fruit of that joint-venture agreement was the establishment of 
the first Saudi corporation participating in heavy industry projects, which is 
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responsible for planning the development and manufacture of various 
petrochemicals, metallurgical products and fertilizers. 62 SABIC believes its policy of 
developing downstream through joint ventures with established producers will ease 
the entrance of Saudi material into World markets. 
In Saudi Arabia, regulation is more evident in the downstream operations such as oil 
refining and domestic marketing, where there is substantial participation. Saudi 
Aramco's equity participation in the foreign oil companies has given the corporation 
a majority at the board level and accordingly can influence investment and 
production policies. As the host country government's interventionist policies 
develop, so inevitably do the areas of potential conflict with the transferors of 
technology. As reported earlier, the interests of the host government and of the joint 
ventures do not always coincide. A joint venture subsidiary for example may 
attempt to implement a multinational competitive strategy set by the parent 
company, while the host government insists that the subsidiary enter into joint 
venture arrangements with local companies, which the joint ventures may consider 
less efficiently operated. SABIC's projects at Jubail and Yanbu show that the Saudi 
joint venture approach adopted by SABIC can speed up technology absorption by 
Saudi labour. Saudi Arabia's industry in general has made rapid progress in its 
production of a large variety of advanced materials. From this experience, Saudi 
Arabian's industrial joint venture model can be summarised in Box 3.11. 
Box 3.11 Saudi Arabian's industrial joint venture model 
" setting up an independent company to run the joint venture 
" production is shared according to a formula 
" each partner markets his share as a profit centre 
" profits are distributed according to equity shares 
" expansion is financed from profits. 
Sources: SABIC, Planning Department, 1995 
Saudi participation in petrochemical projects has, arguably, succeeded in acquiring 
greater technological capabilities. SABIC has succeeded in transferring technology 
to Saudi Arabia. Although Saudi Arabia has 
' 
made rapid progress in reducing its 
dependence on foreign suppliers of industrial equipment, Saudi industry continues to 
be dependent on foreign for know-how and imports of key components and other 
advanced-technology products such as machinery. Saudi industry has yet to achieve 
the technological capability, skilled manpower, and investment capital needed to 
complete industry projects of small capacity in which it hopes to develop a 
competitive advantage and to achieve technological independence in the long run. 
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3.6.4 Saudi-US Joint Commission for transferring technology 
The Saudi-US relationship promotes technology transfer to Saudi Arabia, through 
US corporations, to a greater extent than for any other country in the Third World. 
The strength of the linkage between the two countries speeds up the transfer of 
technology to Saudi Arabia. This condition can be seen through the creation of the 
U. S. -Saudi Joint Commission, a government-to-government facility for transferring 
technical expertise to Saudi Arabia. The greater the supplier of technology is 
involved with the recipient in joint ventures, the greater the likelihood that 
technology will be transferred to the recipient. The American companies geared to 
take advantage of the situation in Saudi Arabia include Ralph M. Parsons, which 
was planning and managing the industrial complex at Yanbu, and Bechtel, which 
drew up the master plan for Jubail. Other large corporations already involved 
include Exxon Mobil, Dow Chemical, Texas Eastern Corporation, and Celanese - 
all with petrochemical plants at Jubail. These corporations have been involved with 
Saudi firms in joint ventures; however, the Saudi side'is generally not looking -for 
capital investment when entering a joint venture, but rather wants technology and 
management and marketing skills. 
3.7 Saudi economic offset programmes 
With a view to achieving a qualitative move in the Saudi Arabian Economy, there 
emerged the concept of Saudi economic offset programmes. Strategically, the most 
important of these was the Saudi American and Saudi-British economic offset 
programmes. These two programmes were aimed at transfer of American and 
British advanced technologies to Saudi Arabia, supporting the Saudi industrial base, 
qualifying national manpower elements, and providing an opportunity for Saudi 
investors to participate in national development of highly profitable projects. This 
Saudi economic move was initiated in early 1980s when the Saudi government 
obligated foreign companies having contracts within Saudi Arabia to invest a certain 
percentage of the value of their respective contracts in joint ventures with Saudi 
firms with a view to enhancing the future development process in the country. The 
major goals of the economic offset programmes in the Kingdom are listed below: 
1. contribution to develop and support the economic infrastructure of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and transfer advanced technologies to Saudi Arabia 
to support its industrial base 
2. contribution in reducing the Kingdom's reliability on imports 
3. contribution to provide necessary services to citizens and to increase job 
opportunities for the Saudi population, encouraging the flow of private 
investments (national & foreign) in the private sector. 
As an extension to its participation in education, health and social affairs, the 
ministry of defence and aviation introduced a new way of implementing the 
economic offset programme in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The offset programme 
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covers military as well as some major civilian contracts and encourages firms from 
the US, Britain and France to set up local high tech plants in joint ventures with 
Saudi companies. The programme creates new diversified industries, increases 
training and productivity, facilitates technology transfers and stimulates economic 
growth. The offset programmes require an investment of about 35 per cent of 
contract value giving the foreign company 10-12 years to identify potential 
investment projects, receive approval, find Saudi partners, and initiate operations. 
Among the major American companies involved in the programmes are Boeing, 
General Dynamic, General Electric and United Technologies. Boeing Industrial 
Technology Group has formed four high technology firms capitalized at over SR 
325 million. 63 Lucent Technologies has an offset investment requirement for viable 
industrial joint ventures and has been an active participant in the Kingdom's 
ongoing telecommunications expansion programme. 
A Ministerial committee, headed by Prince Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz, the Second 
Deputy Prime Minister of Defence and Aviation and Inspector General, heads the 
Offset Programme. It falls under the direction of the Ministry of Defence. It directs 
the Kingdom's economic development policy and prepares and implements the 
development strategy. The Ministry establishes and adopts policies, strategies and 
actions necessary for developments. The committee is responsible for arranging the 
necessary procedures and follow-up for implementing the investment agreements. In 
addition to the above there is an executive committee. This committee is supported 
by the secretary of economic offset programme, to follow-up on the performance of 
day-to-day affairs. Table 3.13 surnmarises Saudi offset achievements and sets out 
the projects, capital investments and number of employees. 
Table 3.12 Saudi offset agreements and projects 
Foreign partner No. of Capital investment in 
(million SR) 
No. of 
employees 
Boeing Group 04 1298 1818 
General Electric 02 281 64 
British Government 04 665 410 
French Government 03 217 94 
Hughs Co. 01 219 50 
- AT&T 01 17 90 
Total 15 2699 1516 
Sources: Saudi Offset Program Secretariat, Internal Reports, 1997 
Saudi Arabia's investment environment reflects the country's traditions of liberal, 
open market private enterprise policies. Foreign investment in the Kingdom has 
been rising steadily. Saudi Arabia had 1,753 joint venture projects in operation in 
the Kingdom. 64 The Saudi Economic Offset Programme has provided opportunities 
for more than 27 national companies; out of this four of them are partnership 
companies and about 40 individual investments. 65 The total capital is about 2670 
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million, distributed in Riyadh, Dammam, Jeddah, Jubail and Al Khobar. This 
programme has transferred several technologies to the local companies in aviation, 
space, petrochemicals, electronics, computer systems and medical equipment. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
OIL EXTRACTION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SAUDI 
ARAMCO 
4.1 Introduction 
Saudi Arabia's economic development has been driven for decades by the success of 
its oil industry. Proven oil reserves amount to 261.8 billion barrels and gas reserves 
to 224.2 trillion cubic feet. ' British Petroleum estimates that Saudi Arabia has 213.8 
trillion cubic feet ((6.05 trillion cubic meters) of reserves, which is also 4% of the 
world's total reserves. 2 Both US Department of Energy and unofficial Saudi 
estimates put the Kingdom's total ultimately recoverable holdings as high as one 
trillion barrels, and the total could be even higher with more advanced EOR 
techniques. 3 
After the Second World War, oil quickly became the main source of revenue for the 
Kingdom. In the 1960s, Saudi Arabia embarked on an ambitious economic plan to 
use its massive oil resources to create full economic development. In addition to 
being the world's major oil producer, Saudi Arabia is now also the world's largest 
exporter, consuming only about I million bpd of its 8.8 million bpd of production 
4 (see Table 4.1, below). Revenues from oil export sales are an important source of 
national income and Saudi Aramco is responsible for the Kingdom's proven crude 
oilreserves. - 
The oil sector accounted for over 39% of the Saudi GDP in 2000.5 The Energy 
Information Agency of the US Department of Energy (DOE) estimates 90-95% of 
total Saudi export earnings in 2000,70% of state revenues, and 35-40% of the 
country's gross domestic product (GDP) come from oil. 6 The EIA estimates that net 
petroleum exports brought the Kingdom $ 68.7 billion in 2000.7 It should be noted, 
that Aramco reports that export earnings do not include total income from the entire 
petroleum sector including downstream operations, related manufacturing, and 
domestic earnings which Aramco puts at $70-$80 billion in 2000.8 
Given that Saudi Aramco is the principal corporate vehicle for oil extraction in the 
Kingdom, this chapter examines the focused development of this company. It 
describes the process of oil technology transfer to Saudi Aramco, and analyses how 
the technology transfer policy was shaped. It shows how Saudi Aramco benefited 
from oil technology and the knowledge available from international oil companies, 
examining R&D achievements in the development of technological capabilities at 
firm level. Finally, it focuses on how technological learning took place in the firm as 
well as the problems that remained relating to technology transfer in particular. 
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Table 4.1 World top ten oil producing Countries (million barrels per day) 
Country 200Q 2001 
Saudi Arabia 9.1 8.8 
U. S. A. 7.8 7.7 
Russia 6.5 7.1 
Iran 3.8 3.7 
Mexico 3.5 3.6 
Venezuela 3.3 3.4 
Norway 3.3 3.2 
China 3.2 3.2 
Canada 2.7 2.7 
Iraq 2.6 2.4 
Sources: British Petroleum World Report, 2002, p. 62 
4.2 Industrial antecedents 
The history of Saudi Aramco dates back to 1933 when the famous agreement to 
commence oil exploration was signed between the Saudi Government (Ministry of 
Finance) and Standard Oil Company of California (SOCAL), the predecessor of 
today's Chevron. Despite initial optimism, early results were frustrating, with oil 
only discovered in commercial quantities in 1938 by the Standard Oil of California 
Arabian American Oil Co. After the commencement of the Second World War, on 
May 1,1939, King Abdul Aziz Al Saud, the founder of the Kingdom, inaugurated 
the first oil shipment, opening the valve which let oil flow into the first tanker at Ras 
Tanmura. In 1940 it was decided to expand the operation by adding more oil 
companies (Exxon, Texaco and Mobil) to the operation and establishing the Arabian 
American Oil Company (Aramco) in preparation for the development of Saudi oil 
reserves. 
This was the start of an era which opened a large part of Saudi Arabia to 
hydrocarbon exploration. The period from 1933 until 1947 was the period of 
exploration and consolidation, not just of natural resources, but also of social and 
educational provision and economic restructuring and development. During those 
early years, American-Saudi work teams built the first stabilization plant at 
Dhahran, the first refinery at Ras Tanmura, marine terminals at Ras Tanmura and Al 
Khobar plus more than 50 miles of pipelines and a score of storage tanks and 
permanent roads from Dhahran to al Khobar and Ras Taninura. The teams drilled 19 
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wells on the Dammam structure, five of them in 1939 alone, and seven more were 
started in 1940.9 
In the early 1950s, Aramco expansion projects and manpower recruitment peaked. 
Crude oil production had reached 830,000 b/d, but when Aramco expanded its 
operations, drilling and production, its need for manpower, materials, and logistical 
support became the limiting factor to the expansion programme. Nevertheless, 
outside the government, Aramco became the main source of direct employment. 
Today, Saudi Aramco ranks as the largest oil and gas company in the world and 
sixth in refining, owning seven operating refineries in the KSA. Five of these 
refineries are wholly operated by Aramco, and the remaining two are in partnership 
with major oil companies; specifically, Shell at Jubail and Mobil at Yanbu. Saudi 
Aramco reports to its owner, the Saudi Government, through the Supreme Council 
of Petroleum and Minerals Affairs, chaired by the King. The Council is responsible 
for the general policy of Saudi Aramco, as the national oil company. It approves the 
company's five-year plan, which provides for crude oil production, exploration 
programmes for new reserves of hydrocarbon materials, and plans for developing 
new reserves. The council also approves Saudi Aramco's five-year programme for 
future capital investments. Saudi Aramco's Board of Directors, chaired by The 
Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, makes high-level planning, budgeting 
and project decisions. The company's president is the chief executive officer. To 
accomplish its missions, Saudi Aramco is organized into key business areas, each 
headed by a member of corporate management (see Appendix 4). 
4.2.1 Development characteristics 
Saudi Aramco's activities are focused on oil exploration and development. Saudi 
Aramco's exploration and producing business line has four general functions: 
find new oil and gas reservoirs 
drill new wells and maintain them 
produce crude oil and gas from wells 
perform primary crude oil and gas processing for delivery to regional export and 
marketing facilities within Saudi Aramco. 
Saudi Aramco is committed to these responsibilities. The depth of this commitment 
is reflected in its fourfold mission statement: 
safely and efficiently produce oil and gas 
develop employees to their fullest potential 
protect and preserve the environment 
undertake all of the above with the best technology available. 10 
In broadest terms, Saudi Aranico's mission is to find, produce, process and deliver 
oil and gas, as well as their refined products, for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and 
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for world markets. To accomplish this, Saudi Aramco is administratively divided 
into functional groups called 'business centres', with subgroups called 'business 
lines'. 
Saudi Aramco's relationship with its suppliers is built on trust, cooperation, 
understanding and respect. In order to achieve mutually positive results, Aramco, 
views its ties with suppliers not simply as a business arrangement, but- as a true 
partnership. That is also the spirit Aramco bring to relationships with joint venture 
partners as well as customers. From its inception, Saudi Aramco has nurtured long 
lasting partnerships; a successful strategy that has continued to Provide far- ranging 
benefits. With such an effective business philosophy, Saudi Aramco places a high 
value on its continuing relationships with suppliers and the business community. 
This is evidenced by the following comment from a senior company official "... To 
succeed as a Saudi Aramco business partner in a highly competitive environment, it 
is important that Saudi Aramco suppliers bring added value through product quality, 
support, competitive pricing and focused supply-chain models". " In addition, Saudi 
Aramco senior vice president Dhaifallah Al Utaibi told a 2002 supplier conference 
in the Kingdom "... Suppliers must position themselves to utilize enabling 
technologies that allow supply-chain participants to effectively realize concrete 
results and access relevant supply-chain information". 12 
Saudi Aramco, through its policy of promoting the development of the Kingdom's 
economy, awards 86% of its contracts to own orioint venture companies. 13 Saudi 
factories have supplied over $330 million worth of goods, and more than 11,000 
local contractors were registered with Saudi Aramco as at the end of 2002.14 The 
Company has helped in developing private sector contractors, which in turn have 
helped other developing companies to achieve knowledge, experience and expertise 
in project operation and management of huge projects in the oil and gas sector. 
4.3 Industrial status 
4.3.1 Product portfolio 
In 2003, Saudi Aramco was responsible for managing 90 oil and gas fields 
throughout the Kingdom including the Red Sea area. The proven extractable crude 
oil reserves in the fields managed by Saudi Arainco amounted to 262.8 billion 
barrels. 15 These reserves constitute about a quarter of world's total reserves making 
Saudi Arabia the country with the largest oil reserves in the world. That is more than 
twice the output of the next highest producer and nearly five times greater than the 
largest US oil company. 16 Saudi Aramco maintains a maximum sustained crude 
production capacitý of 10 million bpd, underscoring its determination to meet 
customer demand. ' 
The majority of Saudi Aramco's oil production is concentrated in just eight fields 
out of a total of 90, with estimated remaining reserves of 70 billion barrels, 
accounting for around half of Saudi Aramco total oil production capacity. 's The 
largest offshore field is Safaniya with estimated reserves of 19 billion barrels. 19 
These two fields, together with Abqaiq and Berri, account for around 45 percent of 
90 
20 the Kingdom's oil reserves and 85 per cent of production capacity. Saudi 
Aramco's efforts to develop new fields and improve processing facilities and 
transmission networks is expected to boost production capacity by 2.5 million 
barrels per day of oil by 2005 . 
21 Table 4.2 shows the crude oil production and 
reserves of the fields managed by Saudi Aramco for the 10-year period, 1990 to 
2002. It shows that in 2002 Saudi Aramco produced 2.5 billion barrels of crude oil 
or an average of 6.8 million barrels per day (bpd). 
Table 4.2 Saudi Aramco crude oil production and reserves 
Years 
Production 
billion barrels 
Reserves 
billion barrels /day 
2002 2479.2 259,500 
2001 2763.3 259,300 
2000 2847.0 259,300 
1999 2655.0 259,200 
1998 2922.2 259,200 
1997 2829.4 259,100 
1996 2878.5 261,444 
1995 2928.5 261,450 
1994 2937.9 261,374 
1993 2937.4 261,203 
1992 3049.4 261,203 
1991 2962.8 260,936 
1990 2340.1 260,300 
Sources: Ministry of Planning, Achievements of the Development Plans 2002,20'h issue p. 318 
and Saudi Aramco, AnnualReview, 1995-2002 
Saudi Aramco production reacts to political and military events, and OPEC energy 
strategy, as well as market conditions. But the fact that production capacity is 
normally larger than actual Saudi production gives added importance to Saudi oil, 
because Saudi Arabia is one of the few countries that can make sudden major 
increases in oil production. to provide additional supplies in an emergenCy. 22 Saudi 
Aramco also has the advantage that oil can be produced cheaply in the Kingdom. It 
has been estimated the cost of production at under US$1.5 per barrel, compared with 
a global average of US$ 5 per barrel. 23 Exploration costs are also low, less than 10 
cents per'barrel, making difficult fields such as the remote Shaybah field in the 
empty quarter economically viable. This field has reserves of up to 7 billion barrels 
and production capacity of 500,000 barrels per day and, despite needing a 385 
kilometre road and a 635 kilometer pipeline, the field was brought on stream for a 
total ofjust US$ 2.5 billion. 24 
Saudi Aramco is also an important producer of gas. In 1970, only II percent of 2.3 
billion cubic metres of produced natural gas was effectively utilized, the rest was 
25 either re-injected or flared. By 1984, nearly all natural gas produced was utilized. 
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Saudi Aramco is engaged in the provision and development of natural gas supplies 
produced mostly in association with crude oil in the Eastern Province, for water 
desalination, electric power generation and to provide energy for oil production. 
Fuel gas and NGL, produced from natural gas, support industrialization and 
petrochemical production in the industrial cities in Jubail and Yanbu, yielding LPG 
for export. The Saudi Aramco gas development programme has successfully utilized 
gas in downstream activities, mainly petrochemicals, as shown in Table. 4.3. The 
table shows that the quantity of the flared gas has been reduced, thereby utilizing 
most of the gas gathered through the Aramco Master Gas System (MGS) to enhance 
related gas products. This reflects the change in Saudi industrial policy towards 
downstream industry to diversify the Saudi economy. 
Table 4.3 Production and utilization of natural gas 
Million Cubic Metre 
Year Gas utilized as % of gas 
produced 
Flared Utilized Re-njected Produced 
1999 94.9 310 46,200 2,180 48,690 
1998 97.1 430 46,720 990 48,140 
1997 96.4 990 45,840 720 47,550 
1996 96.2 930 44,510 820 46,260 
1995 97.6 240 42,930 830 44,000 
1994 69.4 10,200 _ 37,700 6,400 54,300 
1993 69.6 9,900 35,900 5,800 51,600 
1992 67.1 11,520 34,000 5,180 50,70 
1991 64.6 13,100 32000 : L ' 
4,400 
ý 
2 49,500 
1990 73.7 7,550 O , 5-0 0f 3 
3,3 5O 
Sources: Saudi Aramco, Annual Reviews, 19991- 1999 
In processing natural gas, toxic hydrogen sulfide is removed and converted to Yield 
sulfur for export. Greater quantities of propane, butane and gasoline - the main 
components of NGL- are directed towards Kingdom-based petrochemical industries 
to add value to feedstock through exports as petrochemicals. All excess NGL 
continues to be exported. Table 4.4 indicates the extent of Saudi Aramco production 
of Natural Gas Liquids NGL (barrels per day) 1993 - 2001. 
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Table 4.4 Saudi Aramco NGL productions 1993-2001 
Year NGL (barrels per day) 
2001 801,054 
2000 780,843 
1999 731,354 
1998 764,830 
1997 767,450 
1996 758,218 
1995 731,846 
1994 687,925 
1993 639,759 
Sources: Saudi Aramco, "Facts and Figure", Public Relations, Dhahran, 2002 
Saudi Aramco ranks among the top 10 companies in gas production worldwide. 26 
The company is also a leader in both the production and export of Natural Gas 
Liquids (NGL) and a major producer of refined products. The company produces 
natural gas in association with crude oil and non-associated gas from deep, 
independent gas fields. This gas is used as fuel and feedstock for the Kingdom's 
backbone industries and utilities, and for export and domestic consumption as NGL. 
Gas production has done much to meet domestic energy needs and to reduce the 
domestic demand for oil, which is easier and more economical to export. Saudi 
Aramco gas production now accounts for roughly 2% of all world production. 
Virtually all this gas production is consumed in Saudi Arabia, and domestic demand 
for gas is expected to increase at an average rate of 7% a year for at least the next 
decade. 27 
Saudi Arabia's natural-gas reserves of 224 trillion cubic feet are the world's fourth 
largest, after Russia, Qatar and Iran. The Kingdom's gas-production rate of 6.7 
billion cubic feet per day is in the top five worldwide and represents the Middle 
East's higheSt. 28 Saudi Aramco's exploration programme has added significantly to 
the Kingdom's gas reserves. In the five years to 2001, those reserves increased by 
nearly 30 trillion standard cubic feet. 29 Gas production has increased by more than 2 
billion cubic feet a day -a growth rate of more than 10 percent a year. In the 10 
years to 2009,30 Saudi Arabia has become the world's largest exporter of natural S as 
liquids as well as gas-based methanol, octane enhancers and ammonia fertilizers. 
A further. field of activities for Saudi Aramco is its operation of five domestic 
refineries at Jeddah, Rabigh, Yanbu, Riyadh and Ras Tanmura, with a combined 
capacity of more than I MBPD. Table 4.5 indicates domestic refineries partly or 
fully owned by Saudi Aramco and their production and ownership percentages. 
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Table 4.5 Aramco's domestic reflneries, production and ownership percentages 
Refinery Operator Saudi Arainco ownership '000 b/d 
Ras Tamnura Saudi Aramco 100% 325 
Jeddah Saudi Aramco 75% 60 
Riyadh Saudi Aramco 100% 150 
Yanbu 
(Domestic) 
Saudi AraMco 1005 225 
Yanbu (Export) Saudi Aramco/ 
Exxon Mobil 
50% 378 
Jubail Saudi Ararnco/Shell 50% 310 
Rabigh Saudi Aramco 100% 400 
Sources: Saudi Review- Economic & Political Analysis Issue 12 Nov. 2001, p. 56 
Saudi Aramco plans to increase the operating performance of its five refineries by 
the use of modem technologies to enhance proficiency and return on capital. The 
Company has set an overall refining strategy to make each of the wholly owned 
refineries 'pacesetter refineries' by the year 2006.32 To implement this strategy the 
company has developed action plans to move the downstream refining business 
towards a more profitable operation. Table 4.6, below, shows the principal products 
manufactured in the domestic refineries wholly owned by Saudi Aramco. 
Table 4.6 Production of Saudi Aramco local refineries, 2000 
Products Ras Tanura Yanbu Riyadh Jeddah Rabigh Total 
LPG 6,178,473 2,321,973 1,467,201 1,064,131 - 11,031,778 
Naptha (2,382,760) 464,362 - 3,107,095 26,279,391 27,468,088 
Gasoline 20,538,925 13,464,817 10,990,311 4,582,752 - 49,576,805 
Jet Fuel/ 
Kerosene 
2,320,702 1,688,570 5,352,702 (606,172) 12,175,955 20,931,757 
Diesel 44,794,104 27,077,402 12,072,880 6,527,523 43,903,769 134,375,808 
Fuel Oil 40,603,381 26,189,542 21,737 4,626,299 46,125,138 117,566,397 
Asphalt 
& Misc I 
1,712,202 - 3,786,341 
I 
1,127,429 
I 
- 
I 
6,625,972 
- 
Total 1 113,765,327 71,206,666 33,691,172 1 20,429,187 1 128,484,253 1 367,576,605 
Sources: Saudi Aramco Annual Review, 2001 
Saudi Aramco joint ventures located at Yanbu on the Red Sea and at Jubail on the 
Gulf are 50150 joint ventures and commenced operations in 1984 and 1985. Table 
4.7 sets out the principal products manufactured in the joint venture refineries 
owned by Saudi Aramco. 
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Table 4.7 Saudi Aramco joint venture refineries' production (2000) 
Products SAMREF SASREF Total JV** 
LPG (178000)* 1,341,500 1,163,500 
Naptha - 12,202,500 12,202,500 
Gasoline 23,263,000 2,174,000 24,659,000 
Jet Fuel/Kerosene 11,652,000 10,956,500 22,608,500 
Diesel 18,018,500 12,529,000 30547,500 
_Fuel 
Oil 11,586,000 12,975,000 24,561,000 
Asphalt & Misc - - 
Total 62,235,000 52,222,500 115,657,500 
Sources: Saudi Aramco, Annual Review, 2000 
Negative figures primarily indicate products that were reprocessed into other refined products. 
** Saudi Aramco 50 percent share of production. 
The refined products of Saudi Aramco's refineries meet the needs of domestic 
markets, including the needs of the industrial sector, with the excess exported to 
other countries. Diesel oil production grew at an average annual rate of 7.7%, 
increasing from 21.5 million barrels in 1970 to 198.2 million barrels in 2000.33 
Production of kerosene and jet fuel increased at an average annual rate of 4%, rising 
from 20.6 million barrels to 66.9 mb during the same period . 
34 
43.2 Diversification policy 
Saudi Aramco's gas infrastructure and processing plants are being expanded to meet 
downstream domestic demand. Saudi Aramco has identified three specific targets 
with regards to its gas reserves, to: 
optimise ethane and natural gas liquids (NGL) utilization up to 2025 and beyond 
identify the ultimate economically-recoverable gas reserves of the country 
identify the appropriate near-term actions which allow ongoing development of the 
gas sector. 
Since the .1 970s, the MGS has offered substantial economic benefits by gathering 
and utilizing the associated gas to diversify the country's sources of income, 
stimulating industries such as petrochemicals and providing more affordable 
utilities. 35 The vision is to create a prosperous Saudi Arabia, that is less dependent 
on crude oil exports. The Saudi Government believes that a well-planned 
programme would not only achieve this goal but also accomplish several other 
objectives: 
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petroleum based industries would produce fuels, petrochemicals and other feed 
stocks, thus adding value to crude oil and expanding Saudi Arabian manufacturing 
and export opportunities 
non-petroleum industries - including steel, cement and agriculture would reduce the 
Kingdom's dependence on imports 
development of industries in different parts of the country would contribute to 
regional and national prosperity, distributing wealth across the country 
operation of these industries would entail the training of large numbers of Saudis, 
thus raising the nation's manpower skills and providing newjob opportunities. 36 
4.3.3 Saudi Aramco exports 
Saudi Aramco exports 78.6% of its oil production and 48% of its refined produetS. 37 
Countries in East Asia are by far the most significant customers for oil exports. 
Building on its reputation as a reliable supplier of crude oil, Saudi Aramco has 
established a strong position downstream in the international oil industry. The 
company has a global marketing organization with subsidiary offices in New York, 
London, Tokyo and Singapore, and sells crude oil, refined products, NGL and sulfur 
to customers worldwide. Indeed, Saudi Aramco has become the world's largest 
crude oil marketer and owns the world's newest crude oil tanker fleet. 38 
Accordingly, Table 4.8, below, sets out the exports of Saudi Aramco's crude oil, 
refined products, and NGL (in barrels) for the 5 years from 1996 to 2002. 
Table 4.9 shows the world market percentages of Saudi crude oil exports by Saudi 
Aramco according to different regions of the world. It shows that Saudi Aramco is a 
key oil supplier for USA, Europe and Asia. However, the importance of the market 
has varied according to market conditions. 39 While Saudi Aramco production levels 
have altered sharply over time, it has been a critical exporter for at least three 
decades. Saudi Aramco sells oil as a global commodity at market prices on a 
relatively free world market, and the destination of its oil is determined largely by 
current transportation costs and other marginal price differences affecting a given 
consuming region. The only major exception has been the oil that Saudi Arabia 
supplies to the United Kingdom under a defense procurement agreement by which it 
obtains advanced aircraft and infrastructure development for the Saudi air force. 
This oil reached a peak of 600,000 b/d but declined to about half that amount in the 
late 1990s. Saudi Aramco sells it at market prices. 40 
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Table 4.8 Saudi Aramco exports (barrels) 
Year Crude oil Refined products NGL 
2002 1,897,875,597 145,084,881 239.265,378 
2001 2,178,400,024 169,281,494 230,072.047 
2000 2,263,876,508 175,609,350 237,803,981 
1999 2,085,712,815 176,445,226 235,032,625 
1998 2,349,177,143 191,780,263 240,536,573 
1997 2,284,246,362 187,304,346 244,015,639 
1996 2,283,963,361 211,589,896 252,277,979 
Sources: Saudi Aramco, Annual Reviews, 1996-2002 and Saudi Review- Economic & Political 
Analysis Issue 12 Nov. 2001, p. 78 
Table 4.9 Percentages of Saudi crude oil exports - World market 1996-2001 
Region 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Europe 11.0 13.2 12.5 10.1 10.7 8.6 7.9 
Far East 39.1 38,0 37.2 38.8 40.7 42.8 43.7 
Mediterranean 
area 
14.2 13.8 14.6 11.3 10.3 9.5 10.1 
USA 20.2 20.0 21.5 23.4 23.3 24.2 23.7 
Other 15.0 14.0 14.2 16.4 15.0 14.9 14.6 
Sources: Saudi Aramco, Aramco Reviews, 1996-2002 
World market percentages of Saudi Aramco's refined product exports for the 5 years 
from 1996 to 2001 are set out in Table 4.10 below. The company expands its exports 
by creating massive downstream refining capabilities through seven refineries with 
capacity more than 2.8 million b/d. 
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Table 4.10 Percentages of Saudi refined exports- World market 
Region 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Europe 1.3 0.4 3.2 2.87 3.1 6.7 
Far East 57.7 51.3 57.2 68.4 61.0 61.1- 
Mediterranean Area 7.4 1 5.2 1 5.9 4.5 5.8 1 6. 
USA 11.0 11.0 6.1 1.8 1.5 1.6 
Other 32.6. 32.1 27.6 22.5 28.6 24.2 
Sources: Saudi Review- Economic & Political Analysis Issue 12 Nov. 2001, p. 80 
Table 4.11 shows the world market percentages of Saudi Aramco NGL exports 
during 1996 to 2000. However, Saudi Aramco use most of its gas production to 
meet domestic demands and it is focusing on the gas development to provide energy 
as well as feedstock for local petrochemical plants. As a result, it is focusing on the 
development of gas to provide a nation-wide source of energy as well as feedstock 
for product and petrochemicals. The EIA reports that Saudi Arabia has not 
expressed great interest in liquefied natural gas because it is more cost-effective to 
use it as feedstock or fuel. 41 
Table 4.11 Percentages of Saudi Aramco NGL export - World market 
Region 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Europe 0.2 0.5 0.6 0 0 0 
Far East 68.5 68.1 65.8 73.2 49.6 62.6 
Mediterranean Area 7.9 8.6 7.6 4.5 2.6 4.7 
USA 1.8 0 0.5 1 0.4 1 0.9 0.4 
Other 23.6 22.8 25.5 1 21.9 1 46.9 32.3 
Source: Saudi Aramco, "Facts and Figures", public Relation, 2001 
Saudi Aramco has two main oil pipelines, the East-West Crude Oil Pipeline 
(Petroline) that carries up to 4.8 million barrels per day of crude to refineries in the 
western province and to Red Sea terminals for export, and the, Abqaiq, Yanbu 
natural gas liquid pipeline which carries up to 270,000 barrels per day to the Yanbu 
petrochemicals plant. 42 
4.4 Technology development levers 
At Saudi Aramco, there is the realization that technology contributes significantly to 
growth and development. All divisions of the company therefore encourage the 
acquisition of technological know-how. As noted earlier in Chapter three, Saudi 
Arabia relies on joint ventures for the importation of technology with a view to 
diffusing it through the economic structure, encouraging development of indigenous 
technological capability. Unfortunately, though, for many joint ventures, imported 
technology has seldom resulted in the development of indigenous 'know how'. The 
direction and formulation of policies require knowledge and awareness of the 
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technology transfer process. Many of the companies often have to adjust their 
policies with changing realities. Such policies have often been in response to the 
effects of the past working of the transfer process, and have neither the scope nor the 
depth required to meet present and future needs. 
4.4.1 Technology strategy and policy objectives 
In recent times, Saudi Aramco's oil policy has focused on the following factors: 
necessity of maximizing returns from oil 
need to ensure internal self-sufficiency in the supply of products 
continuing efforts to increase petroleum reserves 
diversification of the energy and financial base of the economy 
international framework of Saudi's oil policy. 43 
The Minister of Petroleum and Minerals Mr. Al Naimi amplified on these points in 
2001 at Conference on Energy Policy in Norway. He noted that oil was seen as "an 
extension of our governing system, as a tool to help achieve our economic and social 
prosperity, and to make meaningful contributions toward peace and economic 
development at the regional and global levels - especially to less fortunate societies. 
" He describes Saudi oil strategy as follows: 
"... Oil policy is (determined by) our position on the world's oil map. We have about 
25% of all proven conventional reserves, currently more than 260 billion barrels. If 
you add the reserves of our neighbors in the Gulf, the total comes to around 500 
billion barrels. It is natural, therefore, that we work to expand the use of, but prolong 
the life of, oil, far into the future. I feel we are succeeding; yet we face problems 
from within the oil business and from outsiders. Within our business, there are those 
who have doubts about the future of our commodity. Others may look only at short- 
term interests, where in the end they might not see the long-term issues". 
"And from the outsiders, there are those whom we might call the anti-oil groups, 
who are using every tactic to discredit oil. Sometimes, they talk about the insecurity 
of supply or independence from foreign sources. Other times they are disguised 
under the guise of environmental protection or restriction of globalization which 
they fear multinational enterprises. 
"The debate can often rise to highly emotional levels. We in Saudi Arabia and, I 
believe, the majority of all of producers feel it is unwise to be guided by emotions. 
Rather, we consider it a duty to protect our long-term interests from any influence 
that might impair our ability to function as major oil suppliers to the world. Only by 
remaining focused on such a mission will stability prevail". 
"The Saudi government is working diligently to reduce the level of dependency on 
oil. The Kingdom is currently undertaking major steps toward economic and 
financial reforms, which will eventually facilitate diversification of the economy and 
lessen our dependence on a single depleting natural resource". 
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"To summarize, Saudi Arabia's oil policies are grounded in the prudent 
management of an abundant and valuable natural resource. We share with our GCC 
neighbors the desire to conduct business world wide in a very competitive market 
economy. And we have been working hard to create a stable environment for much 
needed commodity oil while promoting a better 
- 
understanding of the challenges and 
risks that its delivery entails. Our goal is a stable market, a reasonable price for our 
9 44 commodity and the realization of prosperity for ourselves and those we serve' . 
Up to now, Saudi Aramco has been successful in developing its existing fields in the 
most economically efficient manner, bringing new ones on line when needed, 
creating efficient refineries and creating a large petrochemical industry. Unlike 
many other oil and gas exporting states, Saudi Arabia also has invested in the kind 
of production capacity, refining output, and downstream operations which are suited 
to a strategy of maintaining moderate prices and high long-term demand. Saudi 
Arabia has demonstrated its commitment to securing its markets indefinitely into the 
future by keeping production high and prices at levels that ensure that it can steadily 
expand its exports. 45 
All these criteria emphasize the financial proceeds from oil resources. Although the 
third point highlights Saudi Aramco's effort in oil exploration, no mention is made 
of production. Presumably this is expected to be carried out by the foreign oil 
companies for an indefinite period. The policies in the past highlighted Saudi 
Arabia's quest for oil technology. This was first manifested prominently, and clearly 
distinguished between oil exploration licenses which entitle the holder to 'explore' 
for petroleum and oil prospecting licenses which entitle the holder to 'prospect' for 
petroleum The prospecting policy attracted a number of foreign oil companies. 
Even though oil prospecting licenses imposed certain obligations on the 
government. Retained in earlier legislation, the oil prospecting licenses agreement 
made it mandatory for oil-prospecting concessions to develop indigenous manpower 
and to provide certain infrastructure and utilities in the areas of operation. 
In 1970 the Saudi Council decreed that a petroleum technology institute should be 
created, but it was not until 1971 that the Petroleum Institute was established 
through a joint technological collaboration agreement with King Fahd University for 
Petroleum. As part of a separate decree, which established the Oil Company (Saudi 
Aramco), training responsibilities were emphasized. And since its inception, Saudi 
Aramco has conducted manpower recruitment for its exploration and production 
departments, with heavy concentration on geologists, geo-physicists, petroleum 
engineers and production engineers. A petroleum technology development fund was 
also established and is currently administered by a division of the company. The 
fund provides scholarships, especially on postgraduate courses, in petroleum 
technology and related fields. The strategies or policy actions enumerated above are 
oriented towards transferring technology from upstream operations. From the work 
of past researches into the oil industry, Saudi Aramco and governmental approaches 
to the acquisition of 'know-how' for downstream activities has increased markedly. 
It reflects Saudi Aramco's strategy for the development of local entrepreneurial 
capability especially in international marketing operations, which is based on 
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envisaged cooperation between foreign companies and the national corporation. The 
construction of refineries subsequently was based on turnkey contracts. 
In the oil sector, policy has not been clearly spelt out. However, general statements 
have been made in national development plans emphasizing the need for indigenous 
participation in the oil service sector. Saudi Aramco as part of its policy for the 
development of indigenous technology capability has given priority to research and 
development locally. At the same time, the Research and Development department 
was formed to provide services to almost all departments. Turnkey projects involve 
the construction and initial operation of the project by specialist contractors who 
demonstrate the running of the project with a view of eventually transferring control 
to nationals by conducting basic and applied research. In addition, laboratory 
services, both routine and non-routine, are transferred to support operational needs 
of the corporation. 
4.4.2 Research and Development: expenditure and trends 
Saudi Arainco has strong experience in technology development. Research prepared 
by Dr. Fuad AI-Adil has thrown light on Saudi Aramco's strategic decision directing 
its engineers, researchers, scientists and technicians to search for technologies to 
increase profits and productivity. It also seeks those technologies which help to 
maintain the environment and to increase safety levels of operations. The creation 
of technical programmes can be traced back to the early nineties and the main 
objective behind them was to effectively participate in increasing Saudi Aramco 
income through development of technologies that enables the company to occupy a 
leading position in its field. The means and methods used for transference and 
development of technology can be summarized according to four major milestones: 
First: undergoing pure and applied researches by the company to find suitable 
technologies 
Second: Saudi Aramco welcomes cooperation with national universities and is 
aware of the practical importance and strategic dimension of such cooperation. This 
is evidenced by the company's agreement between King Fahd University of 
Petroleum and Minerals and collaboration with King Abdul Aziz City for Science 
and Technology, King Saud University and all Kingdom Universities 
Third: transference of development and introduction of modem technologies into 
company operations. This can be summarized as a continuous search for 
technologies pertinent to petroleum and gas production activities 
Fourth: participation in the company's international programmes for technology 
development. The company is keen to cooperate with advanced international 
universities and specialized research centres. It already participates in joint industry 
projects, enabling funding of specific technologies for specific areas, and also allows 
division of expenditure between all companies. It is estimated that the average 
research revenue resulting from these projects is US$ 25 for each dollar paid by the 
company. 46 
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Table 4.12 shows that Saudi Aramco spends little money on R&D compared to the 
size and magnitude of its activities as one of the leading oil companies in the world. 
The table also suggests that Saudi Aramco is heavily dependent on technologies 
imported from foreign countries rather than the development of local technologies to 
meet requirements. 
Table 4.12 Saudi Aramco expenditure on R&D, 1997- 2001 (In SR. Million) 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
50 40 30 60 70 
Source: Figures are estimates based on data from different reports and information from Saudi 
Aramco, 2002 
However, Saudi Aramco has made strenuous efforts to introduce advanced 
technology into its disparate activities. For instance, the company has locally 
developed technologies in prospecting for the accurate specification of oil fields, 
especially large fields such as the Al-Ghawar field, (the largest petroleum field in 
the world) . 
47 Also, the local development of three-dimensional seismographic search 
(3D-Seismic) technologies contributes to the acquisition of precise information 
about fields. Computer experts of the petroleum engineering centre at Aramco use 
locally developed sophisticated computer software to help increase productivity of 
petroleum and gas wells. 48 Such technology enables experts to follow precisely 
changes that take place in 'lurking' situations. And gives opportunity to accurately 
locate petroleum sites which are not developed. The research and development 
laboratories centre in Dahran was also able to obtain an invention patent from the 
US for developing a heat-breaking technology that helped in assessment of 
petroleum reserves of the Al-Sheeba field in the Al-Rab Al-Khali region. 49 
Appendix 5 shows that Saudi Aramco is successful in locally developing its own 
technology, as well as making improvements to imported technologies. "Me list 
contains 91 patents granted to Saudi Aramco and registered in the United States 
between 1976 and 2002. 
Saudi Aramco has also added new technologies through the establishment of an 
automatic experimental laboratory that deals with hydrogen breakage-50 Moreover, 
researchers at the Company's research and development laboratory have designed a 
mobile laboratory equipped with the most modem analytical devices used at 
refineries during the catalyst generation process. 51 The company is using the latest 
technologies in control of different manufacturing stages in petrol refineries, 
including those types of technologies that rely on infrared radiation. This allows 
precise spontaneous measurement of manufactured compound properties. The 
company has also adopted modem techniques to simulate process conditions at 
refineries, developing recommendations to take appropriate practical decisions. 
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4.4.3 Research and Development Centres 
Saudi Aramco has long been considered a pioneer in the development of petroleum 
technology. The first phase of a new Research & Development Centre was 
inaugurated in Dhahran in 2002 and is expected to boost R&D in Saudi industries in 
general, and the petroleum industry in particular. The centre will eventually employ 
350 engineering scientists during the first two phases of development. 52 The facility 
will expand and upgrade research equipment to support exploration, production and 
refining operations. Saudi Aramco reports that its scientists and researchers often 
develop additional value through patentable discoveries as they work to meet the 
challenges associated with the company's complex operations. 53 To support such 
endeavours, the company has an Intellectual Assets Management (IAM) team to 
manage and protect company-developed assets and commercially exploit those 
developed by company technology and research. This initiative which started in 
2000 centralises the processing of patents and copyrights so that intellectual 
properties can be licensed and developed for marketing. This in turn has great 
potential to increase future revenues and generate significant cost savings, according 
to the company. 
A major upgrade programme at Ras Tanura refinery spurred the construction of the 
new Ras Tanura Laboratory (RTL). The 4,500 sq m facility is connected to an 
advanced computer system - the Laboratory Information Management System - 
linking it to all refinery plants and related administrative divisions. Among the most 
important pieces of RTL equipment are octane engines, which measure gasoline- 
combustion efficiency; gas chromatographs, used to determine the components of 
samples; and inductively coupled plasma-mass analyzers, which determine the 
percentaqe of metals in various types of water used in refining operations and for 
4 drinking. 4 RTL also operates a miniature fractionation tower. It is used to study 
crude oil distillation and help determine product quantity and quality - which 
benefits marketing and planning. 
Effective corrosion control can save Saudi Arabia in general, and Saudi Aramco, in 
particular, huge amounts of money in potentially lost natural resources. In its 
ongoing battle against corrosion in the harsh environmental conditions prevalent in 
the Kingdom, Saudi Aramco has turned away from metals, which have been the 
staple material for oil and gas industry, to hi-tech non-metallic materials. In 
particular, the company is installing phenolic gratings on offshore structures because 
of their superior corrosion resistance, strength-to-weight ratio and fire resistance. 55 
Officials have stated that the company should further promote the use of non- 
metallic material. Accordingly, Saudi Aramco has been testing two types of non- 
metallic piping for oil industry application. 56 
Saudi Aramco has improved engineering capabilities in risk-based assessment and 
fitness-for-service determinations, and uses new technologies, which allows it to 
reduce the probability and consequences of certain equipment failure. To 
demonstrate further the company's commitment to fight against corrosion, Saudi 
Aramco will complete 21,000 sq in of additional laboratory and administrative 
facilities in 2005 at its Dhahran Research & Development Centre to house state-of- 
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the-art corrosion testing facilities, including high pressure circulating loops to 
simulate field conditions. 57 The first phase of the R&D was completed in 2002. 
Another significant development within Saudi Aramco, is the reservoir simulation 
Supercomputer Platform that is now used mainly to run the Company's parallel 
simulator called POWERS. This system was developed in-house, comprising over 
180 processors that process data simultaneously. 
4.4.4 Overseas joint ventures 
As early as the mid 1980s the Kingdom decided that it must build strategic 
petroleum relations with oil consumers. These relations included entering into joint 
petroleum ventures with advanced countries to refine Saudi oil and distribute 
petroleum products. This achieved a dedicated market for Saudi oil, irrespective of 
the price fluctuations that occurred. It also achieved additional income for Saudi 
Aramco as a result of refining and distribution operations. The first project was 
signed with the US company, Texaco, in 1988. It was followed by similar projects in 
South Korea, Philippines and Greece. Saudi Aramco is currently seeking to enter 
into similar projects especially with countries increasing oil demand growth, such as 
China and India. 
Several of Saudi Aramco's downstream projects have involved investments in joint 
venture partnerships in the US. The earlier mentioned partnership formed by Saudi 
Aramco and Texaco meant that Saudi Aramco acquired 50 percent of Texaco's 
refineries and distribution network in the US East and Gulf Coast regions. Known as 
the Star Enterprise project, it had a combined capacity of 615,000 bpd, and a 
distribution network covering 26 states in the eastern and southern US, including the 
District of Columbia . 
58 This venture opened a downstream outlet that provided 
quality crude in a lucrative area over a long period. In mid-1997, agreement was 
reached by Saudi Aramco, Texaco, and Shell Oil to dissolve the Star Enterprise and 
merge the refining and marketing activities in the Eastern and Gulf Coast regions of 
the United States into one company, Motiva Enterprises. The merger of Star and 
Shell makes it one of the largest refining and marketing companies in the US. 
Saudi Aramco has diversified and integrated its operations through strategic joint 
venture alliances with leading refining and marketing companies in the Company's 
principal crude oil markets. Through such alliances, Saudi Aramco benefits from the 
management expertise, market strength and experiences of its joint venture partners. 
For example, in 1991, Saudi Aramco acquired a 35 percent interest in Ssang Yong 
Oil Refining Company. This is South Korea's third largest refiner and leading 
lubricant manufacturer, having also a strong marketing presence in the Pacific Rim 
region. To such alliances, Saudi Aramco brings its strengths as the world's largest 
crude oil producer and a major international refiner. 
In 1994, Saudi Aramco entered into a further joint venture. This time it was with the 
Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC). It purchased 40 per cent of the 
outstanding shares of PNOC's refining and marketing partner. Consequently Saudi 
Aramco committed itself to supplying at least 90 per cent of its crude requirement of 
155,000 BPD. 59 Petron has more than 1,000 retail outlets and owns a 155,000 bpd 
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refinery. In March 1996, Saudi Aramco acquired a 50 percent interest in Motor Oil 
Hellas and Avin Oil, the refining and distribution affiliates of Greece's 
Vardinoyannis Group. Additionally, as at the time of writing, Saudi Arainco is 
engaged in negotiations with Exxon Mobil and China-Sinopec, a Chinese 
government-owned enterprise, for 220,000 barrels per day (bpd) joint venture oil 
refinery project in China. Discussions are also reported to include petrochemical 
plant expansion and repair of an existing refinery in China. 
Saudi Aramco has already established a strong foothold in the Chinese domestic 
market, having renewed a crude supply agreement with the Chinese International 
Petroleum and Chemicals Company in Saudi Aramco's Sinopec subsidiary 
company. Fujian Refining and Chemicals in a joint venture with Exxon Mobil will 
build an integrated plant in Fujian province. It will include an eight million ton per 
year refinery, 600,000 tons per year ethylene facility, 300,000 tons per year 
polypropylene facility and 450,000 tons per year polyethylene plant. 61 
Saudi Aramco will own a 25 per cent share of these projects. 62 Saudi Aramco is 
committed to the long-term success of its international joint ventures as evidenced 
by its support for economically justifiable major improvement projects in each joint 
venture. The Company currently has equity participation in thirteen refineries 
worldwide, with total crude oil distillation capacity of 150 million tons per year or 3 
million barrels per day. 63 
The details of the joint venture Refineries of the Saudi Aramco are set out in table 
4.13 below with the names of the joint venture partners, the country, the products as 
well as the Saudi Aramco ownership percentages. 
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Table 4.13 : Saudi Aramco's joint venture refineries 
(Thousands of barrels per day) 
International Countries Products Saudi Aramco 
Ownership 
Motive Enterprises USA 840 50% 
_S. 
Oil, S. Korea South Korea 575 35% 
Petron ýhilippines P 180 40% 
Motor oil (Hella) Greece 100 41.9% 
Domestics 
. 
SASREF Jubail 305 50% 
SAMREF Yanbu 365 5% 
Source: Saudi Aramco, Annual Review, 2002, p. 28 
The Kingdom views joint ventures with foreign partners as the most practical and 
efficient form of business organization to transfer technology to partners in 
developing countries. There are numerous benefits which partners from developed 
countries can reap from establishing joint ventures overseas. The most important 
benefits include: 
Free access to competitively priced feedstock and raw materials, thus decreasing 
dependence on foreign suppliers and attendant exposure to the vagaries of 
fluctuating market demand and the prices of raw materials 
Entry into the markets of partners that might otherwise be entirely closed, and 
geographical proximity to other markets, which can help to save transportation 
costs. The strategic geographic location of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for 
exporting products to Europe, Asia-Pacific, Africa and the Middle East is of critical 
importance in this regard. 
The benefits which Saudi Aramco can gain, include state-of-the-art technology; 
production of high quality product and systematic staff training and development in 
production operations, marketing and management. Joint Ventures are playing an 
important role in bringing change in the economic structure of Saudi Arabia, and the 
production of petrochemicals and other energy related manufactured products in 
which Saudi Arabia has a comparative advantage. JVs bring about an increased 
volume of national output for local consumption and export trade. Other beneficial 
effects on international trade include increasing the volume of trade among 
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countries, changing their pattern and direction of trade through globalization and 
liberalization. 
4.4.5 Diversiflcation 
Saudi Aramco plays a pivotal role in the future development of the Kingdom's gas 
resources, working with the international oil companies as part of a long term 
strategy to provide expertise and knowledge in the unique working environment of 
the gas industry. Central to the development of the gas sector is the establishment of 
an integrated industry, from exploration and production to supply lines and pipelines 
for primary industries, desalination units, power plants and exports. On June 3, 
2001, BP Conoco, Exxon Mobil, Marathon Oil, Occidental, Phillips, Royal 
Dutch/Shell and Total FinaElf signed three agreements - called 'Core Ventures' - to 
spend at least $ 25 billion on gas exploration, production, transportation and 
processing, in addition to petrochemical projects, power stations and desalination 
plants. 64 Some $ 50 billion has 
6 
been spent on joint venture refineries and 
petrochemical plants in the country. 5 These core projects are expected to stimulate 
the private sector into providing further downstream services, increasing 
localization, providing new jobs, transferring technology and facilitating the training 
of Saudi nationals. 
At the upstream level, which is mainly exploration and production, involvement of 
international companies is not needed. The Kingdom has at its disposal, through 
Saudi Aramco, the expertise to develop natural gas reserves. More than sixty years 
of experience, backed by state-of-the-art technology, gives Saudi Aramco an edge. 
Since 2001, the focus of upstream Saudi Arainco investment has been the three 
'Core Ventures' (CVs). These include: the South Ghawar project led by Exxon 
Mobil, with Shell, BP and Phillips, the Red Sea project also led by ExxonMobil but 
this time with an Enron/Occidental partnership; and the Shaybah venture, led by 
Shell with Total Fina Elf and Conoco. 66 Core Venture One is the largest of the three 
projects and covers exploration in the empty quarter, which has estimated gas 
reserves of at least 30 trillion cubic feet, plus gas processing plants and ethane 
crackers in both Jubail and Yanbu. The venture will also include a 2,000 MW 
power plant and two ISO million gallon per day desalination plants. 67 Core Venture 
Two includes exploration in the northern Red Sea area and the development of the 
Midyan and Bargan gas fields, plus power, desalination and petrochemical plants. 
Core Venture Three, meanwhile, includes gas exploration in the Southern part of the 
Empty Quarter, the development of the Kidan gas field and power, water and 
petrochemical plants in Jubail. Service sector companies are hoping to participate in 
technology transfer and many different facets of the Gas Initiative through contracts 
in the upstream, midstream and downstream elements of the projects, including gas 
processing, petrochemical, electricity and desalination plants. For the construction 
sector it will be very important in terms of investment in new petrochemical, 
desalination and industrial plants, which in turn will mean additional investment in 
pipelines and related services. 
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Mr. Al-Naimi made his view clear in a speech at the Houston Forum on October 20, 
1999: 
"I am happy to tell you today that many of the proposals which we have received 
do fit within our needs and within the criteria we have just mentioned. We 
are looking into these proposals carefully, with each receiving close 
consideration. Equally important, we are considering other new ideas and 
possible projects. We expect soon, therefore, to see the commencement of 
negotiations with companies to formalize the needed projects. In this regard, 
I would like this opportunity to make it , clear 
that the concerned companies 
will have an equal and fair chance. Moreover, the proposals and information 
supplied by each will be kept completely confidential". 68 
The Ministerial Committee for the Saudi Gas Initiative provided the following 
clarifications regarding Saudi Arabia's policy on foreign investment in gas: 
" The Kingdom is fully committed to offering International Oil Companies (IOC) 
world-class rewards for their investments in world-class projects. Furthermore, 
we will make sure that the fiscal term to be applied to the CVs is appropriate to 
produce acceptable returns from exploration and production activities, as well as 
the midstream and downstream segments of integrated core ventures 
" IOCs will be free to produce and market all gas liquids associated with natural 
gas discoveries - but not crude oil 
" Long-term supplies of feedstock gas for the straddle plant project in CV I are 
guaranteed 
" Long-term supplies of feedstock (gas and liquids) for downstream projects are 
guaranteed until IOCs discover their own gas resources 
Saudi Aramco will be a participant in IOC projects, not a competitor 
Some of the power, desalination, and petrochemical projects that were 
previously described as satellite projects, have been included in the CVs 
Additional data on CV I will be made available to IOCs 
Details of regulatory system, to in place by end-2001, will be officially 
published after approval by the Supreme Petroleum Council. 69 
This activity demonstrated Saudi Arabia's interest in foreign investment and played 
a key role in the creation of gas expansion (see Appendix 6 for list of Aramco's 
subsidary companies). 
4.4.6 Human resources management and employmentl growth 
Saudi Aramco management's commitment to the development of human resources 
is a driver in all Saudi Aramco policies for future development, particularly in the 
transfer, adaptation and localization of technology. The employment, training and 
professional development of Saudi nationals had been a guiding principle since the 
earliest days of the venture, and Saudi executives, professionals, and operations 
personnel are to be found throughout the company. Saudi Aramco also believes that 
human resource development is a company responsibility. In this regard, Saudi 
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Aramco in its efforts to employ the best available Saudi manpower, places emphasis 
on trainees to take over the future responsibilities of the company. Almost all the 
trainees come from the best universities and educational institutions in the Kingdom 
and the Middle East region and a healthy percentage possess US and UK 
qualifications. 
Saudi Aramco, plays a major role in creating a healthy environment to attract foreign 
investment in the Kingdom by working closely with foreign international companies 
as part of a long-term strategy to provide assistance, expertise and knowledge in the 
working environment. As a result of Saudi Aramco training programmes aimed at 
Saudisation, progress has been made from 1993 to 1999 towards increasing Saudi 
manpower, gradually decreasing the expatriate work force. A comparison of Saudi 
Aramco manpower levels after initiating the above programmes from 1993 to 2001 
is set out in Table 4.14. 
Table 4.14 Manpower category 1993-2001 
Ca gory 
Year Saudi Expatriates Total 
2001 45,650 8,455 54,116 
2000 45,620 8,445 54.076 
1999 45,586 8,490 54,076 
1998 46,172 9,360 55,532 
1997 46,429 9,916 56,345 
1996 46,133 10,347 56,480 
1995 1 46,180 11,596 57,776 
1994 44,938 12,548 57,486 
1993 37,233 12,435 49,668 
Sources: Saudi Aramco, Human Resources Department, 2001 
The Saudi Aramco's work force by the end of 2001 totaled more than 54 thousand 
employees, representing more than 50 nationalities, 80 per cent of whom are 
Saudis. 70 Table 4.15 breaks down the employment structure still further, with a 
focus on total employees, Saudi nationals, supervisory and professional job 
percentages held by Saudis in Saudi Arainco from 1991 to 2000. The data reflect 
the success of human resource development and Aramco's Saudisation programmes. 
About 10 million hours were invested in the company's development of human 
resources during 2002 alone. 71 
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Table 4.15 Saudi Arameo human resources development 1991-2000 
Year Total employees Saudi 
nationals_ 
% Saudis in 
supervisory posts 
% Saudis in 
professional jobs 
2000 54,501 46,315 85 100 
1998 55,532 46,172 _ 80 100 
1997 56,345 46,629 79 - 
1996 56,480 46,133 - 
1995 57,776 46,180 - 
1993 47,500 34,500 76 60 
1992 46,023 33,847 66 42 
1991 1 45,036 32,900 ' 76 56 
Sources: Saudi Aramco "The Arabian Sun- Special Edition Vol. LVI, No. 3 November 7,2ool 
Saudi Aramco's human resources development policy has- recognised that having 
highly qualified people using the most appropriate technologies and business 
practices is the key to success. Table 4.14 clearly indicates that the company focused 
on developing the skills and the capabilities of its 54,501 employees. As part of 
these efforts, in 2002, Saudi Aramco employees submitted nearly 3,500 innovative 
ideas via the company's web-based Idea Management System. 72 These idea and 
suggestions ranged from improving the most basic work process or piece of 
equipment to patentable ideas. Many of these ideas will have a profound impact on 
Saudi Aramco's future. 
4.4.7 Saudisation - roles played by Saudi Aramco 
In 1949, when Harry Snyder was hired to head up the training of Saudis for Aramco, 
James Terry Duce, a company executive in New York, told him what was expected: 
"Your task at Aramco is to train Saudis as quickly and as soundly as possible to 
operate the Saudi oil industry. Inevitably, the Saudi Arab Government will 
eventually nationalize the industry. When that occurs, we want the young Saudis to 
have attained the proficiency that will enable them to operate the oil industry 
efficiently and with goodwill toward Aramco. Thus they will be serving their 
country's best interests and will be protecting the interests of our parent 
companies". 73 
From that time, Saudisation and the development of a highly specialized and 
competent national workforce has been a top priority at Saudi Aramco. It has 
achieved an 86% Saudi workforce through a concerted process of "Saudisation". 
The company is implementing eight mutually supportive strategies to achieve 
"Saudisation" ofjobs, technology transfer and productivity improvement: 
the company provides resources, education, training and development 
opportunities to national employees at all levels. More than 86 percent of 
nearly 54,500 employees, for example, are Saudi nationals 
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2. Saudi nationals hold all jobs at the highest levels of management 
3. state-of-the-art technologies are employed in all operations. Cutting-edge 
applications of the in dustry's latest processes flow easily across Saudi 
Aramco's operations 
4. linking, for example, national employees with specialists at all work levels 
5. employee development programmes focus on building job performance 
competencies and leadership skills 
6. special emphasis is given to projects that provide high-level employment 
opportunities 
7. professional training and exposure to new technology 
8. Saudi Aramco is committed to M roving the lives of its Saudi employees, 
IS! 
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their communities and institutions 
Saudi Aramco provides its employees with a broad range of training and career 
development activities. Job training and educational programme participants include 
individuals enrolled in the apprenticeship programme. For example, in 2002 job 
training and educational programme Saudi participants included 1,973 individuals 
enrolled in the apprenticeship programme. 75 Also Saudi Aramco sponsors students, 
both employees and non-employees, seeking university degrees, including 
bachelors, masters, doctoral and advanced degrees, inside and outside the Kingdom, 
every year. (See section 4.4.8) Lack of Saudi educational planning in the past had 
led to expatriate domination of the industrial sector. And studies by the World Bank 
indicate that the Saudi education system is failing to educate Saudi students for 
future jobs adequately. 76 But the situation in Saudi Aramco has been corrected by 
changing the emphasis in education and training programmes. This experience 
confirms that the important factor for "Saudisation" in Saudi Aramco is to have in 
place an educational system tailored to the needs of its industry. 
4.4.8 Training, education and career development 
Saudi Aramco's work force by the end of 2002 totaled 54,501 employees. 77 These 
employees represented more than 50 nationalities, though by far the largest number, 
85 per cent, are Saudis. 78 Saudis hold 100 percent of the company's senior 
management positions and 80 percent of the company's 2,500 supervisory positions. 
Saudi Aramco's training and career development programme is one of the largest of 
its kind in the world, and is staffed by more than 2,000 full-time researchers, trainers 
79 and support personnel. Its aim is to transfer technology to Saudis for the purpose 
of building a Saudi national work force. 80 
Saudi Aramco's MCD has established 10 multimedia learning resource centres 
throughout Saudi Arabia, serving the growing needs within Saudi Aramco for 
professional training. The Corporate Learning Centres were originally established to 
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meet the demand for training thousands of employees to handle basic computer 
functions. Today, they offer an efficient training option because the same number of 
employees can study the same basic courses, which are taught in the classroom at less cost and in less time, thereby providing more value. T&CD reports directly to 
the General Manager. This Division performs two major functions, curriculum 
development and testing and evaluation. An international system for planning and developing instructional programmes, Instructional Systems Development, has been 
adopted to ensure that instructions address the knowledge, skills and attitudes 
essential for successful job performance. 
At Saudi Aramco, all employees, no matter how skilled, periodically upgrade their 
skills in specialized training courses, either in-Kingdom or overseas. Saudi Aramco 
has had a training programme in place since the earliest days when the Kingdom 
signed its first oil concession agreement in the 1930s. In the beginning, training was 
conducted at the worksite to accomplish a particular task, but, following the 
discovery of oil in 1938, a previously inexperienced workforce ballooned to meet 
the needs of the company. Saudi Aramco opened its first schools in 1940 and 1941 
to teach English, arithmetic and the rules of industrial safety. Although primitive, 
these schools marked the start of a training programme, which has expanded into the 
world's largest. 8 1 The Arainco Production Training Programme, started in 1949, was 
the first to qualify large numbers of Saudis for jobs held by expatriates, marking the 
beginning of the Saudisation process. In the 1950s, Saudi Aramco built Industrial 
Training Centres in Abqaiq, Dhahran and Ras Tanura. In the first five years, the 
programme raised 12,000 Saudi employees from unskilled to skilled and semi- 
skilled job levels. 82 Table 4.16 lists the throughput of training programmes initiated 
by Saudi Aramco from 1993 to 1999, showing the steady yearly increase in 
participants. 
Table 4.16 Training participants 1993-1999 
Category 
Year Prof 
develop ent 
College degree IndJadmin. 
(trainee/RDP) 
Total 
1999 1,055 1,019 4,586 6,660 
1998 1,104 1,035 4,931 7,070 
1997 1,034 985 5,362 7,381 
1996 846 857 5,540 7,243 
1995 782 760 6,091 7,633 
1994 811 719 6,483 8,013 
1993 780 578 5,346 6,704 j 
Sources: Saudi Arameo, internal reports, Human Resource Department, 2000 
During the year 2000, there were about 3,800 participants in job-related academic 
courses and almost 4,800 enrolled in Job Skills and on-the-job training programme, 
as a part of their Saudisation drive. Maintenance new hires join Saudi Aramco as 
apprentices. These new hires progress from intensive classroom/shop training in 
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industrial skills training school to eventual on-the-job qualification. Job qualification 
and certification are conducted in operating plants and shops as a part of routine 
daily work. The Company adopted a four stage maintenance training programme, 
consisting of one year of basic ITCATS core courses at the AMTC followed by 1 V2 
to two years ofjob targeted training. 83 
Finally the trainees return to the AMTC for another 1 V2 to two years for advanced 
craft training classes. The duration of the training programme varies according to 
job target, it averaged about five years from starting out at the AMTC to 
qualification for an entry-level maintenance job. Several more years of work 
experience and specialized training classes were required to make an employee a 
fully qualified critical-skills craftsman. Structural development has created digital 
instrumentation technicians, machinists, welders, air conditioning technicians, 
electricians and associated support personnel. All operations candidates are hired 
into a two-year apprentice-training programme. After a year of basic training at the 
company training school, candidates are moved to special on-the-job training 
programmes. The Producing Training Division at operating plant sites conducts 
these programmes and in remote area training to systematically progress their skills 
and knowledge from the basic duties of the outside plant operator up through the 
advanced duties of the computer control system operator 
Table 4.17 Saudi Arameo training expenditure - 1997 to 2001 (SR Millions) 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
350 315 360 345 320 
Source: Estimates based on different reports from Saudi Aramco, 2002 
Saudi Aramco has spent a lot of money in training and human resource development 
as shown in Table 4.17. Saudi Aramco is seeking experienced staff to develop and 
manage its hydrocarbon reserves, both oil and gas. It offers a unique opportunity to 
work with cutting edge technology in the world's most important petroleum 
environment. Saudi Aramco encourages teamwork whilst promoting individual 
initiative and a proactive approach to the job at hand. With a quarter of the world's 
oil reserves and a growing role in the gas market, Saudi Aramco offers a wide 
spectrum of challenges to its employees of all disciplines. The sheer size of the 
operation demands dynamic, proactive engineers who are not afraid to back their 
judgment and proven experience with tough decisions. Candidates must hold a 
relevant academic qualification. He must have extensive skills and expertise. 
We leamt from this chapter about, Saudi Aramco's experience in technology 
transfer. How this Company has achieved great success in the transfer of 
technology using different methods from Joint Venture projects to Turn Key 
Contracts. This success can be measured in the transfer of latest technology the 
knowledge, know-how and experience in the different areas of oil exploration and 
refining, thereby harnessing, developing, adapting and localizing the latest 
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technologies to develop and maximize the production capacity of Saudi Aramco. 
The development of Saudi Aramco demonstrates the significant role it has played in 
the transfer, adaptation and localisation of the latest and most modem technology 
from the developed world to the Kingdom for the improvement of the oil industry. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DOWNSTREAM PETRO-CHEMICAL INDUSTRIALISATION 
AND THE ROLE OF SABIC 
5.1 Introduction 
Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC - see Appendix 7 for Organisational 
Chart) provides a good example of Saudi industrialization achievements. SABIC has 
made a significant impact on the Saudi industries and Saudi economy. It contributes 
to domestic capital formation and value added, has lent substantial support to the 
Kingdom's balance of payments and sold millions of tons of goods to agriculture, 
industry and the construction sectors. SABIC is seeking technology, management 
and marketing skills not available in the Kingdom. Therefore technology and 
technology transfer are essential elements of SABIC's strategy to help to produce 
top quality products to customers worldwide. 
This chapter will examine the success of technology transfer as a key element for 
SABIC petrochemical industrial development. It focuses on the process of acquiring 
advanced foreign technology in the establishment of petrochemical joint venture 
projects. The chapter explores how technology transfer is initiated, highlighting the 
role of SABIC's policies for technology transfer and technology development in 
Saudi Arabia. It describes the scope of Saudi petrochemical technology transfer. 
Specifically, it explains the development of SABIC's petrochemical industry and the 
conditions facing this industry. It also provides a background for understanding the 
case study evaluation, raising issues for further analysis that will be presented in 
chapter 6 of this thesis. 
5.2 Industrial antecedents: SABIC - the cornerstone of Saudi industry 
Saudi Basic Industries Corporation was established in 1976 to expand and diversify 
the economic base of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom's commitment 
was to develop a sound economic base through industrialization to create non-oil 
exports, other than just relying on exporting crude oil. Emphasis on the 
petrochemical industry found full expression in the First Five-Year Plan (1970- 
1975), which called for the production of a high volume and variety of 
petrochemicals as well as fertilizers. However, it was only effective during the 
Fourth Five Year Plan when these projects came to full production. One of the more 
important of these projects Was Al Jubail. 
In the early 1970s the Saudi government saw Al Jubail as a growth pole for 
petrochemical and other industries because of the proximity of the Berri crude oil 
and gas field and the deep-water channel that makes the site suitable for 
international shipping. In 1973 the Bechtel Corporation was commissioned to draw 
up a master plan for Al Jubail that defined infrastructure requirements, located 
industries within the site, and set forth land use and community plans, conceptual 
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designs of components, and environment al-control measures. When the master plan 
was presented to the Saudi government in 1975, it was decided to establish a Royal 
Commission for Jubail and Yanbu. 1 
These two centres, however, provided SABIC's industries with the necessary inputs, 
such as feedstock, fuel, water, electricity, manpower. There were numerous 
opportunities available for this modem industry including: 
development of large-scale hydrocarbon processing industries, generally 
in partnership with leading multinational organizations 
establishment of down-stream manufacturing enterprises using feedstock 
produced by larger industries 
setting-up of manufacturing concerns to create other products for export 
and/or local distribution 
establishment of support operations designed to offer essential goods and 
services to other industries and the community at large. 2 
Shortly after SABIC was established in 1976, The Minister of Industry, Dr 
Algosaibi, approached the leading oil and chemical corporations to interest them in 
establishing petrochemical joint-ventures. 
These corporations had great misgivings, however. Doubts existed concerning the 
adequacy of the rate of return, and whether satisfactory markets could be found for 
petrochemical products. After negotiations in Riyadh, Houston, and - other world 
centres, five major US corporations showed serious interest: Exxon, Mobil, Shell, 
Dow Chemicals, and Celanese-Texas Eastern. It was nevertheless tentatively agreed 
with the five US corporations to produce the petrochemicals noted in Table 5.1. 
SABIC continues to work in partnership with leading international companies, 
utilizing the most advanced technologies and employing a highly trained workforce. 
SABIC's list of foreign partners includes leading international petrochemical 
producers from the USA, Europe, Japan, and Asia such as Shell, ExxonMobil, 
Celanese, Mitsubishi, Fortern Oil &Gas, Ecofuel (ENI), and Taiwan Fertilizer. 
People in SABIC have not found these joint ventures easy and a great deal of 
negotiation has had to take place. The petrochemical products and the volume of 
output had to be decided upon; the various processes to make these products 
reviewed and selected; contractors to design and construct the complexes have had 
to be screened and chosen; bidding documents have had to be issued and bids 
received; the bids have had to be reviewed with the bidders' justifying the process; 
and finally, the contracts have had to be drawn up, including financial arrangements. 
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Table 5.1 Early planning of SABIC joint-venture production, 1980 
(in metric tons per year) 
Product SABIC- 
Mobil 
SABIC- 
Shell 
SABIC-. 
Exxon 
SABIC- 
DOW 
SABIC- 
Celanese 
SABIC- 
Japanese 
SABIC 
PDC 
Ethylene 450,000 656,000 500,000 500,000 - 
Low Density 
Polyethylene 
200,000 - 681,0000 - 130,000 
High Density 
Polyethylene 
91,000 - 180,000 - 
Ethylene 
Glycol 
220,000 - 300,000 
Ethylene 
Dichloride 
- 454,000 - 
Caustic Soda - 377,000 
Styrene - 295,000 
Ethanol - 281,000 
Chlorine - 330,000 
Ethyl Benzene - 327,000 - 
Methanol - - - 730,000 650,000 600,000 
Total 961000 1181000 1410000 650000 600000 430000 
Sources: SABIC- Planning Department, Internal Reports, 1980-1985 
Since the early 1980s, a succession of 18 world-scale complexes have come on 
stream with facilities expanded to meet domestic, regional and global demand. 3 At 
the start of the 21" century SABIC has become a catalyst for Saudi economic growth 
and development, encouraging further diversification of the Kingdom's industrial 
base by capitalizing on its natural, human and physical resources to promote 
economic progress. SABIC's manufacturing and support industries produce and 
market worldwide a diverse range of quality petrochemicals, plastic resins, 
fertilizers, metals and industrial gases. SABIC is expanding production capacity, 
enhancing its global marketing presence, increasing efficiency and capability as a 
major player in the petrochemicals industry through research and development, and 
investing its financial strength to improve profitability and shareholder value. 
Several key factors have contributed to SABIC's success. These include political 
stability, a strong economy, and commitment to free enterprise, open markets and 
the encouragement of industrial growth by the government. 4 
5.2.1 Development characteristics 
SABIC's strategic goals stemmed from and have been parallel to the strategic targets 
of the Saudi National Development Plans. From the very beginning, SABIC has 
identified its goals, as follows: 
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" transfer modem international technologies into the Kingdom to build up an 
industrially oriented Saudi workforce capable of shouldering responsibility for 
and developing such technologies 
" utlilization of the country's hydrocarbon and mineral resources, making use of 
the 'competitive advantage' provided by their utilization rather than exporting 
them as new materials 
" adding value to such resources by managing the fluctuations in world market 
prices for primary materials; avoiding the negative impact of such fluctuations 
on the performance and stability of national economy 
" creation of a solid base of basic products on which generations of downstream 
and supportive industries can be based; realizing industrial integration in the 
country, gradually reducing imports and motivating the national private sector to 
invest in industrial fields 
catching up with the industrialised world by opening new marketing outlets and 
channels for Saudi products; to diversify 
5 
sources of national income so that 
dependence should not remain on oil alone. 
The main thrust of SABIC has been to minimize the country's dependence on a 
single resource for economic development, reducing dependence on the import 
sector, and adding value to the country's resources. Taking into consideration the 
advantage of abundant and cheap natural resources, as well as the firm capital base 
for technology transfers, emphasis has been placed upon the use of research 
channels to develop existing products and to create new products and new usage. 
SABIC has achieved growth through a well-conceived and efficiently implemented 
strategy of partnership, joint ventures, and technology transfer. The four most 
important criteria applied in the selection of partners are: 
" international reputation as an industry leader 
" technological expertise and willingness to share and transfer know-how 
"a proven share of the global market to assist SABIC to introduce its own 
products 
" readiness to help SABIC develop Saudi human resources by providing 
training and hands-on experience for Saudi citizens to shoulder operational, 
technological and administrative responsibilities. 6 
SABIC's joint venture partners feature prominent names from the US, Europe and 
Asia. Through joint ventures and a strict focus on human resource development, 
SABIC has managed to groom a generation of technocrats and managers to operate 
and manage its world scale industries. Cost reduction has traditionally been sought 
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to survive periodic downturns in the business cycle. However, it has become harder 
for SABIC to squeeze costs through the supply chain. Instead, SABIC has adopted 
new growth strategies, technological improvements, and organizational 
restructuring. In the long term, the cyclical nature of the petrochemical industry will 
continue to be felt. Companies will increasingly adopt globalization as a strategy to 
achieve growth. This makes it even more important to tap into regional and global 
markets. SABIC needs to maintain its market share in the face of intense market 
competition and achieve consistent growth and stable profits despite the swings of 
the trade and petrochemical cycles. 
SABIC's impact on major production sectors of the economy has also been very 
important. The most significant contribution has been in the plastic manufacturing 
sector where the number of plants has grown from less than ten in 1985 to over 450 
plants in 2000.7 Demand for plastic resins has grown from a few hundred tons to 
over 600 thousand tons, worth SR 1.6 billion during the same period. 8 SABIC has 
also made substantial contributions toward the Saudi economy to achieve self- 
sufficiency in agricultural fertilizers and various types of construction steel. For the 
last 25 years, SABIC has been a leading force in the development of the Kingdom's 
plastic industries. A recent study by SABIC and Tecnon Orbich has confirmed the 
objectives for the Saudi polymer industry as follows: 
" increased contribution to the Seventh Development Plan principally 
Saudisation 
" rationalisation of the weaker industrial elements and a strengthening of 
technological clusters over the medium term 
" improved export by encouraging such clusters to move down the 'value chain' 
" improved efficiencies and profitability of clients. 
5.3 Industrial status 
5.3.1 Product portfolio 
SABIC's comparative advantage as a petrochemical and chemical producer is 
founded on its abundant reserves of hydrocarbon feed stocks, multiple production 
sources for petrochemicals, and proximity to markets. The raw materials for most of 
SABIC's industries are ethane and methane. These are obtained mainly from the 
associated natural gas that is recovered as part of crude oil production. Natural gas 
and natural gas liquids are the key natural resources for the Kingdom's industrial 
development today. Figure 5.2 illustrates the structure of SABIC production. 
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Table 5.2 SABIC production, sales and domestic consumption 
1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 
Production (kmt) 6459 12870 21951 28080 35442 40540 
Total Sales (kmt) 5155 10536 16921 21320 27371 ý9589 
Export Sales (kmt) 3522 6845 11403 14189 18065 19946 
Domestic Sales (lant) 1633 3691 5518 7131 9306 9643 
Profits (MSR) 
Excluding Foreign Partners 
148 3030 6281 3630 1780 2849 
Sources: SABIC, Operational Planning Department, Internal Reports, 1985,1990,1995,2000- 
2002 
Table 5.2 shows that total SABIC production has increased from 6.5 million tons in 
1985 to over 40.5 million tons in the year 2002; i. e., an average growth rate of 
10.3% annually. 9 Total sales grew by 10% on average annually from 5.1 million 
tons in 1985 to 29.5 million tons in 2002.10 Export sales increased on average by 
9.8% per annum, and SABIC domestic sales to the local market including captive 
use have shown the highest growth rate during the period, reaching 11 %. 11 These 
achievements would not have been possible without transfer of technology and 
know-how development. 
The production and capacities of SABIC core industry groups for 2002 are given in 
Table 5.3 below. 
Table 5.3 SABIC's five core industrial groups, 2002 
Basic 
Chemicals 
OOOmt Intermediates OOOmt Polymers OOOmt Fertilizer 000mt Metals 00orta 
Ethylene 5700 Ind. gas 3485 PE 2434 Ammonia 2030 Steel 3409 
Methanol 3750 EG 1855 pp 900 Urea 2612 
MTBE 2700 EDC 840 PVC 324 Phospha 810 
Propylene 1105 NACH 670 Polyesters 154 Sulfuric 
Acid 
100 
Styrene 1040 vCM 990 Polyesters 135 
Benzene 515 PTA 350 Melamine 20 
Xylems 375 2-E H 150 
CIE 300 - 
Butadiene 130 
Butene-I 100 - - 
Total 
Capacity 
I 15,860 
I 
- I 7460 6717 5259 3409 
Sources: SABIC Annual Reports, 2002 
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SABIC's manufacturing base includes 18 industrial complexes operated by 17 
affiliates and interests in another three industrial ventures in the Arabian Gulf. 12 
SABIC through its subsidiary companies, provides the private sector with raw 
materials and technical expertise for producing a wide range of consumer products. 
Broad categories of the various products produced through five core industry groups 
are - Basic Chemicals, Intermediates, Polymers, Fertilizers and Metals (see Figure 
5.1 overleaO. 
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Figure S. I SABIC Structures of Production and Operation 
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5.3.2 SABIC's growth 
SABIC's current product range is heavily weighted towards basic chemicals and 
intermediates, and SABIC has been planning to diversify its product range and 
expand the volume of its existing production. SABIC production as well as sales of 
basic chemicals and intermediates account for around 60 per cent and 37 per cent of 
the total production and total sales respectively. 13 Table 5.4 gives the details of 
production and sales during the four years ending 2001. 
Table 5.4 SABIC production and sales, 1998-2001 
Producti n (mmt) Sales (SRm) 
Product groups 1998 1999 2000 2001 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Basic chemicals 10954 11030 12520 14571 7142 7530 8300 9897 
Intermediates 4828 4560 4880 7182 4348 4150 '4180 6532 
Fertilizers 4399 4360 5120 5357 2910 2980 3460 3600 
Polymers 2663 2580 1 2660 4202 2657 2560 2580 2575 
Metals 2499 2610 1 2900 3110 2317 2850 2800 3385 
Total 25343 27139 1 28080 34422 1 19374 20070 21320 27371 
Sources: SABIC, Annual Reports, 1998,1999,2000, and 2001 
Differences in production and sales are due to in-house usage for producing valued 
added products. Rapid growth has been a strong feature of SABIC over the past 27 
years and it looks likely to remain so, as the industry aims to match its historical 
average of installing 1.5 million t/y of new production capacity up to 201 0.14 
However, growth will not just be generated at home. In a ma or departure from the 
past, SABIC has its sights firmly set on acquisition and joint ventures overseas. 
Mergers and acquisitions have become a commonplace activity to enable companies 
to become more competitive. A number of large-scale mergers have taken place. 
The Chevron-Philips alliance gave birth to a world-class player, creating the largest 
polyethylene (HDPE) producer in North America. Dow's acquisition of Union 
Carbide has created the world's second largest chemical manufacturer, accounting 
for more than half of US polyethylene production. 15 Mitsui Chemical and Sumitomo 
Chemical, with combined sales of over $1.5 billion accounts for more than 30 
percent of the domestic polyolefin market. 16 Consolidation has thus enabled the 
largest producers to dominate the market. SABIC's vision for growth is to be among 
these few companies and become a global leader in petrochemicals. 17 
In this direction, SABIC finalised its purchase of the Dutch DSM petrochemicals 
business in 2002. The move is strategically significant as it positions SABIC to 
become the II th biggest player in the global field, from its previous place on the 
22nd rung. 18 In 2001, DSM Petrochemicals generated sales of Euro 2.4 billion. 19 It 
annually sells about 2.6 million tonnes of polymers, mainly in Europe. 20 This move 
established SABIC as the third and fourth global player in the polyethylene and 
polypropylene businesses respectively. Following the acquisition of DSM 
Petrochemicals, the latter was renamed SABIC Euro Petrochemicals. The 
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transaction involved the transfer of all shares of the companies that together formed 
DSM Petrochemicals (DPQ; the associated DPC participations and sales activities, 
and the related technology positions, patents and trade names. The total 
consideration of the transaction was EUR 2.250 billion as of the effective selling 
date I January 2002 
.21 Through this acquisition, SABIC took a major step forward in the implementation of its strategy, aimed at becoming a leading global player in 
petrochemicals. In total about 2,300 DSM employees transferred to SABIC. DPC 
employs 2,060 people, of whom about 1,530 are based in Geleen (Netherlands) and 22 530 in Gelsenkirchen (Germany). DPC activities of other DSM units involve a 
total of about 220 people. 23 The transaction will not lead to any changes in the 
employer-employee relationship or the terrns of employment in force. This deal will 
lead to a strong partnership between DSM and SABIC. At the Geleen (Netherlands) 
site specifically the partners will have mutual supply of feedstock and products and 
the provision of services and utilities. As such, this strategy represents an 
acceleration of SABIC's ongoing transfori-nation and concentration on global 
leadership positions in high added-value activities characterized by high growth and 
more stable profit levels. 
New products were introduced within the existing industry framework and 
additional manufacturing units successfully brought on stream. As a result, SABIC 
remains one of the most profitable chemical companies and one of the biggest and 
lowest cost producers in the world. 24 Its success is substantially dependent on access 
to cheap raw materials from Saudi Arainco. 'Most of our achievements can be 
attributed to our commitment to goals that were part of a national vision, ' says, Mr 
Mohamed Al Mady, SABIC's Vice Chairman and Chief Executive Officer. 
... 'The corporation controls 5-10 percent of the global petrochemicals 
market and as much as 20 percent of the markets for some individual 
products. My aim is to see SABIC among the world's top five 
petrochemicals companies. It is part of SABIC strategic vision to be a 
global leader'. 25 
5.3.3 Expansion / diversification policy 
In Saudi Arabia, SABIC has become a symbol of national industrial development. 
As most of its products represent raw materials for downstream industries, SABIC's 
growth contributed to the expansion of the Saudi industrial sector. One particular 
example i's the plastic products industry in the Kingdom, which consumed 15,000 
metric tons per year of plastic resins in the early 1980s. 26 In recent years, SABIC has 
been supplying more than 600,000 metric tons of resins per year to domestic 
industry. 27 SABIC's role as a raw material supplier is complemented by its 
commitment to providing technical support services and help to the domestic 
industry to find the right technology. It also conducts periodic project feasibility 
studies to help private sector industries identify new business opportunities for using 
its products as raw material. Financial participation in industrial ventures has been 
another SABIC vehicle for promoting national development. SABIC have already 
set a production target of 50 million tons per year to be achieved by 201 0.28 Such 
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growth in manufacturing capacity is necessary as SABIC pushes itself to maintain 
and earn its position among global petrochemical industry leaders. For example, 
SABIC has already started a major new investment to establish its 17'h world scale 
manufacturing affiliate in Saudi Arabia. 29 Table 5.5 lists future SABIC expansion 
projects. 
Table 5.5 SABIC major expansion projects 2003 - 2006 
Projects Location Capacities 
(mill ons of tons) 
Year of 
completion 
Ethlene/United Jubail 1,0 2004 
EG/United Jubail. 0,575 2004 
LAO Jobail 0.150 2005 
_ PE/Petrokemya Jubail 0,800 2004 
PVC/Ibn Hyyan Jubail 0,425 2005 
Oxygen/Netrogen Jubail 1,0 2004 
Oxyben/Netrogen Jubail 0,800 2004 
_ Ethelene/Yanpet Yanbu 0,368 2005 
_ Amonia-Urea/SAFCO Yanbu 1,0 2006 
_ Acitic Acid/Ibn Rushed Yanbu 0150 2005 
_ PTA/Ifbn Rushed Yanbu 0.200 2005 ýTotal 
6.068 
Source: SABIC, SBUs Planning, Internal Report, 2003 
For instance, Jubail United Petrochemical Company (UNITED), a wholly owned 
affiliate of SABIC, recently awarded an engineering services, construction and 
procurement contract at its ethylene glycol plant to a Japanese firm, Toyo 
Engineering Company. The $220 million project considered to be the largest of its 
kind in the world, with annual capacity of 630,000 mt of ethylene glycol is likely to 
be completed within 28 months. 30 UNITED's other plants include ethylene, with an 
annual capacity of 1,000,000 million tonnes and linear alpha olefins (LAO), with an 
annual capacity of (150,000) million tonnes. 31 In addition, the UNITED complex 
possesses 50 per cent of the Petrokemya polyethylene plant having an annual 
capacitý of 800,000 million tonnes. 32 The factorys cost has been estimated at SR 8 
billion. 3 In May 2002, Linde German was selected against international competition 
to carry out a contract for the National Industrial Gases Company (GAS); a partly 
owned affiliate of SABIC. 34 GAS already has a capacity of 5,600 t/d (tonnes per 
day) at its Jubail and Yanbu plants, and is the Middle East's largest supplier of 
industrial gas. 35 Established in 1983, it is a 70: 30 joint venture between SABIC and 
a group of local investors (see Table 5.6 for the historical profile of GAS). 
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Table 5.6 National Industrial Gases Company (GAS) 
Product Start-up Capacity Technology/ 
Engineering 
Hydrogen 1997 120 M/Hour 
Oxygen 1984 1,200 T/D British Gas 
1993 1,200 T/D Linde 
1999 1,200 T/D Air Products 
1999 170 T/D Air Products 
Nitrogen 1984 500 T/D British Gas 
1993 500 T/D Linde 
1999 1500 T/D Air Products 
1999 150 T/. D Air Products 
Argon 1997 7 KT/Y 
Yanbu/ Oxygen 1999 495 MY Linde/Linde 
1999 495 KTlY Linde/Linde 
Nitrogen 1999 594 KTlY Linde/Linde 
1999 594 KT/Y Linde / Linde 
Argon 1999 14 Kt/Y Linde/Linde 
Sources: Based on information from GAS, SABIC and Royal Commission. 
Saudi Arabian Fertilizer Company (SAFCO) - see Table 5.7 - was established in 
1969 to produce ammonia urea as a joint venture with Occidental Petroleum 
Corporation. In the beginning the plant was plagued by technical difficulties, 
management problems, and the falling world price of urea. However, the natural-gas 
feedstock, the water and the electricity were provided at heavily subsidized prices. 
In 1976 SABIC took over the exclusive management from Occidental Petroleum. 
Since that time SAFCO showed a profit-$35 million in 1979 and eventually, the 
price of urea began to rise. 
Table 5.7 Saudi Arabian Fertilizer Company (SAFCO) 
Product Start-up Capacity (000 
mt) 
Technology/ engineering 
Ammonia 1969 189 Icl 
1993 500 Haldor Topsoe/Chiyoda 
1999 500 Technimont 
Urea 1969 330 P Cros 
1993 600 G Stamicarbon/NSM 
1999 600 Tecnimont 
Sulfuric acid 1971 100 
Melamine _ 1985 20 Starnicarbon 
Feed Stock Source 
Natural Gas Saudi Aramco 
Markets: All products are marketed by SABIC 
Sources: Based on information from SAFCO, SABIC and Royal Commission 
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SABIC has three fertilizer manufacturing affiliates (SAFCO, SAMAD and IBN 
ALBAYTAR) and ranks as the world's second biggest producer of urea with 
36 capacity of 3 million MT/Y. SABIC, moreover, is the largest urea exporter in the 
world. 37 
Saudi Arabian Fertilizer Company (SAFCO), will, when further expansion is 
completed in 2006, consist of a single train ammonia plant to produce about I 
million t/y each of urea and ammonia. 38 It will take total SAFCO capacity to 1.2 
million t/y of ammonia and 1.5 million t/y of urea. 39 Estimated to cost between $400 
million-500 million, the project will entail the installation of two new lines. 40 
Natural gas extracted in Saudi Arabia will be used as feedstock. The Uhde group 
will be responsible for the entire basic and detailed engineering and procurement 
process as well as the project management, construction, plant commissioning and 
training of the operating personnel. The end product will be marketed worldwide by 
SABIC, which is the largest international fertilizer exporter (5.5 million tonnes per 
year). For Uhde, Dr. Wolfgang Essig, Chairman of Uhde's Executive Board, told the 
Info German Trade Review: 'With this contract we have now become a world leader 
in the field of high-capacity ammonia plants, and this constitutes a major step into 
the future of Uhde's Ammonia technology'. 41 
Acording to SABIC's plan, by the end of 2003, annual production will reach over 42 
million tons of petrochemicals. But SABICs top priority in the years ahead is to 
become a global leader by expanding at home and building up its presence abroad. 
SABIC is aware that the future growth of the global petrochemical industry is 
directly linked to the future growth of the world economy. Currently, Asian 
economies hold the best prospects for the future growth. For the period 2000-2005, 
China is expected to show the highest economic growth rate of 7.6 percent, followed 
by India with a growth rate of 6.7 percent. 42 Taiwan for the same period is likely to 
notch up a frýwth rate of 6.3 percent followed by South Korea with a growth rate of 
4, 6 percent. The proximity of the Asian region to the Middle East is an important 
incentive for investors in this region. Major producers should invest globally to be 
competitive and survive in today's world market. They will have to consolidate their 
operational and marketing activities, restructure and search for competitive 
advantages. SABIC'S global chemical position has grown over time and Table 5.11 
below shows the global position of SABIC's diverse product exports, especially 
chemical products. 
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Table 5.8 Chemical company financial performance -Selected Data 
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Company Reports. 
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SABIC has increased its share of the international petrochemical market over the 
past 15-20 years. 44 According to the corporation's estimates, it meets around 5 
percent of the expanding global demand for petrochemicals. 45 Its international 
marketing success steins from its reputation as a reliable supplier of quality products 
and customer-oriented support service. 46 
5.3.4 SABIC exports 
SABIC has developed a global marketing network that consists of local affiliates to 
service respective markets. The fundamental advantages of the Kingdom and its 
natural hydrocarbon resources is its access to competitively priced feedstock, a 
geographic location mid-way between major markets in Europe and Asia, and 
domestic and regional markets that hold tremendous potential for growth. Despite 
fluctuations resulting from turbulent world trade, and especially the petrochemical 
cycles, exports sales have been robust with a positive trend. 
SABIC's continuing goal is to provide products of world-class quality to local and 
diverse international markets to seek the most profitable payback possible on sales, 
following this up with reliable technical assistance and customer service 
worldwide. 47 At the same time, SABIC strives to cause minimum impact on 
existing markets by marketing its products in an orderly manner and pricing them at 
prevailing market levels. With the above marketing philosophy in mind, SABIC 
established SABIC Marketing Ltd, which is responsible for marketing products of 
SABIC affiliates, as well as other related industrial products and various services 
related to product sales. These services include logistics and insurance, technical 
assistance to customers before and after sales, plus providing customers with 
constructive advice to achieve maximum value from product sales. SABIC 
reinforced its marketing network by opening sales service offices and leasing 
storage facilities in various parts of the world, and by signing necessary charter 
transport agreements for shipping SABIC products. The Company has also 
established in-house workshops, laboratories and a technical service centre, staffing 
these facilities with technical personnel experienced with most advanced industrial 
applications. 
5.4 Technology development levers 
5.4.1 Technology strategy and policy objectives 
Research and technology is an essential element of SABIC's global strategy, helping 
to deliver top quality products to customers worldwide. Its three pronged strategy is 
on: - 
technology development 
technical support to customers 
improvement of manufacturing processes at SABIC plants in Jubail and 
Yanbu 
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R&T focused towards chemicals, catalysts, polymers, fertilizers, metals and 
environmental management. 
SABIC's R&D works in close coordination with SABIC's business units and 
manufacturing affiliates, consolidating research activities across all areas. The 
research is concentrated on applications according to the requirements of the 
markets. SABIC is committed to developing new technologies to strengthen the 
company's technological base and in-house research. As an important part of 
SABIC's global vision, R&D focuses on attracting home grown and international 
scientific talent to support these goals in Saudi Arabia, Europe, USA, Asia and the 
Far East, having over 500 scientists, technicians and administrative support staff to 
deliver its services. 48 SABIC's R&D progress has also meant that SABIC and Saudi 
Arabia are less dependent on foreign technology licensors. So far, several 
international licences hdve been granted. This is an important and real step on the 
road to scientific research and technological development, to be followed by other 
steps towards the development of local technology in the future. SABIC Research & 
Development has made solid achievements and has also played a key role in 
SABIC's strategy to develop its own technology. The technology quest underlines 
that SABIC is entering a new phase in its development. Some examples of SABIC's 
achievements are as follows: 
researchers at SABIC R&D, in cooperation with IFP (Institute of France du 
Petrol), have succeeded in developing butane-I technology, and 'Butadiene' 
production technology and consequently SABIC have become a 
technological partner of the French Institute and shares with it the right of 
licensing the same. This technology is being marketed worldwide as the IFP- 
SABIC butene-1 process. 
* developing new products in polystyrene 
* improving the PVC manufacturing process 
development of a new technology, Alpha Sablin, in the area of Alpha 
Olefins 
several solutions for industrial problems, such as corrosion and industrial 
loss 
supply of SABIC R&D services to the agricultural sector. Preliminary 
experiments at some of the national farms in increasing productivity and 
reducing irrigation water quantities 
cooperation with universities and with scientific and technological centres 
inside and outside the Kingdom. 
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SABIC has developed a model of innovation strategy. SABIC's innovation strategy 
is based on four elements: firstly, generation of new ideas and technologies; 
secondly, commercialising these ideas and technology so that from a revenue point 
of view it is possible get maximum financial benefit; human resources is the third 
element, which is the development of employees with high skills through which the 
company benefits by way of production growth, revenue and profit margins; the 
final step is the SABIC industrial culture that ensures international confidence and 
thereby global growth. This innovation strategy has led SABIC to develop very 
strong R&D activities and R&D structures. However, the weakness of this strategy 
seems to be the lack of an information structure which is available for scientists and 
engineers needing to expand their horizons and to be more open to other areas where 
they can get information to support analysis and findings. SABIC's innovation 
strategy can be summarized in four elements in Box 5.1 
Box. 5.1 SABIC innovation strategy 
SABIC's innovation strategy: 
knowledge infrastructure - to ensure 
SABIC business is at the forefront of generating 
new ideas 
commercialisation oftnowledge - to facilitate the 
necessary inechanisms to capture the benefits of new ideas 
human resources - to develop a workforce 
with the skills and attitudes to make new 
things happen, and 
industry environment and modernisation -to promote 
SABIC investment. 
Sources: Different industrial and investment reports, SABIC, 2000-2002 
SABIC R&D successes include a major breakthrough in the development of new 
technology to produce acetic acid from ethane oxidation; the first time that a modem 
grass root petrochemical technology has been developed in the Middle East. 49 The 
new process was developed after seven years of research and development work and 
differs fundamentally from the conventional industry practice of producing acetic 
acid through methanol carbonisation. 50 Acetic acid industrial applications include 
production of vinyl acetate monomer (VAM) and purified terephthalic acid (PTA). 
SABIC R&D has registered 221 patents in the development of new technologies in 
the technical support to affiliate manufacturing operations, and in the development 
of new improved products and processes (see Table 5.12). 
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Table 5.12 SABIC patents status 2002 
Status No. of Patents Years 
Under Study 47 2000-2003 
Field 169 1998-2003 
Granted 05 1995-2000 
Total 221 
Sources: SABIC's R&D, Internal Report, 2002 
Table 5.13 shows the SABIC patent status for 2002, which indicates that SABIC has 
5 patents completed and now registered with the Office of Patents in U. S. A. Under 
process of finalizing the necessary documentation for registration there are 169 
patents while 47 projects are under study. See Table 5.14 for the list of patents 
granted in the US. 
Table 5.13 SABIC patents registered with the Office of Patents in U. S. A 
Patent No. Title 
1) 6,448,348 Process for polymerizing olefins with supported Ziegler- 
Natta catalyst systems 
2) 6,413,901 Highly active, supported Zeigler-natta catalyst systems 
for olefin polymerization, methods of making and using 
the same. 
3) 6,403,520 Catalyst compositions for polymerizing olefins to 
multimode molecular weight distribution polymer, 
processes for production and use of the catalyst 
4) 6,288,182 Supported metalloocene catalyst system for olefin 
polymerization 
5) 5,240,754 
Container for photographic film cartridge 
Sources: SABIC, R&D and United States Patent and Trade Mark Office, 2002 
SABIC's experience in patent registration confirms that. the procedures are 
sophisticated and need specialized people to respond to all the requirements and 
51 follow up registration procedures. SABIC has learnt a lot from this experience and 
has been successful in completing 5 patents in the US as shown in table 5.13 upto 
the year 2002. These patents indicate the success of SABIC in developing 
technologies. The image of SABIC R&D has been enhanced after the development 
of SABIC's own processes for the production of Acetic Acid and Linear Alpha 
Olefins (LAO). SABIC announced the creation of a new technology for the 
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production of linear alpha olefins developed jointly with Germany's Line, which 
will be commercially used for the first time on a 150,000 tonne a year unit that is to 
be built at the $1,500 million olefins complex planned by Jubail United 
Petrochemical Company. 52 Registering patents within and outside the Kingdom 
shows the possibility of growing the business through technology and investing in 
the right technology at the right time. R&D has also developed a new catalyst for 
the production of butene-I known as SABCAT-1 that improves product quality and 
reduces production costs. SABCAT-1 will benefit PETROKEMIA and other butene- 
1 manufacturers. The products are expected to meet the demands of local industry. 
The R&D reveals major breakthroughs as detailed in Box 5.2. 
Box. 5.2 SABIC's successful research in catalyst developments 
and other various fields as follows: 
e catalyst developments 
0 catalyst pre-activation 
9 process technology development project 
* plant technology support projects 
e product development projects 
9 failures and corrosion problems. 
Sources: SABIC- R&T, internal reports, 1999-2002 
SABIC's R&D Centre is contributing to the profitability and business development 
of SABIC, through research on various product portfolios, technical support to 
plants and also to customers. A project to identify high volume corrosion in Saudi 
Arabia has been completed and draft reports issued by King Saud University include 
SABIC R&D comments which identifies several potential inhibitors to be 
manufactured by SABIC R&D. 53 In addition, a great deal of assistance and support 
has been provided to the plants and customers in their fabrication runs and physical, 
mechanical and analytical tests. 54 At SABIC's Complex for Research and 
Development, work proceeds to ensure product quality and improvement as well as 
to diversify categories, grades and develop applications. The complex is supported 
by integrated relations between SABIC's industrial facilities. 
5.4.2. Research and development: expenditure and trends 
In spite of huge reserves, petrochemical production in the Arab world does not 
exceed 5% of world OUtpUt. 55 One of the reasons for this weakness is the fact that 
Arab countries do not pay attention to R&D. The number of scientists in the Arab 
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world is very low, equal to 1.5% of the world total, whilst Europe enjoys 21% and 
North America 18%, respectively. 56 Total Arab expenditures on R&D is also very 
low (0.7% of the world total compared with North America's 43 %). 57 Recently, the 
Arab world started to recognize R&D and the role it might play in developing Arab 
countries. Since 1985, SABIC has spent huge amounts of money in R&D as shown 
in Figure 5.2, placing SABIC expenditure on R&D among top of the world 
companies that invest heavily in R&D. SABIC has a vision of developing its own 
technologies and improving the quality of products to keep competitive, because the 
nature of petrochemical products needs a continuous improvement process. 
Figure 5.2 SABIC expenditure on R&D 1995 to 2001 (SR Millions) 
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Sources: Based on inforination from SABIC R&D Internal Reports and SABIC Annual 
Reports 1983-2001 
The need of the Saudi petrochemical industry for R&D became obvious after 
production began in the early 1980s. In order for SABIC to break through the 
dependency on foreign technology and new products/materials, it focused research 
oil chemistry and chemical engineering to create new materials, industrial chemicals, 
and chemical processes. As Vice President of SABIC R&D confirmed: 
'SABIC R&D is mostly driven by technology rather than pure science 
and research for innovation knowledge, and understanding science has 
been replaced by product and process driven research that must meet the 
test of success in the competitive market place. The primary aim of almost 
every R&D project is to maximize return with minimum R&D expenses. 
Working with tighter budgets and smaller staffs, R&D managers have 
changed their focus and role to respond to corporate needs... by going 
global through overseas joint ventures or acquisition, SABIC will benefit 
froni technical advancement and talent that will give SABIC a leading 
edge. The technology quest underlines that SABIC is entering a new 
phase in its development; no company can continue to rely on imported 
technology'. 58 
By concentrating on technology, SABIC can upgrade people, matenal assets and 
add value to products. Technological advancernent and self-sufficiency will be the 
driving f'orcc behind future industrial growth. 
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5.4.3 Research and development centres 
Technology transfer has played a major role in the development of technology in 
SABIC's affiliates. Reflecting on the importance of modem technology and the 
concept of technology transfer, SABIC has developed a dedicated technological 
team at the company's Industrial Complex for Research and Development. The 
process is a result of the importance ofý technology transfer and consequential 
research and development. SABIC's complex for research and development, which 
was officially opened in 1994, created a strong infrastructure framework for 
undertaking research. The complex is located on a 33 hectare in Riyadh. It is a 
modem technology centre equipped with impressive facilities. Among these are 
pilot plants and bench scale reactors for producing new test grades of polymer 
resins, catalyst development and preparation laboratories, state of the art analytical 
instrumentation, and a staffed technical service laboratory. This centre is committed 
to carrying out systematic study of industrial process application technologies for 
SABIC's manufacturing operations in chemicals, polymers, fertilizers, metals, and 
catalytic research and new product development. The R&D group also work closely 
with SABIC marketing operations to provide customer related technical support. 
One aspect of SABIC's R&D strategy is its satellite research centres outside Saudi 
Arabia. These centres are active in exploratory research and exploit the knowledge 
and technologies available in each country. SABIC has built a strong research and 
technology (R&T) facility, as shown in Figure 5.3, that consists of the main SABIC 
R&D complex in Riyadh and SABIC Technology Centres (STCs) in the US, in Al 
Jubail and in India. 
Figure 5.3 SABIC R&D facilities 
SABIC Research and Technology Centres 
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Source: SABIC, R&D, Internal Reports, 2002 
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It is foreseen that this type of decentralized R&D will generate increased 
cooperation with leading overseas universities and research organizations and 
provide direct local technical service support to the customers of SABIC. 
According to the head of the research at SABIC R&D, these centres succeeded in 
developing collaborative research projects, inside and outside the Kingdom, with 
universities, national laboratories, consortia and academia to speed-up F roduct and 
process development and achieve targeted technological objectives. 5 SABIC is 
steadily heading towards multi-directional growth as it pools its R&D resources with 
government agencies and academic centres. 
Technological innovation in the petrochemical industry demands cooperation 
between R&D institutes and industry, and from the beginning, SABIC has 
developed wide cooperation with research institutes and universities outside the 
Kingdom. Table 5.14 shows the nature of such cooperation which covers mostly the 
most advanced industrial countries. These joint research projects can lead SABIC to 
meet its needs from technology development. 
Table 5.14 SABIC 's external research cpoperation with universities and, 
institutes inside and outside the Kingdom, 2002 
Country USA UK Germany France Canada Japan KSA 
Number of 3 2 2 1 2 1 5 
Research Institutes 
and Universities 
Source: SABIC R&D, External Research, 2003 
In the past, this cooperation was a new expeýience for SABIC, and difficulties were 
faced in its development. It was mostly individual efforts. However, SABIC has 
now gained good expertise and experience to pursue such cooperation. Cooperation 
mainly covers: 
technology process development 
product quality improvement 
technology improvement 
new technology, and 
cost reduction. 
For example, joint research with the Japan Research Institute has developed a plan 
to develop new materials for green houses using SABIC polymer raw materials, 
taking about three years to complete. In cooperation with Saudi Universities, 
SABIC has developed good relations. Table 5.15 lists SABIC's joint cooperation 
with Saudi Universities. The aim of this cooperation is to benefit from the capability 
of Saudi Universities and SABIC R&D in developing technology processes and 
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products. The experience of this cooperation is promising both for SABIC and the 
Universities. 
SABIC's R&D strategy focuses on attracting home grown and international 
scientific talent to support its technology development efforts in Saudi Arabia, USA 
and India. Tables 5.15 and 5.16 show the number of employees in SABIC R&D 
Centres according to Saudi and Non-Saudi categories in all areas covering research 
and development activities. 
Table 5.15 Number of employees in SABIC R&D Centres according to 
qualifications 
High school Technical 
college 
Bachelors Masters PhD Total 
91 67 216 47 69 490 
Sources: SABIC R&D, Internal Report, 2002 
SABIC's R&D geographical spread allows it to draw on worldwide expertise and to 
remain close to its global customers. SABIC R&D continues to work in developing 
new strategies and technology alternatives to support SABIC strategy. 
Table 5.16 Number of Saudi & non-Saudi employees in SABIC's R&D Centres 
Saudi Non-Saudi Total 
299 191 490 
Sources: SABIC R&D, Internal Report, 2002 
Another example of gaining access to the advanced technology is that of SABIC 
Euro Petrochemicals' acquisition of a 50% share in StaMax BV; a joint venture 
formed in 1999.60 This gives SABIC full ownership of this company which produces 
StaMax long glass fibre polypropylene composite material. Under the arrangement, 
Owens Coming will be the supplier of PerforMax glass fibre. StaMax BV will use 
Owens Coming's unique patented process and this proprietary glass fibre to produce 
and sell material in the European market. 
SABIC and Sild-Chemie AG have also announced a joint agreement on the 
acquisition of Scientific Design Company Inc. from Linde AG. Under this changed 
ownership, Scientific Design will remain an independent entity and continue to 
license its processes, provide engineering services and sell catalysts to its clients 
worldwide. SABIC and Sild-Chemie will manage the Scientific Design Company 
Inc. through a fifty-fifty joint venture. Scientific Design is based in Little Ferry, 
New Jersey, US; its major fields of business being catalysts and process-technology 
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for use in the production of major chemicals such as ethylene oxide and maleic 
anhydride. With more than 70 employees, the company has recorded sales in the 
double-digit million ranges in recent years. 61 
SABIC's Quality-Lab Networking Sub committee comprises one member from each 
SABIC affiliate, with a view to improving quality and promoting safety awareness 
among the laboratory personnel. Other aims include enhancing communication and 
cooperation between SABIC laboratories and providing a forum to share ideas, 
information and technical expertise on matters of common interest. 
5.4.4 SABICI's partnership/ joint ventures/ transfer 
SABIC success in the area of petrochemical manufacturing has over the years been a 
function of three main factors, namely: 
feed stock and energy resource advantages 
technological edge 
marketing capability. 
SABIC is willing to trade off some of its raw material and feedstock advantages for 
the advantages associated with the foreign joint venture model catering for a 
tripartite relationship. This model institutionalized the partnership relationship 
according to the features shown in Box 5.3. 
Box 5.3 SABIC's joint venture arrangements 
In SABIC's earlyjoint ventures, equity was equally shared with the foreign 
partner. More recently different arrangements involving unequal equity 
shares have been tried. 
In all cases, the SABIC model has given partners equal 
responsibility and an equal stake in the success of the joint venture 
It also eliminated many of the conflicts that can arise between 
majority and minority partners 
The SABIC model also called for the setting up of an independent 
company to run the business 
Production is shared between the partners according to an agreed 
formula 
With the JV acting as a profit centre, each partner has the 
responsibility of marketing its own share in the world market 
Profits are distributed according to equity shares. 
Sources: SABIC, " joint ventures agreements", Internal Reports, 1980-1994 
The success which SABIC has achieved in collaboration with a number of 
American, Japanese, European, Korean and Taiwanese companies attests to the 
success of the SABIC model; its practical use and sustained viability. Through joint 
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ventures and a strict focus on human resource development, SABIC has managed to 
groom a generation of technocrats and managers to operate and manage its world 
scale industries. The Company has also benefited from a strong and stable political, 
social and financial system that has been supportive of SABIC's industrial 
development programmes. The four most important issues in the selection of 
partners are listed in Box 5.4, below. 
Box 5.4 Criteria for selection of foreign partners in SABIC joint ventures 
" International reputation as an industry lead 
" Technical expertise and willingness to share and transfer this know 
how 
" Proven share of the global market that would help SABIC to 
introduce its own products 
" Readiness to help SABIC develop Saudi human resources by 
providing training and hands-on experience for Saudi citizens who 
will shoulder the operational, technological and administrative 
responsibilities. 
Source: SABIC, Annual Reports, 1985-1988, and SABI Planning Department 
The joint venture route has helped SABIC to achieve its early objectives. Of 
particular importance is the Corporation's contribution to developing the Kingdom's 
human resources and importing modem manufacturing technologies. SABIC and its 
affiliates have considerably strengthened their own capabilities to provide in-house 
job training for the new generation of Saudi workers. A full description of SABIC's 
joint ventures is shown at Appendix 8. 
5.4.5 Foreign joint ventures 
The most important lesson that SABIC has learned from its experience regarding 
foreign joint ventures is the necessity of institutionalizing its relationship with 
foreign partners. In most SABIC's earlier partnerships, equity was equally shared 
with foreign partners. In all cases, however, the SABIC model has given the partner 
equal responsibility and a fair stake in the success of the joint business. It also has 
effectively resolved many of the conflicts that were likely to arise between majority 
and minority partners in areas such as management control, pricing and marketing 
policies, profit distribution and future expansion plans of the joint investment. Short- 
term price changes regarding feedstock, electricity and other utility services have 
had negative effects on the ability of the industry to compete as well as discouraging 
foreign investment flows to the Kingdom. To build a partnership based on trust and 
to protect the partners' mutual interests, transparency is essential. Comprehensive 
agreements were negotiated in which potential conflict areas were discussed and 
resolved. The SABIC Model called for setting up of an independent company to run 
the business. Such a company had a Board of Directors in which partners can be 
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represented. SABIC partners who were early movers in the first wave of 
petrochemical manufacturing projects in the mid-1980s have had generally 
satisfactory financial returns on their efforts and risks over the past 15 years. Table 
5.17 summarizes the cumulative financial results for eight of the major joint 
ventures affiliated with SABIC during the past 15 years. SABIC's partners in these 
eight ventures have included large oil companies, such as Exxon/Mobil and Shell, 
chemical companies such as Celanese, Ecofuel, Mitsubishi and Neste, and a number 
of local and international investors. 
Table 5.17 SABIC Partner returns 1987-1999 
- Partner average annual operating income as % initial equity: 421/o/year 
1987 start up - Average cash dividends paid to partners as % initial equity: 28Vo/year 
8 joint ventures 
(I I partners) - None of the 8 joint ventures gave SABIC partners a negative return 
which began 
operations in - Cash dividends paid rate of return: 250/o/year 
early-mid 1980s 
- Compound growth of partner equity value: II 0/o/Yea 
- Total return to partners (1987-1999) 360/o/year 
Sources: SABIC, Operation Planning Department, 2001 
Note: combined financials shown assume all joint ventures began in 1987 - which would tend to 
slightly overstate actual returns of those joint ventures with earlier start-ups. 
Table 5.17 indicates the following performance achievements: 
cash dividends paid out to partners have averaged a rate of return of 
about 25% year on initial partner equity investment 
book value of partner's equity share in the eight ventures (after payment 
of cash dividends) has increased at a compound growth rate of 
approximately I I% year 
cash dividends paid (25% year) plus equity appreciation (11% year) 
provided a total return to investors of about 36% year 
none of the joint ventures had negative results - and all eight of these 
large, capital intensive, development projects paid cash dividends to 
partners that exceeded the initial equity invested within 5-7 years after 
operations began 
all eight joint ventures have elected to at least double - and in some 
cases, quadruple - the capacity of original facilities. 
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The 1987-1999 cumulative financial results for the eight joint ventures tend to 
overstate 'true' return, where the initial start-up of the operation occurred before 
1987. Even so this can be seen as a favourable track record for SABIC since the 
period 1987-1999 was a volatile and sometimes difficult period for the industry. 
None of the eight SABIC joint ventures has experienced disappointing performance. 
5.4.6 Diversification 
Partially, as a result of these efforts, SABIC's net profits, excluding those of foreign 
partners, increased from SR 148 million in 1985 to SR 40.2 billion by the end of 
2002.62 There have been several other benefits, and one of the more important of 
these has been the impact on the Saudi economy from increased capital formation. 
Table 5.18 below summarizes the capital formation contribution of SABIC to the 
industrial production base during the fifteen years 1985 to 2000. 
Table 5.18 SABIC's contribution to capital formation (Billion SR) 
1985 1990 1995 2000 
Gross capital formation 
Net capital formation 
11.6 
10.7 
18.9 
13.9 
53.9 
37.0 
. 94.7 
63.7 
Sources: SABIC, Annual Reports, 1985,1990,1995,2000, Planning Department, 2001 
Table 5.18 shows that the contribution of SABIC to Gross Capital Formation 
(including plant, equipment, property, and depreciation) increased on average by 
15% annually during the last fifteen years. 63 Its contribution to net fixed capital 
formation (excluding depreciation) has increased by 12.6% annually during the 
same period. 64 Primary and secondary manufactured products still represent only 
10% of Saudi's total exports. 65 Within the chemicals sector itself, Saudi Arabia had 
achieved a trade surplus of more than one billion SR by 1997.66 Relative to oil and 
oil products, Saudi's petrochemical exports were still relatively small in the late 
1990s. It has taken time for SABIC and other manufacturing activities to diversify 
the Kingdom's oil exports. 
5.4.7 Human resources and Saudisation 
One of the major goals in creating SABIC was to develop Saudi manpower. The 
first generation of SABIC's Saudi personnel received on-the-job training from joint 
ventures in industrial management, technical operation and administrative skills. 
SABIC considered human resources as the biggest challenge and the most difficult 
faced in the early stages of its operations due to the shortage of a skilled Saudi 
national work force. In order to face up to the challenge of developing a national 
work force capable of taking over management and technical positions in the future, 
SABIC started programmes for the development of human resources aimed at 
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fulfilling this aspiration. In addition to its concern for customers, SABIC 
demonstrated solid commitment to the development of growing numbers of 
employees. 67 
Saudisation requires massive investment in human capital. At SABIC, Saudisation 
has been an intensive manpower development and training programme. SABIC joint 
venture partners have aided the realization of Saudisation efforts. They have 
advanced the technological skills needed to help SABIC attain its goals. These joint 
efforts have made it possible to achieve a majority percentage of Saudi personnel 
throughout SABIC's plant, supervisory, technical and administrative staffs. By the 
year 2002,75% of SABIC's 12,000 workers were Saudi citizens. 68 Some SABIC 
affiliates have achieved Saudisation of up to 90 percent. 69 Moreover, the fact that 
most of the senior technical., administrative and other positions are held by Saudis 
deserves special mention. Tables 5.19 and 5.20 show a comparison of the manpower 
status in relation to the manpower development programmes in SABIC's companies, 
indicating how the gradual Saudisation has been implemented in SABIC. 
Table 5.19 Manpower status of SABIC Affiliates, 1997 
Saudi Expatriate Others Trainees Total 
Manpower 
Saudi 
AR-RAZI 348 7 50 407 86 
Gas 103 1 17 - 128 86 
Hadeed 1116 - 1522 424 3062 50 
Ibn Al Baytar 462 94 14 570 84 
Ibn Hayyan I - - - 1 100 
Ibn Rushd 92 3 752 161 1008 25 
Ibn Sina 246 7 90 - 343 72 
Ibn Zahr 304 1 81 70 456 82 
Kemya 269 6 70 - 345 78 
Petrokernya 898 - 24-0 104 1242 81 
SADAF 626 19 119 - 773 82 
SAFCO 617 - 231 43 891 74 
SAMAD 382 128 28 528 76 
SHARQ 531 7 106 25 669 83 
Yanpet 798 20 294 62 1174 73 
TOTAL 6793 71 3794 949 11607 1132 
Sources: SABIC/ Human Resources Department, Internal report, 1997 
In co-operation with its joint venture partners, SABIC has conducted training 
programmes inside and outside the Kingdom which have produced an industrially 
oriented generation of Saudi citizens. 
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Table 5.20 Manpower status of SABIC Affiliates -2001 
Saudi Secondees Others Trainees Total 
Manpower 
Saudi % 
AR-RAZI 373 2 40 415 90 
Gas 164 3 22 189 86 
Hadeed 2023 - 1276 66 3365 62 
Ibn Al Baytar 0 0 - 0 0 0 
Ibn Hayyan - - - - - - 
Ibn Rushd 467 - 606 21 1094 45 
Ibn Sina. 248 2 4 8 1 22 - 271 92 
. 
IbnZahr 409 0 4 9 1 38 12 460 92 
Kemya 465 4 6 5 46 82 - 597 79 
Petrokemya 1107 - 145 63 1315 89 
SADAF 633 10 48 33 724 92 
SAFCO 886 - 96 - 982 90 
SAMAD 385 8 41 434 89 
SHARQ 635 635 1 45 - 684 93 
Yanpet 1214 1214 22 323 16 1575 78 
fTOTAL 9009 94 2784 218 12105 75 
Sources: SABIC/ Human Resources Department, 2002 
5.4.8 Training, education and career development 
Although SABIC has had its own successes and drawbacks in its efforts to develop a 
local work force, early success of these programmes were reflected in the 
comparison of figures for the period 1980 to 1985. During the years 1980 and 1981 
only 1,400 trainees were involved in the training programmes. However, this 
marginal early success had its impact on the young generation, whereby more and 
more young Saudis were attracted to the programmes of SABIC. This increased the 
number of trainees and consequently much needed qualified and skilled employees 
for SABIC. The figure of 6,659 high calibre technical and management trainees that 
came out of these training programmes in 1985, as against 1,400 four years earlier, 
to take up responsible positions in SABIC, provides proof of the success of SABIC's 
human resource development policies. 70 With this early success, SABIC policy 
makers stressed the need to include provision in the joint venture agreements for the 
joint venture partners to provide training to SABIC employees. SABIC approached 
this early vision, mapping out a strategy to ensure success. 
The strategy included the hiring of graduates from universities and sending them to 
be trained with the foreign partners, in engineering, operation, management and 
marketing, for periods ranging from six months to three years. SABIC also started 
an English training programme vital to proper communication between foreign 
workers and Saudi trainees. SABIC sent its employees to the UK and USA for 
English training programmes of six to 18 months, helping to narrow the language 
barrier thereby helping Saudi employees to understand technological and operational 
theories. Moreover, as part of its employee-training scheme, SABIC entered into 
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agreements with universities and institutions in the Kingdom to conduct training 
programmes for its employees for one to two years. The main aim of SABIC's 
training programmes has been to give its employees an opportunity to gain wider 
knowledge and know-how and achieve the maximum benefits from joint venture 
partnerships within a limited space of time. Another important objective is to give 
all SABIC employees in general, and especially engineers and supervisory level 
staff, on-the-job training within the joint venture. In marketing, SABIC had the 
belief that experience in marketing cannot be easily achieved without actual 
participation of the people involved in marketing in dayAo-day marketing activities., 
Therefore, SABIC introduced a marketing programme through which they buy 
products similar to that of their own products and re-sell them to give them 
experience in the market itself. The aim is to make them ready to take over stiff 
challenges in marketing their own products when joint venture production 
commences. SABIC also placed special emphasis on petrochemical recycling and 
marketing research issues when SABIC sends employees to marketing consultants 
for higher training. SABIC pre-production marketing activities include domestic re- 
selling of products similar to those that would be produced in their plants. The re- 
sale programme was intended to study the market in the Kingdom, to identify its 
needs and requirements, to establish a close relationship between SABIC and the 
market and to build up a national staff trained in marketing and related technical 
services. While the above programmes were on going, SABIC conducted worldwide 
intensive market research. It also participated in specialized international 
conferences and symposiums, established working agreements with shoppers; 
carriers and insurers and opened branch offices in various cities in the world. The 
objective was to strengthen relations with foreign markets to develop marketing, 
capability, supporting SABIC s manufacturing projeCtS. 71 
When SABIC chose the joint-venture method for technology transfer and for 
implementation of its projects, the reasons were varied. The aims were to construct 
a strong bridge that would give SABIC's industries permanent access to new 
technologies and to ensure a fair share of SABIC products on world markets through 
distribution and marketing agreements with overseas partners. 
However, SABIC's fundamental objective in using the joint venture approach, was 
to accommodate the development of Saudi nationals, to make them capable of 
shouldering the responsibilities of industrialization. This required the preparation of 
training programmes for Saudi workers so that sufficient trained manpower required 
for management and operation would be available at the time of start-up. Table 5.21 
details SABIC's expenditure on worker training over the period 1985-2001. Also in 
the 1980's, SABIC started successive qualifying and training programmes within the 
Kingdom, followed by on-the-job training inside and outside the country at its plants 
and plants of its partners. These training programmes received large numbers of 
secondary and intermediate school graduates as prospective trainees. 
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Table 5.21 SABIC annual expenditure on training 1985 to 2001 (SR. millions) 
1985 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
55 77 86 73 88 79 
Sources: Based on information from SABIC Reports 1985,1997,1998,2000 and 2001 
The number of Saudi employees in the areas of direct management and maintenance 
at SABIC's industrial complexes by the end of 1984 reached 3,280 out of a total of 
6,953.72 Employees at SABIC Marketing Companies at the end of the year reached 
314; 81% of whom were Saudi universities graduates, holding a B. A, B. Sc, M. A or 
a PhD degree. 73 As for the Saudi employees at SABIC plants, engineers, skilled 
workers and technical foremen constitute the majority. 74 For the years 1985-2001, 
Table 5.22 shows SABIC manpower to local/non-local status and also qualification. 
Table 5.22 SABIC's manpower qualifications 
according to nationality (Year 2001) 
Qualification Saudi Non Saudi Total Saudi 
PhD 07 89 96 07 
Masters Degree 112 229 341 33 
_High 
Diploma 08 06 14 - 
Bachelors Degee 1,900 1,856 3,756 51 
_High 
School 3,806 1,049 4,855 78 
_Technical 
(Industrial) 1,474 195 1,669 88 
_High 
School Commerce 204 30 234 87 
Vocational Training 52 16 68 76 
_Secondary 
School 2,345 95 2440 96 
_Total 
11,088 4,357 15,445 72 
Sources: SABIC, Human Resources Department, Internal Report, 2002 
SABIC's intention was to have Saudi workers representing at least 60-70% of the 
total manpower during the first years of a plant's operation. This percentage was 
planned to gradually increase in favour of Saudi nationals in subsequent years. The 
training plans covered the period 1980-1985 and the period 1985-1990. The 
preparation, qualifying and training elements of the plan include manpower 
programmes for direct management and operations staff of the first generation of 
SABIC industries, totalling about 7,000 persons. Total manpower requirements for 
the second generation of SABIC's industries was estimated to be approximately 
5,400 employees of all categories. In general SABIC training for affiliated 
companies aimed to achieve at least 75% of Saudis in their total manpower 
requirements. According to a recent study of Human Resources development in 
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SABIC, the company considered development of manpower, especially a national 
work force, as one of the most important elements for industrial development. 75 
Finally, Table 5.23, below, indicates how successful SABIC has been in reducing 
expatriates in all areas of production, maintenance, marketing and management. In 
2002, there were II companies exceeding 90% Saudisation; one company had 70% 
Saudisation and another had 65% Saudisation. The average Saudisation is 78%. - 
Table 5.23 Saudisation change, by SABIC's Affiliates for years 1985 and 2002 
1985 2002 
Company Total Saudi Non- 
Saudi 
Total 
manpower 
Saudi Saudisation 
% 
Contractor 
employees 
$ABIC 2297 1603 473 
HADEED 2359 1 740 1512 3037 1967 65 0 
ARRAZI 254 200 54 412 371 90 51 
SAMAD 432 232 200 406 367 90 181 
YANPET 1191 600 591 1516 1222 99 263 
KEMYA 358 310 48 584 495 85 483 
SADAF 1249 590 659 713 649 91 381 
IBN SINA 203 170 33 276 257 93 110 
PETROKEMYA 458 250 208 1436 1300 91 513 
SHARQ 407 350 57 689 648 94 108 
SAFCO 594 310 284 930 844 91 171 
GAS 88 70 18 189 164 98 31 
HAYYAN 286 160 126 
IBN ZAHR 62 50 10 460 422 92 128 
IBN AL Bayatar 60 45 15 - - - - 
SAPTANK - 142 129 91 52 
TAIF - 105 74 70 
79 
Total 8001 3814 4167 1 '108 
1098 78 3500 
Sources: SABIC, Human Resources Department, Internal Reports, 1985 and 2002 
5.5 Summary 
Analysis from Chapter 5 clearly shows the success of SABIC in technology transfer 
from partners to employees. On the job training has been the key to transfer of 
knowledge and experience to Saudis. Also SABIC and partners together share the 
challenge of educating people and transferring knowledge, expertise and technology 
to Saudi Arabia. SABIC cannot achieve this success without partner support. 
In a broad sense the local shaping of technology in Saudi industry can be seen as the 
adoption and further elaboration of technology development on the basis of 
technology transfer from abroad. From the viewpoint of SABIC's experience, it 
also shows the way for other Saudi firms to acquire technology capability by 
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managing transfer of foreign technology. The seeming success of SABIC's 
technology transfer has made it possible for the company to increase production and 
quality using new technology. Success in petrochemical manufacturing is the 
function of three main factors. A feedstock and energy resource advantage, a 
technological edge, and a marketing capability. A good fit between SABIC and a 
foreign partner, is where SABIC offers competitive feedstock and the foreign 
partner, technology and marketing expertise. A direct result of implementing 
SABIC's joint venture model, is that the share of foreign assets constitutes 33% of 
SABIC's total assets. 76 
SABIC and its partners are today marketing their products in over 100 different 
regional and international countries across the world. 77 From the preceding analysis, 
SABIC has pursued a strategy of technology development and technology transfer 
as the key to future modernization, relying on an intensive, rather than extensive, 
developmental strategy. SABIC is enjoying development in which diversification of 
the Saudi economic base and expansion of infrastructures facilities requires the 
material and experience of the industrialized world. Ultimately, transfer of 
technology will prove to be the critical key to the continued development of 
petrochemical industry. Therefore, the primary thrust of development is to achieve a 
self-sustaining and diversified industry. This chapter suggests that, with the help of 
several factors, such as raw materials and the cooperation of international 
companies, SABIC is involved in what appears a successful strategy of technology 
acquisition. However, SABIC is likely to remain dependent upon external sources 
of technological development for the foreseeable future. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN SAUDI ARABIA'S ENERGY 
AND DOWNSTREAM PETROCHEMICAL SECTORS 
6.0 Introduction 
As highlighted in Chapter one's study framework, this study explores how Saudi 
Arabia can accumulate technological capabilities and contribute to advanced 
industry technology transfer. The key for success is effective utilisation of 
technological competencies. Various strategies and choices are available in selecting 
particular types of technology transactions. These choices may also depend on the 
objectives and requirements of a company. For example, what level and type of 
competence are needed? Is innovation and competence required as well as 
productive capacity9 Is there a difference between long and short-temi goals? 
This chapter examines these questions in detail through a comparative analysis of 
the research data gleaned from the questionnaire appended as Appendix I which was 
sent to the companies and other affiliates of the two case-study organizations 
indicated in Appendix 2. This Chapter is the core of the thesis. It aims to examine 
the survey's questions in detail. It also measures the responses to the questionnaire 
related to the achievements of both these companies. This analysis shows how Saudi 
Arabia has acquired oil and petrochemical technological capabilities by utilising 
advanced foreign technologies in the two cases, Saudi Aramco and SABIC. From 
the survey analysis, this chapter comprises five sections. Section 6.1 analyses the 
results of the survey on the different strategies represented and different 
development methods adopted by Aramco and SABIC, and contrasts their strengths 
and weaknesses. This analysis mainly focuses on how the characteristics of the 
different technologies and the type of transfer processes affect the possibility for 
both Saudi Aramco and SABIC to gain access to appropriate foreign advanced 
technologies. 
In light of the analysis of these two cases, section 6.2 analyses technological 
learning and adaption activities in Saudi Aramco and SABIC affiliates, relating to 
various formal and informal means of technology transfer. It also stresses the 
importance of wider industrial development and its impact on the effectiveness of 
the technology transfer activities. 
Section 6.3 examines the outcome of the exp'eriences of Saudi Aramco and SABIC 
in technology transfer. This is done in relation to technological leaming, 
technological capabilities and the contribution to the Saudi oil and petrochemical 
industry. It distinguishes technological capabilities at the firm level from those at the 
national level, highlighting the gap between the technological capabilities of 
individual firms like Aramco and SABIC for innovating oil and petrochemical 
technologies in Saudi Arabia. 
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In light of the two cases, section 6.3 seeks to examine the links between players 
involved in technological activities and the incentives to explore technological 
opportunities and engage in technological learning, ultimately to build up the 
technological capabilities of these companies. This section explores how Aramco 
and SABIC enabled new links to be developed between technology R&D 
institutions for adopting technological changes. 
Section 6.4 draws the survey analysis in the preceding sections together in order to 
reach concluding points. In particular, it seeks to answer the research questions 
raised in chapter 1, relating to indigenous industrial developpent of Saudi Arabia, 
driven by oil and petrochemical technological development. It also discusses the 
scope for local participation in technological development, and how this strategy has 
worked in different circumstances for Saudi industrial development. 
6.1 Technology absorption in Saudi Arabia 
This study has shown how Saudi oil and petrochemical development has 
successfully utilised advanced foreign technology through technology transfer to 
fulfill national objectives in both technological and economic development. In less 
than thirty years, the Kingdom has managed to expand its oil and petrochemical 
capacity. It has also modernized its plants with high technology systems. At the 
same time, Saudi Arabia has built up oil and petrochemical technological 
capabilities not only in production, operation, maintenance, but also in innovation of 
new technological knowledge. 
As noted in the theoretical critique of Chapter 2, technological learning is the means 
by which technological capabilities are created. This section analyses how 
technological learning took place in the two cases. It looks to the means of 
technological learning, i. e. formal learning activities and informal technological 
information flows. It explores the importance of involving a wide range and number 
of players in technological learning, and the different roles that technology 
manufacturers, designers, users and suppliers can play in technological learning. In 
addition, the discussion emphasizes the importance of the wider social and economic 
environment in encouraging technological learning activities 
To a large extent, this study has found that Saudi technology transfer from abroad 
has been effective in respect of the acquisition of technological capabilities. The oil 
and petrochemical technology transfer process has provided avenues for 
technological information inflows and a wide range of means for technological 
learning. This also indirectly provides the basis for technology cooperation and 
technological learning by using, operating, producing, adapting, designing, creating 
and innovating to achieve accumulation of indigenous technological capabilities. 
The study highlights the importance of informal as well as formal links and 
knowledge. Chapters 4 and 5 discussed the close relationships between technology 
transfer, sharing and technological development through learning. The findings 
verify the presumption indicated in Chapter 3 that technology transfer is necessary 
for Saudi industry to build up absorptive capabilities for progression towards 
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indigenisation. The key for ultimately acquiring technological competencies is to 
select and adapt imported technology. 
In respect of the concept of technological capabilities, distinctions have been drawn 
between the capabilities of production, operation, maintenance, resource allocation 
and marketing management and the capabilities of innovation and technological 
capabilities at basic and advanced levels. The initial presumption prioritised the 
advanced technological capabilities of innovation. The two case studies 
demonstrate the pressing need of developing and strengthening basic technological 
capabilities. These are two reasons for this: firstly, basic technological capabilities 
create the basis for wider advances in economic growth and provide the foundation 
for the development of more advanced technological capabilities; for example, 
through the effective use of foreign advanced technological competencies. The fact 
is that in most Saudi industries these capabilities in general are weak. And this is 
particularly true for individual firms that lack these basic capabilities. Secondly, the 
development of basic technological capabilities requires mass involvement in 
technological learning. 
The findings of this study confirm that in Saudi industry, technological capability at 
the national level can be much stronger than that at the level of the firm, and it 
depends on effective technological collaboration between organizations. For 
example, only SABIC and Arainco have sizeable R&D capacity and, having 
cooperated with R&D institutes, they can develop and produce more petrochemical 
processes. This highlights one of the major issues of this study, the role of 
institutional linkages and government policies in supporting technological 
cooperation and in fully utilizing existing technological competencies across -the 
country. 
There is in principle a range of strategies available for Saudi industry to adopt, in 
accordance with domestic requirements and existing technological capabilities and 
external opportunities. The cases studies demonstrate how different strategies have 
been successfully applied in Saudi technology. The survey analyzed and compared 
the two strategies presented by the cases of SABIC and Saudi Aramco. 
6.1.1 Technological capabilities and development 
Saudi Arabia, as with most developing countries, lacks technological resources. 
However, while making this comparison at the national and the firm level, this study 
shows that the country as a whole acquired considerable technological capabilities 
not only in production, operation and services, but also in innovation. 
This study distinguishes basic level technological capabilities, such as, production, 
operation, maintenance, marketing and resource allocation, from the higher-level 
capabilities of innovating new technologies. It also stresses differences in 
technological capabilities between the firm level and the national level. The two 
case studies demonstrate that: 
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both companies now possess a wide range of technological capabilities, from 
production, operation and maintenance 
as shown by the survey responses, both SABIC and Aramco have sought to 
master new technologies to improve production and revenues 
both companies' technological activities, such as technology adaptation, 
domestication of component production, were selectively chosen, in order to 
pursue their benefits 
" learning of managerial methods was not a simple copying of processes as the 
companies developed a style of management between partners and local 
suppliers through which they achieved high productivity from involvement in 
technological learning and collaboration 
" the concept of an innovative system conveys an image of a process that is 
systematic, ordered and stable. 
The findings of this study point to the nature of Saudi industrial iransactions, 
suggesting that it is helpful to search for the best model of the nation's system to 
promote innovation in changing Saudi industrial and technological development. 
Just as important, there may be no single best national system for the country as a 
whole, not just because of regional differences, but also because the features of 
different national systems of innovation for different industries and different 
technologies may well need to be different. The findings from this study indicate 
that there are differences between firm level and national level in terms of 
technological capabilities. 
In light of both case studies, this study shows that both companies have obtained 
considerable technological capabilities in a range of areas from production, 
engineering, operation, marketing, management, to services. Acquisition of 
technological capabilities needed to produce technologies. These capabilities are 
associated with not only a few extremely highly skilled and creative engineers and 
technologists, but rather involve a wide range of players including technological 
specialists. Development of technological capabilities in production, operation and 
services in Aramco and SABIC as a whole have been successful, via advanced 
technology transfer from industrialised countries and in particular, joint venture 
technology transfer. In the case of Aramco, production capacity had expanded 
rapidly, from 1980 to 2002, during twenty years of production (Sections 4.3.1 and 
5.3.1). Production capabilities have also been gradually established and upgraded. 
As was seen in both case studies in chapters 4 and 5, the technology was good, 
especially in production, quality and production management. Since 1985, SABIC 
and Aramco's production capacity had been increasing rapidly compared to its 
designed annual capacity (Table 4.9.5). SABIC's actual output in 1989,1995,2000, 
2002, has produced ten times more than what was anticipated. ' With average growth 
of 1.3 million metric tons per year this is an impressive growth. 2 Furthermore, 
production volume continued to increase at about 32% per year. 3 According to the 
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SABIC plan, at the end of 2005, after the completion of new expansions, the annual 
production volume will be 47 million metric tons. 4 As has been explained in chapter 
5, SABIC expects to be one of the largest petrochemical producers in the world by 
that time. This study demonstrates that the firms involved in both case studies have 
capabilities such as marketing, including recognition or the importance of users 
requirements, production, management and an understanding of all human resource 
issued. 
6.1.2 Learning methods adoPted by Saudi Aramco and SABIC 
Technological learning took place in both case studies. The range of learning 
activities includes formally organized learning such as staff and employee training 
courses arranged by both companies to obtain technological competencies, training 
and technical assistance from experts and management participation. Through these 
formalized means, the engineers in the companies have systematically obtained 
skills for manufacturing, installation and maintenance, as well as engineering 
technologies. 
Advanced managerial methods and values were also introduced to the engineers. 
This helped both Saudi Aramco and SABIC to develop their own strategies, policies, 
resource allocation and management. It allowed their affiliates to achieve high 
productivity. As production quality is one of the most common problems in the 
industry, the help of foreign technology and specialists to gradually achieve 
production quality at world levels was critical. This study has found that new 
technology allowed Aramco and SABIC to cut cost. At the moment Aramco invests 
more in improving the success of exploration, in new ways to image oil and gas 
reservoirs, in improving drilling technology, in automating plants and equipments, 
and in implementing manufacturing processes. 
Technological learning has been widely spread through both informal and formal 
channels. This study shows that learning is the responsibility of everybody in the 
company. In order to achieve this, Aramco and SABIC have a number of techniques 
and tools that help to promote learning. The companies have established their own 
R&D centres and cooperation with universities in order to provide the means for 
transfer of technological information across the companies. Many of the engineers 
and researchers who gathered at the company, later returned to their original 
department, and thereafter, used their knowledge to carry out technological projects. 
Some of them also contributed to the improvement of technology when they were 
involved in technical approval. 
Informal and formal learning activities in Aramco and SABIC have taken place at 
almost all levels, involving not only those involved indirectly in technology transfer 
and development projects, but also via installation engineering teams (Questions 
3.08 and 6.03). Achievement of company production capabilities have required the 
involvement of a wide range of players within the company to inculcate not only 
understanding of manufacturing processes but also wider recognition of the 
importance of industry. 
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As noted in chapter 3, a supportive industry and economic environment is crucial in 
providing incentives far technological learning. Without it, . even 
formalized 
technological learning may be inefficient and incomplete. This was demonstrated in 
the cases of affiliates. Both Aramco and SABIC have sought cooperation 
opportunities in technological learning to improve their technological capabilities. 
The case studies of the two companies show the importance of technological 
learning through which the Saudi firms could adapt foreign advanced technologies 
and create indigenous systems. Four elements are essential in this process. 
First, formalized means are needed e_. g. technological- training operating with 
technical assistance I 
Second, technological learning through the market to compare different products 
and therefore learn what quality can be expected 
Third, ' mass involvement in technological learning is crucial, particularly for 
improving technological capabilities in operation and production 
Fourth, a supportive environment is crucial for technological learning. 
Oil and petrochemical companies are famous for applying and adapting existing 
technology to their needs. Aramco and SABIC like other leading companies have 
adopted this approach. Table 6.1 provides a summary of what has so far been 
attained in Aramco and SABIC in the transfer and implementation of new 
technology. A good example of this transfer is the work on automated process 
controls that monitor safety, efficiency and plant operations. To meet these business 
goals, Saudi Aramco has established a strategy based on good corporate citizenship, 
a principle that guides the business to invest only in those technologies which 
contribute to regulatory compliance in all respects. Good examples are emissions 
controls, industrial wastewater treatment and bioremediation. Table 6.1 also 
highlights that Saudi Aramco and SABIC are dependent mainly on contractors in 
building new plants and maintenance. However, the table indicates the weaknesses 
of both companies and the need to develop their own technology with more national 
participation in these two areas. 
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Table 6.1 Summary of the extent of technology transfer in Aramco and SABIC 
Industrial sectors 
ou . ou 
S B. 
rj 
0 C2, 
r 
;; .20 
:6 
t 0 PCs E-4 = 
cl 
Upstream operation (Aramco): 
- Oil exploration -100% 100% Mainly 67% still foreigners foreigners 
- Oil production 100% 100% Mainly 70% still 
foreigners foreigners 
- Oil operation 100% 100% 
Mainly 75% 'still 
foreigners - foreigners 
-Gas operation 100% 100% 
Mainly 
foreigners 
75% still 
- Crude transportation: foreigners 
Pipeline network 100% 100% Mainly local 78% Mainly 
Tanker fleet of crude oil 55% 65% 
Mainly 
foreigners 
65% foreigners 
Foreigners 
Down stream operation (Aramco): 
Refining: 
- Local refineries (in KSA) 100% 100% Foreigners 86% Foreigners 
- Export refineries (in KSA) 50150 iv 50150 jv Foreigners 84% 
Foreigners 
Domestic marketing distribution 100% 100% Foreigners 90% Mainly 
International marketing 100% 100% 
Foreigners 70% foreigners 
distribution still 
foreigners 
Petrochemicals ( SABIQ: 
- First generation plants 50/50jv %jv 50150 
Foreigners 
Mainly 
74% still 
(1980s) 100% 100% foreign 74% foreigners 
- Second generation plants 
Foreigners 
(1990s) 
Sources: Saudi Aramco annual review 1995-2002 and SABIC annual reports 1990-2002 
However the companies, as discussed in chapters 4 and 5, have been successful in 
national participation through education and training. Aramco shows more success 
in Saudisation of most oil sectors achieving close to 90%. SABIC's success in 
Saudisation is close to 80%. Table 6.1 also highlights the fact that technology and 
know-how are still dominated by foreigners in Aramco and SABIC. This confirms 
the need of both companies to consider long term planning in research and 
development (discussed further in section 6.2). 
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6.1.3 Elements of technology evaluation and selection 
While Arainco and SABIC apply similar methods in technology search and selection 
for most projects, whether oil or petrochernical, the relative procedures remain as: 
- Selection of licensor 
- Evaluation of technology 
- Revision of ternis and conditions for technology licensing 
- Engineering 
- Construction process 
Operation 
Figure 6.1 demonstrates the technology evaluation and selection procedures in 
Arainco and SABIC as follows: 
Figure 6.1 Technology evaluation and selection procedures in Aranico and 
SABIC 
Final 
rcconiniendations by 
Fxecutive 
CommilteL. 
Project proposal 
from studies, 
marketing and 
nhinnint, team 
Technology 
evaluation by 
technology 
evaluation team 
'I echnology analys., 
and evaluation 
by technology 
evaluation team 
Approval Evaluation 
by the Board by 
Executive 
Committee 
-V 
............................. ........................................ ............................................................... .... ------------- 
Thc procedurc applied by Arainco and SABIC for technology evaluatlon call bc 
Summarized as f, ()Ilows: 
Studies, marketing and planning tcam of tile company conducts research to 
determine the suitability ofthc proposed product 
Recommendation by the tcchnology evaluation team of the proposal prepared b" 
the markcting and planning team is sought and a detailed questionnaire is sent to 
the prospcctIvc liccilsors regarding their specific technology 
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technology evaluation team then analyzes the responses of prospective licensors 
and makes recommendations 
the Technology evaluation team members make inspection tours of the 
technology and its ramifications. 
This process, which takes as long as nine months, finally comes to an end with the 
recommendation of the technologies to be licensed. Technical, economic, legal and 
marketing considerations are the four primary important elements from the data 
collected during visits and meetings with the technology supplier. Technical 
considerations contain infarmation regarding product quality, commercial viability, 
complexity, reliability, flexibility, environmental impact and safety and security 
considerations. 
Economic considerations mainly relate to the cost of the license/services provided 
by the licensor including initial cost, cost of expansion, plant cost and production 
cost. Scope of grant, right of use, selling rights, scope of indemnity, guarantees and 
applicable law mostly form the legal considerations. 
Marketing considerations comprise quality of product range, market possibility, area 
limitations and technical services back up and market presence for product 
distribution. With these methods gleaned from the questionnaire appended as 
Appendix I which was sent to the companies and other affiliates of the two case- 
study organizations indicated in Appendix 2, Saudi Aramco, and SABIC have been 
able to transfer technology directly from licensors to their industrial complexes. In 
the survey, SABIC considers importation of technology to suit customers needs and 
conditions as the most important factor in its decision making process. Table 6.2 
lists the six criteria for selection of technology that were reflected in the answers 
received from SABIC and Saudi Aramco affiliates listed in Appendix I and 2. 
Table 6.2 Saudi Arameo and SABIC: factors in the selection of new 
technology 
Highest % response 
N Not 
Important 
Slightly 
Important 
Very ot 
Important Applicable 
Aramco SABIC 
Financial condition A S 76 75 
Contract condition A/S 75 74 
Mode of payment & facilities A S 85 72 
Complexity of technology S A 70 78 
Reputation of supplier A S 68 76 
Latest & proven technology A/S 75 70 
% Response to Question 4.05 68 72 
Note: A= Saudi Aramco S= SABIC A/S = Saudi Aramco and SABIC 
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Petrochemical plants emphasize the need for the latest and proven technology and 
the reputation of the supplier as the first priority when it comes to the selection of 
new technology. Whereas the refineries, in Aramco, place more focus on the 
financial condition to be considered in the selection of technology. Differences in 
the criteria of selection technology for petrochemical plants and refineries are 
mainly because of the nature of industries where petrochemical industries need to 
consider the world market competitive conditions through using the latest 
technology and reputation of the supplier. 
In the area of techn 
, 
ology selection most of the answers from the affiliates of SABIC 
and Aramco demonstrate that both companies depend heavily on partner 
recommendations. 
Table 6.3 Technology selection in Aramco and SABIC 
Highest % response 
Technology selection by: Aramco SABIC 
- Chairman of the firm 
- Foreign consulting companies 
- Local consulting companies 
- Your own technical committee AS 
- Educational institutions 
76 70 
- Others . ............. 
% Response to question 4.03 68 65 
A= Aramco S= SABIC 
The responses indicate that Aramco and SABIC may be constrained in developing 
criteria to select and evaluate technology. They still need outside sources to develop 
recommendations about technology selection. This weakness is clearly confirmed in 
Table 6.3 where most of the answers confirmed the use of the company technical 
committeesfor selection of technologies. Some answers to this question mentioned 
foreign consulting companies 
However, in most cases, these committees practically depend on foreign consultant 
and partner recommendations that leave very little choice for the companies own 
decisions.. As such, Saudi Aramco and SABIC need to consider developing their 
own capability for evaluation and selection of technology. Since all answers have 
not mentioned their capabilities in technology selection, the survey confirms 
some weaknesses, which affect mainly the technology transfer process and 
technological learning. 
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6.1.4 Types of technology transaction and technological learning 
As discussed in chapter 2, the nature of imported technology and the type of 
technology transaction together determine both the availability technological 
competencies embodied in imported technologies and the scope for local shaping of 
these imported technologies. Aramco and SABIC use different strategies for 
utilizing foreign advanced technology to meet domestic requirements. This includes 
selecting a different range and type of technology, e. g. between 'oil industry' and 
'petrochemical industry'. 
This section compares the two strategies: the one involved in transferring a 
comprehensive package of techiiology; the other involving purchase of standardized 
technologies. This section analyses the weaknesses and strengths of these different 
strategies, examining how these strategies have helped to develop technological 
capabilities and meet companies' requirements. The two'case studies demonstrate 
how to exploit foreign advanced technologies. However, these cases are very 
different in the following respects: 
First, from the theoretical framework developed, this study shows that these two 
companies have different strategic characteristics. SABIC's strategy can be 
characterized as technology transfer that is subject to local configuration. 
Aramco industry, by contrast, involves a wide range of foreign technology, 
which has been configured into a particular architecture before being transferred 
to the company. This adaption and maintenance of technological knowledge 
reflects their respective technological competencies, which have been 
accumulated over time. 
Second, the two case studies have adopted similar technology transfer 
transactions in a turnkey project approach, which includes the manufacturing 
and engineering, as well as the skills of management. A highly formal and 
carefully planned process of technology transfer was adopted to ensure the 
transfer of all the skills needed to create productive capability. 
Wholesale technology transfer provides access to a wide range of technological 
capabilities spanning from knowledge to production and management techniques. It 
provides much better means for the companies to gain access to advanced foreign 
technologies, which was carefully planned, negotiated and formalized in a written 
contract. 
This study, on the other hand, found that the wholesale technology transaction 
'model' allowed very limited technology innovating capacities. As shown in Table 
6.4, the form and channel of technology transfer used in SABIC and Saudi Aramco 
show that there has been little participation from the affiliates. 
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Table 6.4 Forms and channels through which technology has been transferred 
to Aramco and SABIC 
High est % 
response 
Not Slightly Very Not Aramco SAB 
Important Important Irnportant Applicable 
Technology supply S A 73 70 
Machinery supply A/S 80 70 
Education A/S 56 72 
Training S/A 80 75 
License agreements A/S 86 80 
Turnkey contracts S/A 85 87 
Direct foreign investment A 64 76 
Employment of foreign experts k S 74 75 
Joint venture S 65 85 
Technical assistance/consultants A/S 70 76 
Management participation 75 76 
% Response to question 4.02 1 55 j 71 
Note: A=Aramco S=SABIC 
The two companies under consideration mostly use turnkey contracts as the most, 
important channel of transfer followed by license agreements. Aramco has limited 
uses of technology transfer through joint ventures. In the two case studies, the 
turnkey approach may limit company participation and may affect the level of 
employee learning. 
It may be useful for SABIC and Aramco to complete the project on time; however 
from a learning point of view, both companies should consider implementing new 
strategies whereby they allow more Saudis to be involved in the projects from an 
early stage. One of the most important areas in technology transfer, which oil and 
petrochemical companies should consider, is the design of the plant. However, the 
survey indicates that most of the SABIC and Aramco affiliates depended heavily on 
foreign consulting companies or on firms who supply the technology. Only two 
companies indicated that they have some participation from their own engineering 
departments. 
Designing the plant is an important stage where the company should give 
consideration to a detailed designing and engineering study. The survey clearly, 
highlights that the process and policy of the two companies need to be evaluated and 
revised to raise national participation in the early stage of designing the plant. This 
is because early involvement of Saudis will provide a greater opportunity for 
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learning about the characteristics of technology, its use and its appropriateness 
to local conditions. This is one of the most important findings of the study. 
6.1.5 Partners and joint venture cooperation 
In chapter 3, this study argued that oil resources and economic stability in the 
Kingdom have given Aramco and SABIC a great boost in their direct contacts with 
well known foreign oil companies. These relations created confidence with foreign 
companies. The results are that joint venture cooperation focused on developing 
successful long-term partnerships. This has benefited the Kingdom immensely, 
mainly in the areas of technology transfer and know how. This study clearly shows 
that the methods adopied by SABIC in selecting joint venture partners impose strict 
terms and conditions on their partners to train Saudi youths operate SABIC's 
factories in the future. 
Another reason behind the success of technology transfer in both companies has 
regard to the rules governing time schedules and the strict deadlines they set for all 
projects. This covers the provisions in the agreements with the technology providing 
companies regarding the complete and successful implementation of technology 
transfer, as well as the passing of knowledge to Saudi nationals. Both companies 
have successfully built plants with the latest technologies in very short periods using 
the turnkey approach, where the contractor builds the plant, passing it to locals only 
at the time of start-up. 
Table 6.5 indicates that for SABIC and Aramco, as with other oil and petrochemical 
companies in the world, is accorded a high priority. A high level of responses from 
both companies supported this view. 
Table 6.5 Continuous innovations plays a major role in generating revenue 
Highest % response 
In the company does continuous innovation plays a major role Aramco SAB IC , in generating revenue 
Yes Yes 
% Response to question 3.01 62 68 
However, in the response to question 3.02 in Table 6.6, more than 90% of the 
answers indicate that innovations originate from another country. Few answers 
indicate that innovations have originated within their own firms without any foreign 
involvement. 
All SABIC and all Aramco affiliates, in sections B and C in Table 6.6, confirm that 
the source of most innovations came through joint venture partners mainly from the 
United States of America. This shows strong and deep-rooted domination by 
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American technology and American investment in both oil and petrochemical 
industries in Saudi Arabia. 
Table 6.6 Sources of innovation for Aramco and SABIC 
Highest % re Tp-onse 
In the last five years, did the company introduce a new product 
or service, or did it substantially change its method of Arainco SA13 IC 
r ducti ? p o on 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
A- If yes, this innovation originated from 
Yes Yes 
- Within the firm AS 65 78 
- Another source in your country%. 
- Another country 
-- ----- --- ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
B- If the innovation-was from another country, which of the 
following was involved? 
- It was part of foreign direct investment operation AS 76 78 
- You obtained a license or otherwise compensated 
foreign company for the innovation 
- It was a direct import of foreign machinery, 
equipment or technology with no finther contact 
- You simply adapted the innovation to your 
needs, with none of the above 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
C- Please specify the country source of most innovation 
whether licensed or through joint venture partnership: 
the company source through thorough 
of most innovation licensed JV partnership 
- USA AS AS 60 70 
- EU 
- Japan 
- Other ............ 
% Response to question 3.02 65 
=75 
Note :A= Aramco S= SABIC AS = Aramco and SABIC 
All answers from SABIC and Aramco affiliates strongly suggest joint ventures are 
an important source of obtaining and transferring new technology. The survey 
clearly identifies that SABIC and Aramco mainly depend on the joint venture 
approach as the method of technology transfer. This method has been very 
successfully implemented in the early plants. The main attraction for partners to 
work with SABIC and Aramco in joint ventures at that time was mainly the 
availability of raw materials and financial flexibility. 
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Table 6.7 Advantages to partner companies from JVs 
Advantaizes to Aramco and SABIC , Advantages to foreigner partners: 
State -of -the- art technology 
producing high quality products 
* economies of scale 
establishing modem production 
and marketing operations 
conducting systematic training 
for management and labour 
serving vital development 
objectives of the host country. 
Free access to competitively 
priced feedstock 
entry into protected markets of 
partners, specially EC, NAFTA and 
Japan 
9 an alternative to costly acquisition 
meet more closely customer needs 
and services. 
Table 6.7 lists the joint venture advantages for Saudi Aramco and SABIC and their 
partners. From this table, and the discussions in chapters 4 and 5, this study 
confirms that JVs are suitable for the oil and petrochemical industries. JV 
arrangements have offered Aramco and SABIC an important mechanism for the 
transfer of technology and technical know-how. Partners in these joints ventures 
have been able to achieve the following: 
Allowing partners to share the risk of large investment and the benefits of 
economies of scale 
2. allowing restructuring among partners during cyclical production surpluses, 
which are endemic to the industry 
3. saving transportation and shipment costs 
4. providing the necessary funds for building new capacity. 
Based on the discussions in chapter 3, the Saudi joint venture experience has 
revealed the vital role which JVs played in the development and growth of Saudi 
industry. It shows that the Americans have been by far the most important JV 
partners in the Kingdom. This is not surprising, because the oil and petrochemical 
industry in the Kingdom has been historically dominated by pioneering American 
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firms. Box 6.1 addresses SABIC's model in joint ventures with foreign partners. It 
shows that joint ventures are mutually agreed upon arrangements to share capital, 
resources, feedstock, management skills and marketing expertise. .i 
Box 6.1 Characteristics of SABIC's joint venture model 
Setting up an independent company to run the business 
" Production is shared according to an agreed formula 
" Each partner markets his share with the joint venture acting as profit centre 
" Profits are distributed according to equity shares 
" Expansions are financed from profits according to an agreed formula. 
Sources: SABIC's joint venture agreements, internal summary, 1990 
However, in recent years, SABIC and Saudi Aramco started using different methqds 
of technology transfer to implement the creation of new plants with 100% 
ownership, using the turnkey approach and license agreements. The result of this 
change has affected the cost of construction and also the profitability of the plant. 
SABIC and Aramco can easily use this approach because they have knowledge and 
expertise about sources of technology, project management and contracting. 
In the area of human resource development with partners and in examining early 
annual reports of the affiliates of SABIC and Aramco, this study shows that large 
expatriate work forces from partner firms were involved in operations and 
management. 
Affiliates now have few expatriates in management and operation. Between 80 to 
90% of expatriate jobs have now been transferred to Saudis. An example of this 
change is SHARQ, a joint venture between SABIC and Mitsubishi, which started 
operations in the early 80s with a 300 Japanese work force, but today has only 2 
Japanese workers. 5 Evidently, the Saudisation policy as applied to the Aramco and 
SABIC affiliates, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, have been successful in SABIC 
and Aramco. Both SABIC and Aramco, have achieved between 75% and 80% 
Saudisation in most of their plants. 
The success of SABIC in human resources development can be also confirmed in a 
recent study by the European Chemical News, which examined the top world 
petrochemical performers based on the Reed survey. Table 6.8 shows SABIC's 
labour productivity among other world largest companies. In this study, SABIC 
ranked 16 in sales, 13 in profits and scored the top rank in sales per employee and 
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enjoyed the highest capital intensity per employee, exceeding the 2', d best DOW by 
almost tvvo fold. 
Table 6.8 SABIC ranking, in sales, profits and assets per employee 
Company Sales / Employees Prolits / Employees Assets/Emplovees 
(000)$ (0()0)$ (()()())$ 
l'yondell Chemical 2331 (30) 2031 
. NJITSUI Chemical 45459 4.5 761 
SABIC 536 33.1 1661 
Dmý Chemical 528 (7.3) 074 
Mitsubishi Chemical 347 (8.8) 438 
Bayer 330 7 282 
Do Pont 321 54.5 510 
BASF 313 56 35 -5 
Solvay 264 12.2 333 
1c1 242 5 237 
Degussa 216 7 302 
AKZO Nobel 189 9 174 
Sources: European Chemical News, April 2003 
6.1.6 Revision of SABIC and Arameo models of technology license 
agreements 
Technology licensing is the most common form of technology transtcr vehicle. 
Discussed in section 2.3.6, the survey aimed to find if there is an article in the 
licensed agreements, which requires the supplier to provide different requirements, 
(see Tables 6.9 and 6.10). The response of the affiliates, from both SABIC and 
Aramco, confirms that education, training and technical services are the most 
important applications provided by the licensor. 
Table 6.9 Obligations in technology license agreements 
Highest response 
In the company, is there any article in the technology license 
agreement, which obligates the supplier to provide the following? Aranico SABIC 
Education courses 
No No 
Training services 
Yes Yes 
Components and parts 
No No 
Specialized technical services 
No No 
Transfer some technical instructions 
No No 
Specialized research 
No No 
Local participation in R&D 
No No 
Local participation in design & construction 
No No 
Local participation in management 
No No 
% Response to question 5.01 62 7 
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However, most companies have not participated in design and construction of 
the plants, thereby depriving themselves of the important opportunity to make 
insights into the design and construction process of a new project. With the 
obvious intention of protecting its stock of valuable technical knowledge and know 
how, at times, the technology suppliers prefer to appoint their own top management 
staff, especially if the licensee is in a joint venture partnership with the technology 
supplier. The supplier by using its own expatriate staff in the highest technical and 
engineering positions, can protect its market position in the face of competition from 
other firms, limiting the diffusion of its know how. 
Table 6.10 Restrictions in license agreements 
Highest% response 
Did the license agreement restrict the use oV Axamco SAB IC 
Local Material Resources No No 
Outside Material Resources No No 
Local Machines & Equipment No No 
Outside Machines & Equipment No No 
Development of Machines & Equipment Yes Yes 
Local Manpower No No 
Local Market No No 
Regional Market No No, 
Outside Market No No 
% Response to question 5.02 65 75 
The results of Table 6.10 is a clear reflection of the supplier's intention of 
maintaining control over foreign operations, relating to everything. affecting the 
technology and its application. It is imperative that in order to ensure the correct 
implementation of technology transfer on a long term basis, there is a need to hire a 
greater proportion of local staff at all levels. This involves pride and 
accomplishment in being part of a domestic organisation which is laying a solid 
foundation for the nation's economic and social advancement. 
The findings of this study on national participation in the stage of engineering and 
construction, emphasizes the need for SABIC and Aramco to revise their models of 
technical license agreements to include more national participation in engineering, 
designing and also in R&D. It is important for the two companies and their affiliates 
to strengthen their position in the technology transfer process. For SABIC and its. 
affiliates and for some products, SABIC should also develop new methods -in the 
negotiation process with the technology licensor in order to reduce limitations in 
market share, mainly in highly specialized products where SABIC can have more 
flexibility in the market area. This is because SABIC and Aramco need to develop 
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new plants to produce new products to support their positions in the international 
market. Nothing has been found in the questionnaire about limitations in the market 
share for most of SABIC and Aramco, products because most of these products are 
considered as raw materials and commodities and have no restrictions in market 
share. 
6.2 National human resources development to absorb and learn new 
technology 
This study found that Saudi Arabia has successfully developed 5-year plans since 
1970, with a special emphasis in these plans on the development of national human 
resources. As presented in chapter 3, these plans considered national human 
development as the most important part of this programmes. The vision was 
encouraged by the Saudi Government to develop and expand the educational 
infrastructure, indluding schools, technical and vocational training and higher 
educational institutes, college universities. 
This study also found that the Kingdom, from the beginning, faced a difficult task in 
educating its nationals. Therefore, Saudi Arabia decided to send Saudi nationals 
abroad, mainly to the USA and Europe to pursue studies in different areas and fields 
such as engineering, science, technology, management and finance. Aramco and 
SABIC stand ahead as pioneering firms which implemented and developed close 
cooperation with the USA and European countries to educate and train their 
employees. During that time, Arainco and SABIC were implementing sophisticated 
project developments through technical cooperation and direct joint ventures with 
large oil companies such as Exxon Mobil, Shell and other well-known international 
oil producers. This vision allowed the Saudi oil and petrochemical industries to 
develop and gain a prominent place amongst the world's producing countries. 
In the beginning the two case study companies faced problems in finding enough 
Saudi nationals willing to join these programmes, because they were new and also 
because koth companies operated in remote areas away from the main cities. This 
required implementation of motivation programmes to attract Saudi nationals and 
hence both companies were able to attract a reasonable percentage of Saudis to join 
in the initial stages. This study found differences between Aramco and SABIC in 
their respective human resources development programmes: 
Aramco successfully developed long programmes with the universities in the 
Kingdom as well as universities in the USA and Europe 
2. SABIC, by contrast, selected short programmes to develop its human 
resources by sending them to its partners to work and gain experience in 
similar plants in the USA, Europe and Japan 
3. During this time SABIC and its partners finalized the construction of new 
plants and when the plants were ready for operation, normally 2-3 years, the 
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employees under training in partner facilities were ready to take charge of 
the new plants in the Kingdom 
4. Aramco and SABIC sought to engage their employees in similar partners 
plants to get them familiar with the engineering and construction aspects. 
These programmes have been the main source of qualified employees in Aramco 
and SABIC. The approach is arguably a good strategy to be considered in the 
development of human resources for other Saudi companies. However, the 
recruitment of foreign employees by the contractors to carry out all the early 
work in turnkey projects is a minus point, because it deprives Saudi nationals 
of participation in building and construction work. 
Human resources, as was discussed in sections 4.4.7 and 5.3.7 are important 
elements in lechnology transfer. Recruitment and training of Saudi nationals to 
perform at high levels of skill by acquiring technology is one of the most important 
aspects of technology transfer as the organization takes in more locals. According to 
the industry involved, the skills of the work force, and also the qualifications 
required for the job, training policies can take different forms. When the skill levels 
of the technical and administrative hierarchy -become higher, the recruiting and 
training become more difficult and complex. These positions suffer scarcity in most 
developing countries due to the inadequacy of local education systems to produce 
efficiently the talent industry requires. 
Aramco and SABIC depend heavily on expatriate workers in spite of the heavy cost 
involved in recruitments. This is due to the better salaries offered and the cost of 
moving them and their families to the employer country, for periods ranging from 2 
to 3 years until the local recruits are ready to take over. 
Most SABIC projects begin the training of local personnel immediately after the 
technology is acquired. With the help of training staff provided by the technology 
supplier, SABIC avoids hiring expatriate workers on excessive salaries in the initial 
periods of project start-ups. Instead SABIC makes every effort to upgrade employee 
knowledge by placing emphasis on technical personnel, providing them with on-the- 
job practical training, thereby helping projects to advance with new techniques and 
products. The two options available to the licensee in the training of its staff are, 
either to send them to the technology supplier or to allow them to attend training 
courses in local training centres outside the company with more emphasis on 
English language familiarization. 
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Table 6.11 Company interest in absorbing new technology 
Highest% response 
Aramco SABIC 
People in the company are aggressive in absorbing new 
technology world's best Yes Yes 
response to question 8.03 62 74--ý 
As shown in Table 6.11 the two companies (SABIC and Saudi Aramco) confirm 
their aggressive approach in absorbing best new technology in the world. This 
approach is due to the fact that oil and petrochemical industry needs to obtain the 
best new technological inventions in the world to improve and maintain high 
standards of production capability and the quality of production to meet the ever 
increasing demand for high quality product, which is not possible without the best 
new technology. 
Responses to Question 8.03 in the questionnaire are shown in Table 6.11. It 
highlights the way SABIC and Aramco, provide their employees with opportunities 
to observe technology developments and to gain professional skills. The questions 
also measure the investment of SABIC and Aramco affiliates in the areas of 
recruitment and training to motivate people to learn. The response of most of the 
companies show the success of both SABIC and Aramco in attracting highly skilled 
people, training them are educating them in the latest technology. However, 
geographically, the three companies from Yanbu area in the West of Saudi Arabia 
are far behind the other regions in the area of training and development. 
Arguably, the reason for this is the location of these plants which are far away from 
the main operational headquarters of both SABIC and Aramco. This study confirms 
that it may be the responsibility of the management of these companies to consider 
training as an important element in human resource development strategies. As 
detailed in chapters 4 and 5, both SABIC and Aramco invest heavily in human 
resource development mainly in training. However, in the Yanbu area the companies 
should make a concerted effort to benefit from the human resource training and 
develop strategies to ensure that all employees are exposed to these training 
prograrnmes acquiring the required skills equal to their colleagues in other parts of 
the country. 
Two other areas of concern highlighted in the survey are about cooperation 
strategies and coordination with the corporate departments. Responses suggest that 
there is a lack of strategy cooperation and information. Therefore, SABIC and 
Aramco corporate strategy departments should consider detailed and clear strategies 
for all affiliates, developing a simple process to help affiliates in developing their 
own strategies. Company management should also consider wider participation of 
employees, and communicate clearly with them the details about corporate strategy. 
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This study also confirms that the two case study companies need to develop training 
programmes about corporate strategy and its implementation. 
Another area which this study's survey highlights concerns individuals who 
have no knowledge whatsoever about corporate activities in the R&D field. 
This places a responsibility on SABIC and Aramco to develop a model for- 
cooperation and communication with their affiliates, where they can enjoy 
involvement in corporate activities. Newsletters and conferences are good methods 
for both SABIC and Aramco to use for effective communications with their 
affiliates. The need is to encourage a flow of information between employees and 
companies to create a kind of technology group to facilitate communications 
between all affiliates in SABIC and Aramco. 
6.2.1 Aramco and SABIC: Saudisation process and methodology 
Aramco and SABIC have both pursued Saudisation policy enthusiastically. The only 
difference is on the methodology that they have followed. The points of differences 
are as follows: 
By taking advantage of the Saudi Government policy of developing national 
manpower to run the industry, SABIC devised a programme for high school 
graduates; orienting them at local institutes and sending them abroad to the 
partner's plants to get on-the-job training 
At the start of the 5th Five-year development plan, as discussed in chapter 3, the 
Saudi government was conscious of the problem of national manpower and to 
cope with the situation, the Saudi government put great emphasis on the 
development of a national cadre of local workers to operate industries envisaged 
to be developed in the Kingdom. Encouraged by government policy and 
patronage, SABIC took the lead in developing its own manpower to run its 
plants by hiring high school graduates, orienting them at local institutes and 
sending them abroad to partners plants to get the required training 
At the start, SABIC faced with a scarcity of required graduates, sought to attract 
graduates from Aramco and other industrial concerns. 
This study shows that both SABIC and Aramco have successfully achieved high 
levels of Saudisation e. g. 80% during the last two years. This is an example of 
the success of their policy. 
Responses to the survey have also identified that SABIC took both short and long- 
term steps to develop its own national manpower by hiring high school graduates, 
orienting them at the local institutes and sending them abroad at partner facilities to 
prepare them for running SABIC plants once they were complete. This crash 
programme of on-the-job training for its recruits at the partners' plants paid off and 
once the plants were ready for operation, the recruits were ready to run the plants. 
SABIC also devised long-term programmes to continually develop manpower needs. 
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This, they did, by sending employees to universities, institutes and other relevant 
institutions to prepare these employees to take up higher positions. As a result, 
SABIC achieved 75% Saudisation at its plants and this percentage is gradually 
increasing. 
By contrast, Aramco has from the very beginning cultivated contacts with foreign 
partners, including oil giants like Shell and Exxon, who provided training facilities 
to Aramco employees. Aramco devised long-term programmes based on these 
contacts and sent employees for long periods to be fully equipped with the necessary 
skills required by Aramco to run its operations. As a result of this long-term 
programme, the Saudisation percentage reached more than 80%, as has been 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
6.2.2 Principal technology sharing problems 
The survey, especially question 6.02 (Table 6.12), has provided more detail about 
technology problems in production and operation. Two of SABIC's affiliates and 
one of Aramco's affiliates have listed several problems, mainly related to three 
areas, namely: 
" quality of design, 
" quality of manufacturing and 
" quality of materials. 
These problems have arisen principally because SABIC and Aramco plants are 
constructed and maintained by contractors. Both case studies indicate little 
involvement from their affiliates in these two important areas. 
Table 6.12 Technology problems 
Highest% response 
Arainco SABIC 
Has the firm faced any technology problems in production or 
operation? Yes Yes 
% response to question 6.02 63 
Non-participation in construction and maintenance Activities in the two case study 
firms are due to the fact that: 
1. construction and maintenance work mainly involves heavy labour forces 
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2. companies believe it is better to do both maintenance and plant construction 
through contractors not only because of the higher number of manpower 
required, but to save cost 
3. the responsibility for completing the project on time lies with the contractor 
4. these activities rest with project management, which is also done mostly 
through contractors. 
Discussions undertaken in the fieldwork survey emphasize the need for both 
, 
SABIC and Saudi Aramco to consider increasing their participation in 
construction and maintenance through promoting their own engineering and 
labours. This study recommends strong involvement from both companies because 
these two areas, construction and maintenance, are a great source of knowledge and 
expertise. They will add skills to SABIC engineers and labourers, as a part of the 
technology transfer objectives, discussed in chapter 2 (sections 2.1.2 and 2.2). Such 
involvement will help the company to limit technology transfer problems. 
In the evaluation of the organization chart of both SABIC and Aramco in appendices 
3 and 4, this study has noted that two activities (maintenance and construction) do 
not have important and clear positions in the organization charts. The focus in the 
organizational charts for both Aramco and SABIC is mainly on management, 
operations, sales, marketing and general services. The construction and maintenance 
functions in both SABIC and Aramco are so important that they should have strong 
representation in the organizational chart. 
Most of the SABIC and Aramco affiliates have confirmed their experience of 
principal technology sharing problems that have arisen with foreign partnerships. 
And this confirms the importance of keeping close relations with partner firms and 
sharing with them the development of plants. This is important as can be seen by 
reference to Table 6.13 in the transfer of technology between the receiver and the 
provider. 
Table 6.13 Case Study experience with regard to principal technology-sharing 
problems with foreign partners 
Highest% response 
Aramco SABIC 
Did the firm experience any technology-sharing problems that have 
arisen with a foreign partner ? Yes Yes 
response to question 6.03 66 = 
Both receiver and provider of technology should honour their responsibilities in 
running the plants smoothly, providing all assistance, and helping to increase the 
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transfer of learning skills to Saudi manpower. However, on the national level, the 
Saudi government should develop a technology transfer mechanism and criteria for 
local technology development based on an appropriate technology transfer model, as 
explained in chapter I (Figure 1.2). This model will provide Saudi industries with 
the opportunity to develop their own technology transfer process, to secure know- 
how and experience to be transferred to Saudis. 
6.2.3 Importance of technology modification 
In the area of important technology modifications, Table 6.14 indicates the success 
of SABIC and Aramco in such modifications based on the experience of their 
engineering teams. Modifications through innovation have created inventive 
products from ideas. For example, Aramco has developed a novel analytical tool for 
evaluating reservoir rock properties called POPI, which is now in the process of 
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being commercialized This technology promises to be a powerful tool helping to 
reduce oil production costs. 
Table 6.14 Existence of modifications of the imported technology in the 
company 
Highest% response 
Aramco SABIC 
Please state whether there have been any modifications of 
the imported technology in the company9 
Yes Yes 
response to question 6.01 61 73 
However, the survey could not provide further examples of such achievements. As 
discussed in chapters 4 and 5, both SABIC and Aramco have exhibited successful 
technology development and modification processes in their plants. The list of 
Aramco and SABIC patents listed in chapters 4 and 5 confirms this fact. The survey 
aimed to discover an estimate of local participation in different areas, mainly in 
project designing, project construction, services, supervision, operation, inspection 
and research and development. The responses from most of SABIC and Aramco 
affiliates have shown very low local participation in these areas. However, few 
companies, mainly Aramco affiliates, showed high local participation in the areas of 
supervision and operation. This study raises important questions about the 
responsibility of SABIC and Aramco in developing methods and models for 
local participation because this is a very crucial area that plays an important 
role in gaining experience, either directly or through local contractors. The 
objectives are: 
1. To increase the capability of local sources 
2. To assist SABIC and Aramco to raise the quality and capability of national 
participation 
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3. At the national level the Saudi government should develop a system to 
encourage SABIC and Aramco to consider local participation in all areas of 
activity. 
Question 7.06 (Table 6.15) highlights the degree in local participation in selected 
areas within the case study companies. 
Table 6.15 Local participation in Aramco and SABIC projects 
Highest % responose 
(P articipati on) 
Aramco SABIC 
L M di Hi h ow e um g 
Projects design AS 65 60 
Projects construction AS 70 75 
Principal services AS 
50 60 
Supervision AS 75 70 
Operation AS 80 70 
Testing and inspection AS 
85 75 
Research and development AS 
50 60 
% response to question 7.06 57 72--] 
NOTE :A= Aramco S= SABIC AS = Aramco and SABIC 
Table 6.16 focused on the importance of the companies' efforts in 7 areas and rates 
the company's (Saudi Aramco and SABIC) position versus other companies. It 
shows that: 
Aramco and SABIC have different achievements as a result of following 
different methods of technology and management strategies 
one of SABIC affiliates highlighted strongly that its weak positions in the areas 
of skilled workers and services contrast with the quality of production which is 
equal to the best in the world. In the same area, Aramco affiliates have 
highlighted that they are equal to the best in the world 
most of the answers rank the companies' position high and or equal to the best in 
the world. Only two answers from two companies indicate that they are equal 
only to the best in the region 
the answers from all companies have different views regarding the position of 
technology, but most of them still believe that they are close to the best in the 
world. A number of answers from some companies indicate that they may have 
better technology than other companies. 
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Table 6.16 Relative position of Arameo and SABIC versus other companies 
Highest % response 
Behind other Similar to Equal to the Equal to the Aramco SABIC local other local best in the best in 
companies companies region the world 
- Product design AS 80 74 
& quality 
- Manufacturing AS 80 79 
process 
- Safety S A 71 70 
- Management S A 76, 73 
- Technology AS 64 50 
- Skilled workers AS 70 65 
- Services offered S A 75 76 
% Response to question 1.08 62 4 
NOTE: A= Aramco S= SABIC AS = Aramco and SABIC 
The issue of technology-related goals is revealed by the answers to question 2.02 in 
the survey. They indicate that one of SABIC affiliates has difficulty with 
technology to achieve anticipated profits, production quality and capacities. The 
survey shows that this company was facing difficulties in achieving its goals in 
technology transfer due to the quality of technology not reaching required standards. 
However, the same company rates its position in product design, quality and 
technology equal to the best in the world, while indicating a very low rating for 
skilled workers. The survey results (Aramco 62% and SABIC 69% response) 
suggest that: 
1. this company was successful in the transfer of technology and hardware, but 
faced problems in transferring the knowledge and know-how to its workers 
2. reflect the problems encountered a low level of skilled worker performance 
I this company also has difficulty in management and management strategies 
rather than the manufacturing process. 
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6.3 Innovation, R&D and company policy 
Chapter 2 has already pointed out the increasing interest in innovation within 
technology studies, addressing the links between technological dynamism and 
institutional structures and incentives for innovation. The case studies analysis 
shows that state intervention has greatly contributed to oil and petrochemical 
technological development. The concept of innovation may be helpful for a country 
to catch up with technologically advanced and dynamic industries. 
In the area of R&D facilities, the survey shows that SABIC has extensive experience 
with R&D. This could not have happened without the support of the joint venture 
partners to SABIC. SABIC has been very successful in developing good relations 
with partners in R&D. SABIC considers that all joint ventures and affiliates act as 
partners in R&D activities. Chapter 5, section 5.3.1, indicates that SABIC has 
developed agreements with all its partners to support R&D activities and using 
SABIC R&D centres for their needs in solving their technology problems. These 
agreements are cost-based on a percentage of total sales. Both SABIC and partners 
gain benefits from this deal. However, Saudi Aramco has not developed this kind of 
mechanism and has not learned the way of sharing with its partners in R&D, still 
depending on outside sources for R&D. Table 6.17 nevertheless shows that 62% of 
the Aramco and 74% of SABIC respondents possessed R&D facilities. 
Table 6.17 Companies' R&D facilities 
Highest% response 
Aramco SABIC 
Does the company have R&D facilities? Yes Yes 
response to question 6.05 1 
62 74 
SABIC has had differing experiences with its partners in research and development, 
and has introduced strategies to invent and develop own-technologies. The cost is 
normally shared by SABIC and its partners. SABIC partners are fully confident of 
the capabilities of SABIC R&D centres in the following areas: 
1. Solving problems such as sudden shut downs and interruptions in plants 
2. provision of valuable technical assistance to all joint venture partners 
3. joint technology development, yielding results neither group could have 
achieved alone. 
Relations between SABIC and its partners in the R&D area should be evaluated and 
studied by Aramco, so as to benefit from this experience, because the development 
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of joint ventures is the responsibility of both Aramco and its partners. This will 
direct Aramco in a more viable direction in developing close relations with its 
partners to develop their plants. 
Table 6.18, details the responses from primarily question 3.07, showing all SABIC 
and Aramco affiliates' annual expenditure on R&D is less than 10% of their 
total annual revenue. This is a small investment in respect of the huge oil and 
petrochemical industry in the Kingdom, which needs to continue development of 
technology capability and introduce new products to enhance product quality and 
profit margins. 
Table 6.18 Research and development in the companies 
Highest % res ponse 
Conducting research and development R&D in the Aramco SAD IC 
company 
Never occurs Never occurs A. Direct government subsidies to company 
Never occur 
A. The company's annual expenditure on R&D, 
as a percentage of revenues Less than 10% Less than 10% 
Less than 10% 
21-30% -41-50% 
11- 20% - 31-40% 
greater than 51% 
% Response to question 3.07 62 747 
Discussion with respondents raises another issue in which both SABIC and Aramco 
need to cooperate; that investments in R&D for Saudi petrochemicals to increase 
natural resources in line with early government objectives to make better use of 
local natural resources (discussed in chapter 3). Specifically this study strongly 
emphasises the need for more cooperation between SABIC and Saudi Aramco to 
develop and expand the Saudi petrochemical industry through provision of more 
feedstock alternatives. 
6.3.1 Innovation and technological capability 
Whilst expansion in production capacity has had the most obvious immediate 
economic importance for SABIC, the indigenous capabilities to create and innovate 
technologies have been seen as more strategic and long term in allowing SABIC to 
avoid technological dependence on foreign firms. At the firm level, SABIC and 
Aramco in the beginning were weak in terms of technology innovating capabilities. 
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Even Aramco, the most powerful and successful of the two case study firms, has had 
limited activities in technology innovation. This is due partly to the model of 
technology innovating capabilities. Moreover, Aramco and SABIC were both at the 
stage of rapid expansion of production facilities, and their products were in constant high demand, thus they had little interest in pursuing major technological changes. 
Although Saudi Aramco is one of world's most modem producers, and one of the 
key developers in Saudi Arabia, it apparently could not carry out any undertakings 
in R&D or design. 
However, Saudi Aramco has recently attempted to develop its own technical 
capabilities through cooperation with R&D institutions. SABIC, on the other hand, 
is the best example of how technological cooperation has fostered local 
technological capabilities in innovation. The SABIC case study displays 
technological capabilities that were able to combine foreign and local technological 
elements to create local innovation. The Saudi Aramco development took advantage 
of technological collaboration between R&D institutes and industries, with the result 
that local technological capabilities in Aramco are still low. In the Saudi industrial 
development case, continued technological cooperation between Aramco and 
SABIC was not evident even at the end of the study. This is a reminder of how the 
strategies of the two big players may inhibit the collaboration and knowledge flows 
needed for developing new technologies. 
Although Aramco and SABIC technology transfers were not designed to'deliver 
technology innovation, they did lead to the dissemination of technological 
knowledge across industries and research institutes. They provided the basis for 
further technology development work in Saudi industry. The comparative analysis 
of these two case studies to develop Saudi industrial competence suggests that there 
is not a rigid division between importing production competence (the focus of Saudi 
Aramco technology transfer) and indigenous technology innovation capacity (the 
focus of SABIC technology transfer). The two cases suggest that there are different 
routes to achieving technological capabilities. However, this should not prevent 
important local innovation effort adapting to country circumstances. The Saudi 
Aramco development model has been extremely successful in the way that it has 
made selective use of imported technological elements, allowing local development 
to concentrate on those areas in which they were most advantageous to indigenous 
development. 
The case studies have thrown light on the rapid changes in R&D activity: 
First, it brought about new types of collaboration between R&D centres and 
manufacturing firms. As shown in chapter 4, Aramco initiated technological co- 
operation with local universities and R&D institutes on quite a few occasions. 
Equally SABIC was itself a successful product of technological collaboration 
between R&D institutes and universities 
Second, the need to change attitudes of firms and employers towards technological 
activities 
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Third, and perhaps most importantly, the creation of incentives in the system for 
technological learning, leading to technological capabilities 
Fourth, firms like Saudi Aramco and SABIC have been forced by the market to 
master new technologies, to improve production, to establish technological skills, 
and to allocate resources by themselves. 
In the area of innovation and research and development, survey responses confirm 
the importance of new innovations in all companies play a major role in revenue 
generation. Examples (section 6.1.5) show that workers in Aramco and SABIC are 
more challenging in this area. In the case of Aramco, perhaps a good measure of its 
position in research and technology efforts is its growing portfolio of 17 patents 
granted, 3 pending and an additional 90 in the pipeline. 7 This study confirms that by 
gaining know-how through the licensing of intellectual property, Aramco and 
SABIC can add additional value to their operations and industries. 
6.3.2 Technology collaboration with education institutions 
In the area of relations between affiliates of both SABIC and Aramco with 
universities and research institutes, some strong relationships with universities in the 
Kingdom is shown. Aramco, especially, indicates stronger relations with universities 
(discussed in chapter 5). Aramco from an early stage has had close links with 
universities outside the Kingdom because of the nature of the business. 
The Aramco case study demonstrates a new process of collaboration with research 
institutes of the local university, King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals 
(KFUPM) and the Japanese Cooperation Centre for Petroleum (JCCP). 
Some of the research ventures are quite new to Aramco but people in Aramco need 
to be prepared to learn from others, particularly in regard to: 
" Sharing of knowledge 
" Setting mutually compatible goals 
" And choosing partners. 
By contrast, SABIC is dependent on its own research and development activities and 
this confirms what was discussed in chapter 5 (section on SABIC research centres). 
SABIC boasts of one of the biggest R&D activities not only in the Kingdom but in 
the region as well. In this direction, Aramco recently started to develop and expand 
its local research and development centre. But SABIC is way ahead of Aramco and 
has invested more (Chapter 5). Because of their close relations, integrated 
industries, and the nature of the business, this study believes that it is 
important -and beneficial for both SABIC and Arameo to develop a close 
relationship in research and development activities. This will help expand 
research and development activities by sharing knowledge and resources to support 
oil and petrochemical industry in the Kingdom. 
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Both companies are great leaders in industry, and will achieve not only fast success 
if they coordinate their efforts in this area but also will become a valuable source of 
R&D for other industrial sectors in the Kingdom. This study strongly recommends 
that SABIC and Aramco develop a joint venture in R&D. In the same direction, the 
Saudi government should be involved directly in developing policy for research and 
development, investing to develop a national system for innovations. This will serve 
industries and provide assistance to achieve national objectives. 
King Abdul Aziz City for Science and Technology (KCAST) has in recent years led 
the development of the Saudi science and technology plan. However (as discussed 
in chapter 3), this plan has not shown any clear direction to develop Saudi national 
science and technology. This study identifies the need to develop a system for 
innovation in the Kingdom. The system should include a clear vision, method and 
objectives in order to support local innovation and technical capability within Saudi 
industry. 
In this study, there is no single model of how collaborative research has been 
pursued in the cases of Aramco and SABIC. Rather, there is a range of frameworks 
and mechanisms for establishing research objectives, which vary from company to 
company. However some universities in the UK have developed different 
approaches to collaboration with industry, which can be summarized as follows: 
" The objectives must be in line with the business strategies and research 
capabilities of the partners 
" The plan should take advantage of, not suffer from, the cultural differences of 
partners and their environments 
* Close communication is critical to ensure effective feedback mechanisms 
Projects should leverage capabilities and minimize the time from concept to 
commercialization 
Projects should contribute to basic knowledge creation and to the rapid 
achievement of technologies that can be commercialized. 
This study suggests that these factors can be used as guideline for Saudi industry in 
their relations with educational institutes and universities. Here, for example, Table 
6.19 shows that Aramco and SABIC have broad and long-term relationships with 
universities inside and outside the Kingdom. 
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Table 6.19 Relationships between the companies and scientific research 
institutions 
Highest% response 
Does your company have relationships with scientifIc 
Aramco SABIC 
research institutions (e. g. university laboratories, government 
laboratories) ? Yes Yes 
response to question 3.05 58 72 
This study confirms that it is 
' 
important for both companies (Aramco and SABIC) to 
keep wide and deep relationships with universities inside and outside the Kingdom. 
Chapters 4 and 5 (sections 4.4.3 and 5.3.3) have discussed, with examples, this 
approach and how successful the development of good relations with educational 
institutes and universities can be. 
6.3.3 Experiences of Aramco and SABIC in granting patents at national 
level 
As a result of the relative success of both SABIC and Saudi Aramco in research and 
development, either through direct facilities in the case of SABIC or through 
universities and institutes as in the case of Saudi Aramco, both case studies have 
shown this as an important development in achieving patents (see Table 6.20). In 
technology transfer, this evidences the capability of both companies to observe and 
develop local technologies. 
These achievements can be considered as an indicator of the success of technology 
transfer to Saudi Arabia. Saudi industry should evaluate both experiences of SABIC 
and Saudi Aramco in granting patents (discussed in Chapters 4 and 5). At the 
national level, both SABIC and Saudi Aramco are facing difficulties in registering 
patents in the Kingdom, because the complex processes require detailed experience, 
and this is absent with respect to the government agent, King Abdul Aziz City for 
Science and Technology. This study identifies this difficulty which affects both 
SABIC and Aramco, in the granting of patents inside Saudi Arabia. 
Table 6.20 Process of registering and granting patents in Saudi Arabia 
Highest % sponse 
Aramco SABIC 
Does the company have any patent registrations? Yes Yes 
response to question 6.07 65 70 
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Box number 3.8 in chapter 3 summarized the needs and objectives of Saudi science 
and technology; however this section highlights the weaknesses of Saudi Arabia in 
the process of registering and granting patents at the national level. As has been 
mentioned in chapter 3, section 3.5, King Abdul Aziz City for Science and 
Technology (KACST) is the leading governmental authority for R&D at national 
level and should provide all assistance to the industry mainly in R&D and 
specifically in patent registration procedures. This study strongly recommends 
that King Abdul Aziz City for Science and Technology expands its activities 
and imparts its experience and knowledge to others in order to build a 
dependable base for patent activities. This may include developing detailed 
strategies, policies and procedures. It is important for KACST to develop the 
capability to encourage innovation for the benefit of the national industrial sector. 
6.4 Aramco and SABIC strategies in acquiring technology 
During the last three decades of Saudi economic reforms (1970 - 2002), Saudi 
Aramco has succeeded in both modernizing oil technologies and increasing capacity 
dramatically. This study confirms that it would not be possible to achieve such a 
quantum jump without introducing advanced foreign technologies along side those 
directly imported. The two case studies of Saudi Arainco and SABIC show that 
transferring foreign advanced technologies has made a crucially important 
contribution to technology development. 
Taking a broad view, that Saudi Arabia should have acquired sufficient foreign 
technologies over the years to develop its local capabilities aimed at sustaining and 
maintaining some elements of technological independence. As was reviewed in 
section 2.2, the most important part of technology transfer is the transmission of 
know-how through education and training combined with practical experience. In 
the cases of both Aramco and SABIC, two elements are essential: 
the type of technology 
and the type of technology transaction. 
These two elements determine the availability of technological competencies, 
embodied in the imported technologies. They also have an impact on the scope for 
local development of imported technologies. There exist several means for the 
transmission of know-how, formal local training programmes, training programmes 
abroad, in-plant courses, on-the-job training, education abroad, circulation of books 
and periodicals. The strategy used in the Arainco and SABIC case studies can be 
seen as involving acquisition of technology, embodying a wide range of advanced 
technologies from the industrialized world, plus foreign developer's technological, 
industrial and economic knowledge. This strategy established technology transfer 
through various formalized channels to allow Aramco and SABIC to gain access to 
these technologies. 
Table 6.21 indicates that these companies have learned by implementing 
sophisticated technology. It summarises their strengths, weaknesses and 
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opportunities. The Table shows that Aramco and SABIC's foreign collaborations are 
an economical and commercial success. It indicates that joint ventures in Saudi 
Arabia can be profitable. This study has found that it may be useful for the Saudi 
government to encourage both companies to expand their knowledge and 
technical-know how to other countries, mainly to GCC countries, especially in 
technology development and joint ventures. 
From the survey (questions 7.02,7.03 and 7.04), weaknesses of SABIC and Aramco 
are identified in the areas of obtaining technology and product design. After many 
years of experience, SABIC and Aramco have not yet been capable of developing 
their own technology and improving their product development. All answers 
indicate that both companies still depend 100% on foreign sources. The responses 
show the need for SABIC and Aramco to invest heavily in R&D, in order to build 
capabilities for developing their own technology and in meeting technical 
development needs. 
In chapter 3 (section 3.6.2), this study showed that it is feasible for Saudi Arabia to 
benefit from advanced technologies and technology transfer. While transferring 
advanced foreign technologies Saudi Arabia may also be able to avoid some of the 
mistakes that may have been made in the earlier technological development and/or 
technology transfer. However, technology transfer is not a simple linear process of 
transporting geographically a technology from one place to another. 
As pointed out in chapter 2, technology transfer requires knowledge, experience and 
skill. In the process of technology transfer, Table 2.1 shows that the success of 
technology transfer is bound up with the behaviour of both suppliers and recipients, 
involving a significant degree of uncertainty. Whether the results of technology 
transfer favour recipients, depends greatly on how the processes are carried out. This 
study raises important questions about technology transfer projects that are 
strategically planned. 
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Table 6.21 Strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities for Aramco and SABIC 
ARAMCO 
Strengths: 
0 Biggest producer in the world 
Huge oil reserves 
Modem technology base 
Experienced management 
Weaknesses: 
R&D inftastructure 
Innovation system 
Human resources system 
Polic coordination 
and evaluation 
Opportunities: 
Diversification of products 
Linkages with domestic firms 
Promote innovation 
Responding to globalisation 
SABIC 
Strengths: 
" Huge commercial success 
" High quality products 
" Modem technology base 
" Well established JVs 
Weaknesses: 
" Innovation management 
" Infon-nation system 
0 Human resources system 
" Policy coordination 
and evaluation 
Opportunities: 
e Improving policy making 
* Linkages with domestic firms 
* Support professional education 
* New joint ventures 
Based on the evidence of the Aramco and SABIC case studies, this study indicates 
that there is a need for effective strategies to use available domestic resources as 
well as to identify opportunities emerging in the global economy. In this respect, this 
study confirms that the structural approach is useful for Saudi industry to understand 
the potential pitfalls in development. However, it provides little practical advice 
about how to avoid these hazards and further to actively make use of the emerging 
opportunities. It is a challenge for Saudi Arabia to strengthen its technological 
capacity through local development of imported technologies. The case studies 
presented provide clear examples of this. 
Saudi Aramco has the stewardship and responsibility for one-fourth of the world's 
proven crude oil reserves and is ranked as the number one oil company in the world 
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for the 14th year by industry analysts! This company realizes that the global 
challenges can only be met by local initiatives that foster the reliability of supply 
and maintain the cost competitiveness of oil through innovative approaches. In fact 
(as has been demonstrated in chapter 4), one of Aramco's strongest commercial 
attributes is that its facilities can quickly increase crude oil production from about 
seven to ten million barrels a day, that no other company anywhere can match. 9 
This is a major commitment of considerable effort to world oil supply stability. 
Arainco's flexibility is strengthened by the fact that it consistently replaces annual 
crude production, year after year, with new reserves through field discoveries and 
enhanced production methods. But most of all, reliability depends on building local 
strategic depth by mining the talents of its people and by honing skills through 
broad-based training programmes which are probably the largest and most 
comprehensive corporate programmes in the world. In the area of national 
participation, Table 6.1, Aramco has shown leadership in the Saudisation of the 
workforce - over 85 percent of Saudi Armco's employees are Saudi nationals while 
oil and gas operations are fully Saudised. 10 
This study confirms that Aramco is a good example of successful transfer of 
technology. It has not only incorporated the latest upstream and downstream 
technologies in its work, but has also advanced those technologies locally, finding 
new applications through innovative thinking. For ex=ple, a number of innovative 
production techniques was used in 2002 to improve performance, reduce costs and 
help protect the environment: 
Extended reach horizontal wells which increase the reservoir contact area 
without drilling additionalwells 
use of a rotary steerable system drilling tools improving drilling penetration rates 
batch drilling used offshore to save time and improve material handling logistics 
multilateral well completions, including fishbone multilaterals, maximizing 
production from a single well 
seismic inversion technology is used to measure indirectly the presence of gas 
slimming designs for well-casing that results in reduced rig time and casing costs 
An aspect of development studies, is whether a foreign company's experiences are 
relevant to firms in other developing countries. The case studies confirm that, 
although their circumstances may be rather different, lessons drawn from foreign 
company experiences are useful. For example, foreign companies may not only 
acquire the capacity to produce their technologies, but perhaps also innovational 
competencies, as in the case of SABIC. The key question for Saudi Arabia is how to 
achieve technological dynamism. The Saudi government can play a complementary 
role in providing an environment for technological development. 
From the experiences of Saudi Aramco and SABIC, the Saudi government needs to 
adopt a technology policy directed at: 
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Managing technology transfer to deal with issues connected with the search 
and selection of the most appropriate technical systems 
Managing technological development to ensure and adopt the technical system 
and, in the long run, to foster innovation based on such technology 
Developing local technological capacity to develop human resources, R&D 
infrastructure and dynamic industrial infrastructure. 
However, there may be limits in which it is possible to generalise from the Saudi 
experiences in oil and petrochemical development. Saudi Arabia is a large country 
and has a special position amongst the * world's energy suppliers. 
Its huge natural 
resources make it an extremely attractive target for foreign companies across the 
world. For the same reason, it makes sense for Saudi Arabia to develop its own 
technology, which can best suit Saudi industry conditions, and to compete in the 
huge world market. 
In the survey, neither SABIC nor Aramco affiliates have encountered any difficulty 
with government agencies in acquiring technology. This is an important factor in 
limiting government involvement in acquiring of technologies and technology 
transfer. In the two case studies the fall responsibility of acquiring technologies is 
placed on the company. The important question is why SABIC and Arainco have not 
leamt from their long experiences in building their own petrochemical and refinery 
plants. There are similarities in production process and technology, requiring an 
urgent need for the development strategies of both companies to be reevaluated in 
this area. However, this study confirms that the Saudi government should play 
a flexible role in helping the companies to acquire the right technology. It may 
be useful for the government to work with Aramco and SABIC to develop a 
technology transfer system, with the objective focused on local technology 
development to create a scientific technology base. In this area the Saudi 
government may seek the opportunity to develop this system by evaluating the 
experiences of both SABIC and Aramco to develop criteria for attracting technology 
into the Kingdom. 
6.5 Summary 
The results of the questionnaire analysis have been discussed in detail in Chapter-6, 
This analysis mainly cover the areas that have been included in the questionnaire 
clarifying the position of technology transfer in both SABIC and Saudi Aramco. 
From the questionnaire, this Chapter has drawn different conclusions relating to the 
technology leaming and capabilities and the need for the two companies to focus on 
the technology transfer process. 
In the case of Saudi oil and petrochemical industries, efficiency is often the result of 
investments in new equipment. The Saudi firm's policy is to transfer modem 
technology and processes that lead to high productivity and quality products. 
However innovation and technology transfer are an interactive and iterative process, 
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involving many different parties. The effective process to transfer technology 
requires interactivity between various users, producers and adaptors of technology. 
From the results of this study, it is clear that Aramco and SABIC's technology 
transfer policy objectives should not just be to build the companies' capabilities, but 
also to facilitate the whole process of technological innovation by modifying the 
form of technology network. From the survey of this study it can be confirmed that 
it is necessary, for Aramco and SABIC, to have a clear policy framework with 
respect to technology transfer and policy cooperation. 
Table 6.21 demonstrates that successful technology transfer includes transfer of 
technological capabilities, which may be beneficial to both the supplier and user. 
Aramco and SABIC as technology users, need to give attention to adaptation as an 
essential and integral part of technology procurement. As shown in Table 6.22, the 
introduction and diffusion of technologies in the industrial kctor needs a sound 
environmental and economic policy, stressing the need for long-term goals and 
commitment by policyrnakers. This also means that technology transfer needs to be 
incorporated into R&D strategies. A possible framework is shown in Table 6.22, 
and may assist Aramco and SABIC to develop their own innovative concepts for 
technology assessment, adaptation and development, improving policy practices of 
technology transfer in their industries. The case studies confirm that the interactive 
and dynamic character of technology transfer stresses the need for innovative and 
flexible approaches, through long-term partnerships. The policyrnakers in Aramco 
and SABIC should be responsible for developing such a comprehensive framework 
for technology transfer policy. The framework for Saudi Aramco and SABIC with 5 
different theme. The first theme "securing appropriate frame work conditions", is 
rightly devoted to developing human resources in Science and Technology with 
increased support from the government and the industry sector for professional 
training. Likewise, all other themes "building an innovation culture", and 
"improving policy making", identify the policy aims to help both SABIC and 
Aramco in developing policies to further enhance and improve technology transfer 
capabilities. These themes, policy aims, and means show that the Saudi government 
can play a complimentary role in providing an environment for technological 
development. 
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Table 6.22 Technology transfer policies for the Saudi oil and petrochemical 
industry 
Theme Policy aim Means 
Secitng appropriate 0 develop human resources o dev' 
Increased government and industry 
am ork conditions S&T 
Fin 
S support for professional education. 
To diffuse best practices in 
Intemet-based business information 
Building an innovation innovation management 
networks. 
culture To promote the creation of 
Funding greater use of benchniarking 
innovative firms. and diagnostic tools 
To increase firms' absorptive Co-fihancing of consultants to upgrade 
Enhancing technology capacity firms'organisational ability. 
diffusion 
To improve linkages and Co-financing of technology uptake via 
public research public/private partnerships 
Competition among regions for funding 
To stimulate the formation of of cluster initiatives. 
innovative clusters of firms 
Promoting networking and Co-funding of centres of excellence to 
clustering To ensure a better match facilitate university-industry interactions. 
between the S&T infrastructure 
and industry needs. Building networks between public 
research actors and firms. 
Increased spending on basic R&D 
Sustain techno, logical Increased support to R&D. 
Leveraging research and opportunities 
in the long run. Public-private partnerships development 
To increase economic return 
Technology foresight for policy setting. 
from research Regulatory reform (university-industry 
interface). 
To increase linkages between Building networks of competitive 
domestic and foreign firms 
domestic firms. 
Responding to globalization To increase country's 
Building innovative clusters (see 
attractiveness as a location for above). Systemic upgrading of the S&T knowledge-based activities. infrastructure 
Improving policy making 
To enhance policy 
coordination. 
Raising the coordination function to the 
highest policy level. 
To improve policy evaluation 
Making evaluation obligatory. 
Developing new methodologies 
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), "Innovation and 
Technology ", 1999, Paris, p. 70 
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The two case studies and the literature demonstrate clearly that there are strong 
needs to develop the capacity to -assess and select 
technologies. Various innovative 
policy concepts, including networking and joint research organisations, were found 
to be successful. To increase the likelihood of success, long-term support is 
essential, stressing the needs of Aramco and SABIC for capacity-building and the 
cooperation of technology suppliers and users as partners. They need to be 
committed to achieving their goals and committed to achieving the goals of the 
partners. This approach can make it possible to transfer technology relationships into 
a successful alliance, meeting the objectives of both partners. In addition to the 
contents of Table 6.22 this study suggests that the Saudi industrial innovation 
strategy should address the following: 
Knowledge infrastructure- to ensure that Saudi industry is at the forefront of 
generating new ideas 
Commercialization of knowledge - to facilitate the necessary partnerships and 
mechanisms to capture the benefits of new ideas 
Human resources - to develop a workforce with the skills and attitudes to make 
new things happen 
Business and industrial environment - to improve the Saudi investment 
climate in the global knowledge-based economy. 
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CHAPTERSEVEN 
LESSONS LEARNED: POLICY OPTIONS FOR SAUDI 
INDUSTRY 
7.0 Introduction 
The preceding chapter 6 analysed issues related to the two cases studies (Saudi 
Aramco and SABIC) and related to the main research question posed in chapter 1. 
This final chapter seeks to offer conclusions from the research results. It -also 
considers the extent to which these findings may be specific to Saudi industry and 
particularly to the oil and petrochemical industry. It further examines how relevant 
these findings are to the main policy issues and concerns of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. Finally it reflects on the study suggesting some implications and 
opportunities for further research. 
This chapter is arranged in six sections. Section 7.1 addresses the fundamental 
theoretical issues, which emerged from the review of literature. It reviews the Saudi 
Aramco and SABIC experiences in oil and petrochemical technology development. 
The next two sections focus on the areas of technology transfer, technological 
capabilities and the learning process. Section 7.2 relates the empirical findings to the 
perspective of local technology and technological capabilities to analyze the 
strategies available for Saudi oil and petrochemical industry to selectively utilize 
foreign technology in order to meet Saudi industrial needs. Section 7.3 reviews the 
SABIC and Saudi Aramco approaches towards human resource development to 
establish linkages between technology transfer and manpower development. Section 
7.4 confirms the need for technological collaboration between Arainco and SABIC. 
It reviews Saudi joint ventures and the criteria for partner selection. It also looks at 
the role of partnerships in speeding up the transfer process. It confirms the need to 
establish institutions to formulate and implement these policies and nurture a 
national S&T capacity. Such institutions would implement the various technology 
policies suggested in this chapter. It argues that Saudi industry needs to have a 
technology policy aimed at enhancing its industrial development process. 
Technology policies need to be advocated as an integral part of industrial and 
economic development. Section 7.5, provides the concluding points and proposes 
policy recommendations in order to make it possible for Saudi industry to improve 
the process of technology transfer. It is recommended that Saudi industry initiate 
steps to achieve a more beneficial and constructive technological transfer process. 
The final section 7.6 proposes areas for further research. 
7.1 Saudi oil and petrochemical technology transfer 
Technology transfer is necessary for Saudi industry to build up technological 
capabilities. The key for ultimately acquiring technological competence is to select 
and to adapt imported technology. The literature in chapter 2 examined the terms 
and conditions of technology transfer, identifying the principal problems 
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encountered. For the effectiveness of transfer, technology must be transferred in all 
its required parts. This depends on how the transfer mechanism is organized; there is 
a particularly high risk that transfer may be incomplete when in its unpackaged form 
via independent dealers. The most important part of technology transfer is the 
transmission of know-how through education and training combined with practical 
experience. There exists several means for the transmission of know-how, formal 
local training programmes, training programmes abroad, in-plant courses, on-the-job 
training, education abroad, circulation of books and periodicals. In the first stage of 
government-sponsored technology development, Saudi industry imported foreign 
technologies, which solved its urgent demands, helped the construction of the 
infrastructure and forever provided a window for Saudi industry to learn about 
advanced technologies. This helped the second stage transferring 'complete 
technologies. This step successfully built up production capacities and also greatly 
contributed to the modernization of industry infrastructure, as noted in chapter 3. 
Subsequent stages provided technological resources for technological development 
and technological learning. 
The experience of Aramco and SABIC confirm that the purchase of technology via 
licenses covering designs or patents cannot in itself be considered as a complete 
transfer of technology, unless, it is accompanied by the following: 
" the undertaking of a thorough market survey including economic and technical 
planning, taking global and domestic factors into consideration 
"a bias towards capital-intensive projects, such as upstream and basic industries, 
including the appropriate infrastructure 
an emphasis on integration, maintenance and operation of utilities 
0 the upgrade and development of transplanted technology processes. 
This illustrates the criteria applied by Aramco, and SABIC in selecting and 
transfer-ring advanced technologies for their industries in the Kingdom. While 
SABIC apply similar methods in its technology search and selection for its projects, 
technical, economic, legal and marketing considerations are the four primary 
elements of its technology evaluation process. Technical considerations contain 
information regarding product quality, commercial viability, complexity, reliability, 
flexibility, environmental impact and safety and security considerations. Economic 
considerations relate to the cost of license/services provided by the licensor 
including initial cost, cost of expansion, plant cost and production cost. Scope of 
grant, right of use, selling rights, scope of indemnity, guarantees and applicable law, 
forms the legal considerations. Finally, marketing considerations comprise quality 
of product range, market possibility, area limitations and technical services back up. 
With these proven methods, SABIC has been able to transfer technology directly 
from the licensors to industrial plants. 
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7.2 Technology transfer and technological capabilities 
As indicated in the preceding chapters technology transfer is a desirable process. 
Saudi industry constantly wants more of the technology to be acquired or 
transferred. The source of foreign technology to Saudi oil and petrochemical 
industry has remained strong over the years, because multinationals still invest and 
operate in the country. This study confirms that the joint venture strategy is the main 
Saudi government technology transfer policy in the oil and petrochemical industry. 
However, it appears the authorities have been unable to make maximum use of the 
opportunities available for acquiring technology. Government policy towards the 
petroleum industry emphasizes that financial return from exploitation of resources is 
preferred to setting out a more effective strategy of acquiring technology. 
In chapter 6, it was noted that the promotion of technological learning is crucial for 
improving the technological capabilities of Aramco and SABIC. Technological 
learning is not only associated with those directly involved in the process of 
technology creation and design, but also with the producers and users. With respect 
to the case study analysis, it is evident that Saudi industrial development has brought 
about three important changes: 
new types of technological collaboration have emerged between R&D 
institutes and manufacturing firms (Aramco and SABIC) 
the attitudes of the companies, including R&D centres, manufacturing and 
other bodies, towards technology have changed, with a more positive 
approach now being adopted 
technological learning has been encouraged and has involved more people 
and a wider range organisations, helping the accumulation of technological 
capabilities at both the firm and national level. 
In some Saudi Aramco projects, acquisition of technology through a licensing 
agreement provides cheaper technology, -not only under the control of the supplier but also more amenable to local adaptation and subsequent development. However, 
this analysis is valid only in certain circumstances. In the Aramco case study with 
stable and mature technologies, it has done better by licensing the needed 
technology. 
The SABIC case study, by contrast, confirms that effective transfer of know-how 
requires a strong personal relationship between sender and receiver. The strength of 
the relationship between SABIC and its partners are two functions of the amount of 
contact between the personnel of the two firms, and the degree of commitment on 
the part of the technology-supplying firm to ensure that real learning takes place. 
From the results of the questionnaire analysis as shown in Chapter 6, the two 
companies (SABIC and Saudi Aramco) have built plants with the latest technologies 
in very short periods using a turnkey approach where the contractor builds the plant 
and hands over the 'key' at the start-up. However, both companies think it is 
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necessary for them to push the contractors to complete the work on time, because 
they consider that time is important from the revenue and profit point of view. The 
contractor gives a lot of attention to the time factor in order not to delay the 
completion of the project to avoid losing money. However, the recruitment of 
foreign employees by the contractor to carry out the work from the beginning to the 
start-up is a minus point, because it deprives Saudi nationals of participation in 
building and construction work. 
7.3 Human resource development in Saudi Aramco and SABIC 
The Saudi government has sought to establish linkages between industrial 
development and manpower development. The industrialisation- concept is not only 
limited by technical and economic aspects, but also has a connection with 
organization and managerial pressures. These come from the need to qualify and 
train Saudi labour to participate in the production process and acquire industrial 
behaviour. For this reason the Saudi government has initiated a number of policy 
measures, as listed in Box 3.7. High rates of investment in human resources by 
Aramco and SABIC have resulted in an impressive improvement in human and 
social indicators over the past three decades. 
SABIC and Aramco are companies of two contrasting styles when it comes to the 
development human resources. Aramco which was inaugurated in 1933 as a 
company fully managed and operated by Americans took a long time to focus its 
attention on the development of an efficient and qualified national work force 
capable of taking over the leadership of the company from the Americans. By 
comparison, SABIC from its inception had a different philosophy whereby the 
company trained and developed Saudi nationals from the beginning to gain skills 
and know how in a very short period of time. Although the approaches of the two 
companies have been entirely different, it is not possible to say that one method is 
better than the other because both methods have their unique characteristics as well 
as disadvantages. 
Although slower in its transition from an American managed company to a fully 
Saudi-managed company, Aramco used to its advantage the training of nationals 
through their working alongside highly skilled Americans. However, although the 
SABIC approach was quicker in the training of a national work force, it is definitely 
a more time consuming and costly method. But SABIC was quickly compensated 
for its heavy investment in human resource development by creating a local skilled 
workforce in a very short time. While Arainco had the advantage of minimizing cost 
and effort in the training of employees, through American expertise, the company 
suffered from being a company fully managed by foreign nationals for a long period. 
The successful experience of Aramco and SABIC make it possible for the Saudi 
government to create a plan to develop local capability to generate technological 
know how and to use indigenous manpower for the benefit of the country. It is 
necessary for Saudi industry to create professional training schemes that will enable 
Saudis to develop local capabilities aimed at reducing dependence on foreign 
expatriates. Saudi industry should also establish effective training and development 
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programmes for Saudis to be trained for technical and managerial jobs. It is clear 
from chapter 2 that recipient firms should be given the opportunity for local 
participation in the various stages. 
In light of the Kingdom's drive for privatization, future development plans 
emphasise expanding the work scope of Saudi private sector to ensure its effective 
contribution in the achievement of the strategic objective of diversifying the 
economic base and upgrading performance and economic efficiency. The most 
significant future challenges facing Saudi industry is the need to employ national 
manpower and to strengthen policies of saudisation and replacement. Along with 
this, programmes for on-going training should be expanded to improve the ability of 
national manpower to gain employment in Saudi industry. * 
7.4 Conclusions 
Employing the conceptual framework of technology transfer outlined in Chapter 
One, this study has through Chapters 4-6 analysed the major issues associated with 
technology transfer sharing development and indigenisation applied to the Saudi oil 
and petrochemical sectors. The key conclusions to be drawn from the results of this 
analysis are as follows: 
This study indicates (section 6.2-2) little involvement from Aramco, and 
SABIC in the three important areas of. 
" Quality of design, 
" Quality of manufacturing and 
" Quality of materials. 
One reason for these problems is that the plants are constructed and maintained 
by foreign contractors. The companies believe it is better to do their 
maintenance and construction through contractors, not only because of the 
higher numbers of manpower required, but also to pass on the responsibility of 
completing the project on time to the contractor. Part of this policy is because 
project management is also done through contractors. The study emphasizes 
that SABIC and Aramco need to increase their participation in construction 
and maintenance through their own engineering and labour effort. This is 
because construction and maintenance are great sources of knowledge and 
expertise and will enhance experience to Aramco and SABIC engineers and 
labourers, as part of the technology transfer objectives. This process will help 
the companies to limit technology transfer problems. 
2. Saudi industry has been successful in, firstly, attracting foreign companies 
and, secondly, through participation in developing their own plants. Aramco 
and SABIC have learrit from the experience ofjoint ventures the advantages of 
technical cooperation in constructing huge plants profitably and successfully. 
Aramco and SABIC are of the opinion that technology transfer cannot be 
successfully undertaken without direct cooperation with companies in the 
USA, Western Europe and Japan. The joint ventures focus on developing 
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successful long-term partnerships, with the joint venture partners considering 
their employees as joint venture employees irrespective of whether they are 
Saudi or non-Saudis. This fact has benefited the Kingdom immensely, mainly 
in the areas of technology transfer and know-how. Success in technology 
transfer for Aramco and SABIC derives from the following factors: 
" very clear strategies regarding the reasonable prices companies negotiate 
with full guarantee and warranty, and the manner in which they implement 
transfers of technology 
" the rules governing time schedules and the strict deadlines they set for all 
projects including provisions in the agreements with the technology 
providing companies regarding complete and successful implementation of 
technology transfer as well as the passing of knowledge to Saudi nationals 
" maintenance of good business relations with the biggest oil and 
petrochemical companies in the world, from management to engineering 
and technical levels 
the similarity of plants in the Kingdom with those outside the Kingdom, 
making it easy for partners to link their strategies between the local plants 
and the plants outside in sharing assistance and knowledge in solving 
problems 
both companies and their partners always aim at de-bottlenecking and 
looking for improvements in cost reduction and raising production 
capacities with a minimum of investments. Therefore, all foreign partners 
develop technology and implement technology transfer and growth 
capacity locally, sharing with Saudi partners 
that the methods adopted by SABIC in selecting joint venture partners and 
the strict terms and conditions that partners should train Saudi youth to 
shoulder administrative responsibilities and operate factories in the future 
SABIC has chosen outside partners to share risks and the profits. This 
approach has benefited the economy of Saudi Arabia so much that today 
every other newly established company is a joint venture. This study 
confirms the fact that joint ventures allow for expansion of the 
petrochemical industry, facilitate the transfer of technology to Saudi 
industry, and enhance the status of Saudi products in the international 
market 
SABIC has adopted a policy of establishing joint ventures with foreign 
firms as the principal means of providing technology and development 
support to manufacturers of petrochemical industries. American companies 
realize that joint ventures with the Saudis is a means to gain better access 
to the Middle East petrochemical market and reduce production costs by 
using relatively cheap Saudi petroleum. Aramco's equity participation in 
209 
the foreign oil companies has given the corporation a majority at the board 
level and accordingly can influence investment and production policies. 
These corporations have been involved with Aramco and SABIC in joint 
ventures; however, the Saudi side is generally not looking f6r capital 
investment when entering a joint venture, but rather wants technology, 
management and marketing skills. 
3. In the area of relations with universities and research institutes, evidence of 
a strong relationship mainly with universities in the Kingdom is shown. 
Aramco, especially, indicates stronger relations with universities and from 
an early stage it had close links with universities outside the Kingdom 
because of the nature of the oil industry. The Aramco case demonstrates a 
new process in collaboration with universities. This -study raises the 
importance of the Saudi government to encourage Saudi universities to 
establish units to extend support, assistance and cooperation to the 
industry. This study suggests that it is important for Saudi Arabia to 
consider these units as a government scheme, which helps companies 
access the knowledge and skills within Saudi Arabia's 'Knowledge Base'. 
Through these units, partnerships are formed between Saudi companies 
and groups of staff, often from different disciplines, in Saudi knowledge 
base organizations. These partnerships are at the heart of innovation 
projects that are central to the strategic development of the company 
partners. The mission of these units is to strengthen the competitiveness of 
industry by stimulation of innovation in industry through collaborative 
partnerships between the science, engineering and technology base and 
industry. Their objectives are to: 
facilitate the transfer of technology and the spread of technical and management 
skills, and to encourage industrial investment in training, research and 
development 
provide industry-based training supervised jointly by personnel in the science, 
engineering and technology base, for high calibre graduates intending to pursue 
careers in industry 
enhance the -levels of research and training in the science, engineering and 
technology base that is relevant to industry by stimulating collaborative 
research and development projects and forging partnerships between the 
science, engineering and technology base and industry 
part-fund Saudi government grants to knowledge-base organizations to 
contribute to the costs incurred in participating 
Through participating in these programmes, universities effectively link with 
Saudi industry for the transfer of their knowledge to drive productivity and 
competitiveness. These programmes involve high quality graduates working in 
companies on technology and knowledge transfer, and jointly supervised by 
personnel in the 'knowledge base' and in business in order to create an 
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environment in which academics and businesses are partners in developing 
industry. 
4. As research and development is the most important factor for the oil and 
petrochemical industry to develop technical know how, Aramco recently 
started to develop and expand its local research and development centre. But 
SABIC is way ahead of Aramco and has invested more. This study points out 
that SABIC's Research and Development Centre is considered to be one of the 
most modem facilities and plays an important role in developing products and 
applications. The results of the case study analysis suggests that there is a 
need to develop cooperation between Saudi Aramco and SABIC in the 
following areas: 
" the two companies need to cooperate in fields, such as the environment, 
maintenance and safety and security for the betterment of both companies 
in particular and the Kingdom in general 
" both companies need to work together in cooperation with universities, 
mainly in the areas of research and development to support efforts to learn 
more about technology transfer and know how 
" cooperation on recruiting intelligent undergraduates from universities 
" provide universities with laboratory equipment that is necessary to upgrade 
the level of education in these institutions, essential as an investment for 
the future of the oil gas and petrochemical industries 
Aramco and SABIC have been able to transfer technology directly from 
licensors to their industries. SABIC considers importation of technology to 
suit its needs and its industry conditions as the most important factor in its 
decision making process. However, this study indicates that SABIC and 
Arameo may be limited in developing criteria to select and evaluate 
technology. They still need outside sources to develop recommendations 
about technology selection. This weakness is confirmed, as most of the 
projects have used foreign consulting companies for the selection of 
technologies. Company technical committees, depend on the foreign 
consultant and partner recommendations, leaving little choice for the 
company's own decisions. Aramco and SABIC should consider developing 
their own capability in the evaluation and selection of technology. 
SABIC has been successful in developing good relations with its partners 
in R&D and considers that all joint venture partners share R&D activities. 
SABIC has developed agreements with all its partners to support R&D 
activities, using R&D Centres for their needs in solving technology 
problems. These agreements are cost-based on the percentage of total sales. 
Both SABIC and its partners gain benefits from this deal. However, 
Aramco has not developed this kind of mechanism and has not learned the 
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way of sharing with its partners in R&D in the Kingdom, still depending 
on outside sources for R&D. 
Another aspect of technology transfer and technol . ogy sharing is the 
establishment of off-shore R&D centres; with partners. Although the 
economics of R&D location dictate that basic design and development 
work by firms be highly centralised in the home country, they do perform 
R&D in host countries. Furthermore, global R&D is positively linked to 
the extent to which foreign markets are served by their subsidiary's local 
production. SABIC has established different types of R&D units abroad 
for the adaptation of existing technology and the generation of new 
knowledge. 
5. In some projects SABIC and Aramco have not included employee 
participation in design and construction of plants. The findings of this study, 
about national participation in the stage of engineering and construction, 
emphasize the need for SABIC and Aramco to revise their models of 
technical license agreements to include more national participation in 
engineering, designing and also R&D. It is important for the two companies 
to strengthen their position in the technology transfer process. 
6. Little has been found about limitations in the market access for most of 
SABIC and Aramco products because most of these products are considered 
as raw materials and commodities with limited restrictions imposed. 
However, SABIC should revise its strategies and methods in the negotiation 
process with technology licensors in order to reduce any limitations in 
market share, this mainly relates to highly specialized products where 
SABIC can have more flexibility in the market area. This is important 
because SABIC needs more flexibility in negotiations to be able to produce 
new products to reinforce its position in the international market. 
7. There is evidence that SABIC and Aramco have undertaken successful 
development and modification of their technology processes in their plants. 
The list of Aramco and SABIC patents confirms this fact. However, with 
regard to technology modification, responses from SABIC and Aramco 
affiliates suggest very low local participation. This study raises important 
questions about the responsibility of SABIC and Aramco in developing 
methods. Local participation is crucial, playing an important role in gaining 
experience, either directly or through local contractors. At the national 
levels, the Saudi government should develop a system to encourage SABIC, 
Aramco and other Saudi firms to consider local participation in all areas of 
activity. 
At the national level, Saudi industry should develop a technology transfer 
mechanism and criteria for local technology development based on the 
technology transfer model, outlined in chapter 1, Figure 1.2. This model 
provides Saudi industry with the opportunity to develop its own technology. 
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9. At the firm level, SABIC and Aramco were weak in the beginning in terms of 
technology innovating capabilities. This is due partly to the fact that Arainco 
and SABIC were in the stage of rapidly expanding production facilities, and 
as their products were in constant high demand, they had little interest in 
pursuing major technological change. 
10. Although Aramco is a major enterprise in Saudi Arabia, it has only pursued 
limited R&D and design on its own. SABIC, on the other hand, provides an 
example of a Saudi company able to combine foreign and local technological 
elements to create innovation. 
Aramco and SABIC technology transfer was designed to deliver technology 
innovation, and it did lead to the dissemination of technological knowledge 
across industries and research institutes. Comparative analysis of these two 
case studies suggests that there is not a rigid division between importing 
4production' competence (the focus of Aramco technology transfer) and 
indigenous technology innovation capacity (the focus of SABIC). The two 
case studies indicate that there are different routes to achieving technological 
capabilities. However, this has not prevented an important local adaptive 
innovation occurring (sections 6.1.4 and 6.1.5). 
12. At the national level, the Saudi government should be involved directly in 
developing a policy for research and development, serving industry and 
providing assistance to achieve national objectives. This policy should 
include a clear vision, as well as methods and objectives in order to support 
local innovation and technical capability within Saudi industry. 
The development of technological capabilities in production, operation and services 
in Aramco and SABIC as a whole was successful, through advanced technology 
transfer from industrialized countries, particularly joint venture technology transfer. 
However, in general, technological capabilities of Saudi firms are still weak. To 
some extent, acquisition of technological capabilities needed to produce 
technologies are more essential than capabilities in innovation. These capabilities 
are associated with not only a few highly skilled and creative engineers and 
technologists, but involve a wide range of players including technological 
specialists. Saudi Aramco shows more success in Saudisation where most oil sectors 
have achieved close to 90% Saudisation. SABIC also shows success in Saudisation, 
close to 80%. However Table 6.1 highlights the fact that technology and know-how 
are still alien concepts in Aramco and SABIC. 
7.5 Policy recommendations: national technology policy 
Whilst research and development is an important aspect of industrial development in 
any developing or industrialized country, Saudi industry's progress in this direction 
has been minimal. No Saudi government policy emphasised R&D development until 
the 7 th National Development Plan. Significantly the contributions of SABIC and 
Saudi Aramco have been the main stay in research and development to date. 
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Industry is a critical factor in Saudi economic development, yet the perceptions of 
industrial development in Saudi Arabia have not considered the critical role of 
technology policy. As a result, Saudi industrial development strategy is concerned 
more with the production of locally generated raw materials than indigenous 
technological development. Technology policies need to be advocated as an integral 
part of industrial and economic development. Saudi national economic plans need 
to consider the fact that the economy in general and industrial development strategy 
specifically can sponsor technical innovation. This study argues that Saudi industry 
needs to have a technology policy aimed at enhancing its industrial development 
process. The policy would comprise the following components: 
" Scientific research and experimental-design work 
" Enhancement of material and technological aspects of scientific work to ensure 
that such advances increase mechanization and automation of pro duction 
" Financing of S&T research - 
Capital investment in the development of S&T 
Training of S&T personnel. 
This study confirms that Saudi Arabia has made statements declaring the importance 
of technology in its development efforts. However, these statements do not amount 
to an industrial technology policy. The limited technology policies that do exist have 
been ineffectually implemented, largely because of. 
weaknesses in understanding the relationship between technology and 
industrial development 
weaknesses in understanding of the nature of 'dynamic' industrial and 
technological change 
the absence of a strategic indigenous programme of action for industrial 
development. 
Saudi Arabia needs to adopt an industrial technology policy focusing on the: 
management of technology transfer. policies for managing international 
technology transfer deal with issues connected with the search and selection of 
the most appropriate technical system, as well as negotiation of the best terms 
for the relocation of imported technical systems 
management of technical change: policies for managing technical change to 
ensure that once the technical system is relocated, the industry, or firm, is able to 
assimilate and adopt the technical system and, in the long run, introduce 
innovations based on such technology 
development of local technological capacity., policies for developing local 
technological capacity intended to develop human resources, an S&T 
infrastructure, and a dynamic industrial infrastructure. 
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The Saudi government should formulate policies that will nurture these critical 
areas. It should be emphasised that these recommendations are not intended as a 
comprehensive industrial technology policy package. Rather it is an attempt to 
outline an industrial technology policy that will create the conditions for industrial 
development. These policies require an institutional framework. Without 
institutions, any planning or policy will remain a dream. 
At the national level, there is a need to formulate national technology policies to put 
technology at the centre of development planning. This study confirms the need to 
establish institutions to formulate and implement these policies and nurture a 
national S&T capacity. Such institutions would implement the various technology 
policies suggested in this chapter to be responsible for: 
planning S&T inputs for other sectors of the economy 
planning and developing human resources 
planning and developing a national S&T infrastructure 
planning and strengthening a dynamic industrial infrastructure 
coordinating national and international factors affecting S&T. 
A national technology institute in King Abdul Aziz City for Science and Technology 
should be established to deal with these issues. A dynamic industrial infrastructure 
would largely supplement the sectoral policies relating to industrial development. 
However, many 'strategic' industries contribute not only to industrial growth but 
also to S&T. Specific policies aimed at strengthening the industrial infrastructure 
should be administered by the Ministry of Industry. The Industrial Technology 
Institute should have both national and international functions. On the national front, 
the centre would concern itself more with the dissemination of technological 
information among different sectors of the economy as well as the mobilisation of 
funds to support domestic S&T activities. On the international front, the centre 
should be charged with ensuring scientific and technical cooperation, coordinating 
technological policies at regional and sub regional levels, and managing and 
monitoring technology transfer. 
The Saudi Offset Programme is another method of technology transfer to Saudi 
industry. In this scheme, Saudi Arabia being conscious of its leverage in having 
huge defence contracts, obliges the seller to invest a certain percentage of the 
defence contract into associated transfer of technology into the Kingdom. The Saudi 
offset programme covers military as well as some major civilian contracts and 
encourages firms from the US, Britain and France to set up local high tech plants in 
joint ventures with Saudi companies. The programme creates newly diversified 
industries, increases training and productivity, facilitates technology transfers and 
stimulates economic growth. This study confirms that the programme has provided 
opportunities for Saudi national companies to transfer several technologies in 
aviation, space, petrochemicals, electronics, computer systems and medical 
operations. 
Reference to the Saudi British Offset Programme (Al Yamamah), this study 
recommends the establishment of a Saudi British Technology Management Office 
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(SBTMO) to assist Saudi industry to learn relevant issues from British industry 
concerning the management of technology. This mission can be accomplished 
through research projects on strategic and organisational aspects of technology 
management, dissemination of that research to practicing engineers and managers, 
and the education of engineering and management students. The programme would 
seek to answer key questions regarding Saudi industrial management methods for 
the creative use of science and technology, such as: 
How can Saudi companies develop product technology that meets market demands? 
" How can Saudi industry move rapidly from a position of technological followers 
to technological leaders? 
" How can Saudi industry succeed in absorbing technology from foreign industry? 
" How can the learning process be improved? 
In its first two years, SBTMO needs to carry out research projects on Saudi product 
design, manufacturing, supplier relations, research and development, and relevant 
topics. 
Saudi Aranico and SABIC should organise a world-wide conference in 
petrochemicals and oil, annually. This conference will be open to all petrochemical 
and oil producers in the world in order to set the technological development agenda 
for the petrochemical and oil industries and to enhance the position of the Kingdom 
as the premier petrochemical and oil producer in the world. This study suggests that 
the conference should be sponsored and organized jointly by Aramco and SABIC. 
This conference will provide the opportunity for technical presentations to be 
delivered by leading experts from across the world, focusing on new products, 
applications and industry-specific issues. 
7.6 Proposals for further research 
The issues involved in this study of technology transfer have necessarily been 
narrowly focused. In a more detailed research project the following areas need to be 
investigated: 
The interrelationship between Aramco and the private sector needs to be studied 
in detail, so as to ascertain the prospects and constraints in the relationship. The 
multiplier effect of the presence of the private sector has not been adequately 
assessed in this study. It would require a detailed study of Aramco, government 
institutions and private entrepreneurs in Saudi industry. 
The limited manpower capacity of Aramco and SABIC particularly Saudis, 
limits the country being able to engage in a more aggressive technology 
acquisition strategy. A further study may provide important information on this 
issue. 
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The apparently differing results in joint ventures between SABIC and the 
multinational companies may be. attributable to the contract agreements. In a 
further study, it might be appropriate to investigate these contracts in detail to 
ascertain their adequacy in ensuring the realization of the government's policies 
on the industry. 
Further research is necessary on the type of technology transfer to Saudi industry. It 
is evident that local service and consulting organizations were not involved in 
important areas of technology transfer to Saudi industry. Without local involvement, 
it is difficult for local capabilities (e. g. technical) to be developed to the level 
required for'Saudi Arabia to create its own technology. It will be of policy relevance 
to study Saudi government plans for eradicating or minimizing dependence on 
foreign consultants. Research undertaken in this area would help both existing and 
prospective new technology recipients to formulate future strategies with more 
confidence. 
It is vital to research modernization through technology, and the impact that culture 
has on this process. There is a need to explore whether certain culture or beliefs are 
barriers to modernization, economic development and success in international 
competition. 
The method of selecting case studies of firms has revealed interesting and policy 
significant examples of problems in the transfer of technology from foreign 
companies to local firms. Future research could use more sophisticated forms of 
analysis. A focus on specific aspects is also possible, in that there could be studies 
of, for instance, management decision-making, production techniques, and the role 
of marketing. The crucial problem of synthesis of different aspects remains and this 
study has been able to demonstrate how technology transfer could help Saudi 
industry to develop its local capabilities aimed at sustaining and maintaining 
technological independence. 
7.7 Non-technology issues requiring attention 
Due to the heavy dependence of the national economy of Saudi Arabia on a single 
national resource, oil, the economy is exposed to wide fluctuations of the world oil 
markets, over which the Kingdom has very little control. 
Although the solid gains made by Saudi Aramco and SABIC in the upstream 
development of oil into higher value added products are outstanding examples of 
achievements in this area, still the Saudi economy remains almost as un-diversified 
as it was in the early 70s. The Saudi economy needs to move away from heavy 
dependence on oil and instead move towards domestic and export-biased productive 
industries based on sustainable high value added production. 
To make this possible, a strategy for establishing a competitive infrastructure needs 
to be implemented. The current lack of well established clusters of firms deprive 
Saudi industries of a competitive advantage. Saudi industrial structures typically are 
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fragmented and weakly linked, if at all. There have been some successful attempts to 
promote clusters in large industrial cities, e. g. Yanbu and Jubail, but much more is 
needed beyond simply building on raw material supply relationships. 
7.8 Complementary Studies 
At the heart of globalization, is the balanced entry into the world arena of emerging 
economies. The Kingdom should thus guide legitimate national interests to embark 
upon opening up its economy and transforming institutions and people to take their 
place in the new global economy. 
To achieve this, it is imperative that more emphasis be given to science and 
technology. Also, a massive literacy campaign should be implemented to overhaul 
the Kingdom's education system. The really important strategic industry for the next 
century is going to be knowledge, and the key to knowledge is education. The 
upside potential for improved educational capabilities is huge. 
Although the private sector entrepreneurs and businessmen of the Kingdom are 
capable world contenders, the present corporate structures, relative strengths, 
technological capabilities and resources are not. The latter needs to be addressed by 
the Kingdom's policymakers. 
Low levels of research, development and technological diffusion are other factors. 
There has been a perverse tendency to pursue 'turnkey' technological projects with 
limited or no potential for the transfer of technical knowledge to the local labour 
market. Saudi industries have also been very slow to adopt new technologies on 
their own volition. Under- investment in training and slow adoption of flexible 
workplace practices exist in the Kingdom compared to other more advanced 
developing countries. Inadequate financing for technology and export-oriented 
companies is another draw-back. There is no equivalent of OPIC or ECGD. 
Small firms are seldom capable of significant efforts in R&D and are too financially 
fragile to compete on the increasingly globalized world markets. Therefore, Saudi 
Arabia needs to establish an adequate science and technology system. VAlilst there 
are some consulting and contracting firms in Saudi Arabia, these remain small and 
specialized only in the areas of civil engineering. 
Therefore the main policymakers of Saudi Aramco and SABIC must work with the 
goverriment, to implement the reforms necessary to create an environment that can 
raise the level of knowledge and know-how in both private and public sectors, by: 
Raising skill levels through learning by doing, abandoning turnkey projects and 
implementing widely accessible training programmes that can absorb and train 
Saudis, on the factory or office floor. Increasing domestic technological 
capabilities through University Centres of Excellence and developing linkages 
within each state and among Gulf and Arab states. 
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Increasing participation in the new world economy and the knowledge economy 
for which Saudis need a viable and efficient informational infrastructure. 
The implementation of the aforesaid strategies and continuous innovation through 
national and regional policies and the dismantling of any barriers that preclude the 
full support and participation of as many Saudis as possible, are essential. Such 
strategies are needed to meet the needs of the Kingdom and to bring the 
economically viable and technically relevant capabilities of Saudi industries into the 
twenty first century as full members of the world community. 
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APPENDIX 1: Questionnaire 
Company 
.......................................................................................... 
Name 
.............................................................................................. 
Position / Department 
.......................................................................... 
Postal Code 
....................................................................................... 
City 
................................................................................................ 
Phone 
............................................................................................. 
The aim of the questionnaire: 
This questionnaire is administered to the managers, directors, advisors and engineers who have 
been involved in the development of Saudi industry. The questions were designed to collect data 
about technological and industrial development within Saudi industrial companies. Your expert 
opinion is therefore essential in bringing to light technology development issues in your 
company that are important for The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
Given the importance of the information contained in each questionnaire response, I thank you 
for taking the time to complete this questionnaire and appreciate that it represents a major 
contribution on your part. 
You may rest assured that by giving your perspective, you are providing an invaluable service to 
the development of Saudi industry and all replies will be treated in the utmost confidence. 
Instruction: 
Most of the questions in this questionnaire ask you to check a box or circle a number according 
to your opinion. Many questions are in the follow forms: 
In your company, products designs are 
Copied or licensed from abroad 12345 developed locally 
Circling I means you largely agree with the left-hand side 
Circling 2 means you agree somewhat with the left-hand side 
Circling 3 means your opinion is indifferent between the two answers 
Circling 4 means you agree somewhat with the right-hand side 
Circling 5 means you largely agree with the right-hand side 
Note: Please circle only one number per question!! 
I realize that some of the questions ask for potentially sensitive information. All responses will 
be treated as confidential. 
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Sections covered in this questionnaire: 
1. About your company 
11. Technology 
Ill. Innovation and research and development(R&D) 
IV. Technology selection 
V. Foreign technology licensing agreement 
Vi. Technology modification 
VIL Company operations & strategy 
VIII. Human resources 
Ix. Final comment 
The results of the questionnaire: 
The Chapter 6 which is the core chapter for this research has discussed the results of the 
questionnaire in detail through a comparative analysis of the research data gleaned from the 
questionnaire which was sent to the companies and other affiliates of two case-study 
organizations indicated in Appendix 2. This Chapter aims to examine the survey's questions in 
detail. It also measure the response to the questionnaire related to the achievernents of the two 
cases, Saudi Aramco and SABIC. 
Kindly return as soon as possible 
Return address: P. O. Box 50748 Riyadh 11533 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
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1. About your company 
Please note that in all questions asking about your firm (your branch or subsidiary) 
1.01 Which of the following best describes your company or your unit (check all that 
apply) 
0 Plant production 
0 Management 
0 Maintenance 
0 Research and development 
0 Accounting 
0 Sales office 
0 Others ........................ 
1.02 Your company's approximate number of employees 
0 Under 250 
0 250-500 
0 500-1000 
0 More than 1000 
1.03 Please estimate the proportions of your company's workforce according to level 
of education attained. Please include all workers - production, maintenance, 
management, accounting, and so forth. 
Less than primary school % 
Secondary school ... % High school completed ... % Vocational school completed ... % University degree completed ... % 
TOTAL OF ALL WORKERS= 100% 
1.04 Approximate percentage of employees in your company involved in the 
Management 
Operation 
Maintenance. 
R&D 
1.05 Your company's average annual revenue growth over the past five years 
0 Negative 0 11-20% 0 41-50% 
0 0% 0 21-30% 0 51-60% 
1-3 
0 1-10% 0 31-40% 0 greater than 60% 
1.06 Your company's annual expenditure on new technology costs, as a percentage of 
revenues 
0 Less than 10% 0 21-3 0% 0 41-50% 
0 11-20% 0 31-40% 0 greater than 51% 
1.07 Your company's competitive strategy in its principal business is (choose the most 
applicable answer) 
0 based on natural resource availability 
0 based on favourable costs of skilled workers 
0 based on product or process technology 
1.08 For each of the following categories, please rate your company's position versus 
other companies. (Again note: you should respond from the perspective of your 
subsidiary. ) 
Behind other Similar to Equal to the Equal to the 
local otherlocal best in the best in 
companies companies region the world 
Product 0 0 0 0 
design 
and quality 
Manufacturing 0 0 0 0 
process 
Safety 0 0 0 0 
Management 0 0 0 0 
strategy 
Technology 0 0 0 0 
Skilled workers 0 0 0 0 
Services 0 0 0 0 
offered 
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11. Technology 
2.01 Your company's position in technology 
Generally lags behind 12 345 is among the world leaders most other companies 
2.02 In your company, does the technology achieve the following? 
(check all that apply) 
Yes No 
More profit 0 0 
More production 0 0 
More export 0 0 
Use of local resources 0 0 
Reducing foreign expertise and experts 0 0 
Others ....................................... 
111. Innovation and research and development (R&D) 
3.01 In your company, continuous innovation plays a major role in generating revenue 
Not true 12345 true 
3.02 In the last five years, did your company introduce a new product or service, or did it 
substantially change its method of production? 
Yes 12345 No 
A- If yes, this innovation originated from 
0 Within the firm 
0 Another source in your country 
0 Another country 
B- If the innovation was from another country, which of the following was involved? 
0 It was part of foreign direct investment operation 
0 You obtained a license or otherwise compensated a foreign company for the innovation 
0 It was a direct import of foreign machinery, equipment or technology with no further 
contact 
0 You simply adapted the innovation to your needs, with none of the above. 
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C- Please specify the country source of most innovation whether licensed 
or through joint venture partnership: 
the country source through through 
of most innovation licensed JV partnership 
0 USA 0 
0 EU 0 
" Japan 0 
" Other ............ 00 
3.03 Licensing of foreign technology is 
Uncommon in your company 12 345a common means of 
acquiring new technology 
3.04 Joint venture in your company 
Brings little new technology 12 345 is an important source of new 
technology 
3.05 Relation between your company and scientific research institution (e. g. university laboratories, 
government laboratories) are 
Non-existence 12 345 the best in their fields 
3.06 Your company 
Does not spend money on R&D 12 345 spends heavily on R&D 
1 
3.07 Conducting research and development (R&D) in your company 
A. Direct government subsidies to company 
Never occur 12345 are widespread and large 
B. Government R&D tax credits 
Never occur 12345 are widespread and large 
1-6 
C. Your company's annual expenditure on R&D costs, as a percentage of revenues 
0 Less than 10% 0 21-30% 0 41-50% 
0 11-20% 0 31-40% 0 greater than 51% 
3.08 In your company, how are the following inputs obtained? 
A. Components and parts 
Almost always imported 12 345 almost always sourced locally 
B. Process machinery 
Almost always imported 12 345 almost always sourced locally 
C. Specialized research and training services are 
Not available in the country 12 345 available from world-class 
Institutions 
D. Specialized technology services are 
Not available in the country 12 345 available from world-class 
institutions 
IV. Technology selection 
4.01 ýWch of the following sources of information have been used for selection of new 
technology in your company9 (choose the most applicable answer) 
0 Periodicals 
0 Catalogues 
0 Consulting 
0 Visiting exhibitions 
0 Partners 
0 Others ............... 
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4.02 There are many forms and channels through which technology transfer can be transferred 
from industrialized countries to other countries, according to their importance, which of 
the following forms of technology transfer were used in your company? (Please do not 
select more than five forms as "extremely important"). 
Not Slightly Very Not 
important important important applicable 
Technology supply 0 0 0 0 
Machinery supply 0 01 0 0 
Education 0 0 0 0 
Training 0 0 0 0 
License agreements 0 0 0 0 
Turnkey contracts 0 0 0 0 
Direct foreign investment 0 0 0 0 
Employment of foreign experts 0 0 0 0 
Joint venture 0 0 0 0 
Technical assistance/consultant s0 0 0 0 
Management participation 0 0 0 0 
Others ........................ 0 0 0 
0 
4.03 Technology in your company selected by (choose the most applicable answer) 
0 Chairman of the firm 
0 Foreign consulting companies 
0 Local consulting companies 
0 Your own technical committee 
0 Educational institutions 
0 Others .............................. 
4.04 Design the plant in your company by (choose'the most applicable answer) 
0 The firm acquiring the technology 
0 Foreign consulting companies 
0 Local consulting companies 
0 Your own engineering department 
0 Educational institutions 
0 Others ................................. 
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4.05 Please rank judge on a four-point scale how important these different factors are to your 
decisions in the selection new technologY.? 
Not Slightly Very Not 
important important important applicable 
Financial condition 0 0 0 0 
Contract condition 0 0 0 0 
Mode of payment & facilities 0 0 0 0 
Complexity of technology 0 0 0 0 
Reputation of supplier 0 0 0 0 
Latest & proven technology 0 0 0 0 
V. Foreign technology license agreement 
5.01 In your company, is there any article in the technology license agreement, which obligates 
the supplier to provide the following? 
Yes No 
Education courses 0 0 
Training services 0 0 
Components and parts 0 0 
Specialized technical services 0 0 
Transfer some technical instructions 0 0 
Specialized research 0 0 
Local participation in R&D 0 0 
Local participation in design & construction 0 0 
Local participation in management 0 0 
Others .................. 
0 0 
5.02 Did the license agreement restrict the use oV 
Yes No 
Local material resources 0 0 
Outside material resources 0 0 
Local machines & equipment 0 0 
Outside machines & equipment 0 0 
Development of machines & equipment 0 0 
Local manpower 0 0 
Local market 0 0 
Regional market 0 0 
Outside market 0 0 
Other ........................................ 0 0 
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VI. Technology modification 
6.01 Please state whether there have been any modifications of the imported technology in 
1 
your company? 
Yes 0 No 0 
If yes, please give example and indicate the source responsible: 
............................................................................ 
............................................................................ 
6.02 Has your firm faced any technology problems in production or operation? 
Yes 0 No 0 
If yes, please give example: 
............................................................................ 
............................................................................ 
6.03 Did your firm experience the principal technology-sharing problems that have arisen with 
a foreign partner 
Yes 0 No 0 
If yes, please give example: 
............................................................................................................. 
............................................................................................................. 
6.04 Did your finn experience difficulty with govertunent sector in the acquiring of 
technology? 
Yes 0 No 0 
If yes, please give example: 
............................................................................................................. 
............................................................................................................. 
6.05 Does your company have R&D facilities? 
Yes 0 No 0 
If no, please state the reasons: 
..................................................................................................... 
.............................................................................................................. 
6.05 Does your company have any relations with educational institutions such as universities? 
Yes 0 No 0 
If yes, please give example: 
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6.07 Does your company have any patent registrations? 
Yes 0 No 0 
If yes, please give example and indicate when acquired, where the registration is lodged 
and the nature of the technology patented 
.......................................................................................................... 
.......................................................................................................... 
.......................................................................................................... 
VII. Company operations & strategy 
Note: the following questions seek your assessment of the typical company or subsidiary that 
competes internationally. 
7.01 Competitive advantage of your company in international markets is 
Due to low cost labour or 12345 due to unique products 
Natural resources and processes 
7.02 Your company obtains technology 
Exclusively from foreign 12345 by pioneering their own 
companies new products 
or processes 
7.03 In your company, products designs are 
Copied or licensed from abroad 12 345 developed locally 
7.04 In your company, production processes 
Generally use obsolete 12345 generally employ the 
technology world's best and most 
efficient technology 
7.05 To what extent has the imported technology your firm's ability to coordinate with 
customers and suppliers? 
No change 12345 huge improvement 
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7.06 In your company, please estimate local participation in 
Low Medium High 
Participation participation participation 
Projects design 0 0 0 
Projects construction 0 0 0 
Principal services 0 0 0 
Supervision 0 0 0 
Operation 0 0 0 
Testing and inspection 0 0 0 
Research and development 0 0 0 
VIII. Human resources 
8.01 The general approach of your company to human resources is 
To invest little in 123 45 
training and 
development 
to invest heavily to employee 
attract, train and retain staff 
8.02 Management training program in your company 
Limited and poor quality 12345 go only to skilled 
professionals among the 
8.03 People in your company are 
Not interested in absorbing 12345 aggressive in absorbing new 
new technology technology world's best 
IX. Final comment 
9.01 Please give here any comment, idea or suggestion that you feel may be relevant to this 
study? 
(Thank you for your cooperation and kindly return as soon as possible) 
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APPENDIX 2: 
2-1: List of Saudi Aramco and SABIC Affiliates in Survey 
The following box describes units or departments who replied to the survey: 
- Plant operation and planning 
- Research and development 
- Finance and accounting 
- Sales and marketing 
- Human resources 
- Production 
Management 
Maintenance 
2-2: List of Saudi Aramco Affiliates in KSA were chosen as a focus through the case study 
survey 
Company I No. of survey No. of reply 
Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Saudi Aramco) 15 07 
Aramco Ras Tannurah Refinery 05 04 
Saudi Aramco Mobil Refinery Co. 
(SAMREF) 
05 08 
Aramco Riyadh Oil Refinery 05 04 
Saudi Aramco Shell Refinery Co. (SASREF) 10 05 
Jeddah Oil Refinery 05 02 
Aramco Yanbu Refinery 05 04 
TOTAL 50 34 
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2-3: List of SABIC's Affiliates in the Vingdom of Saudi Arabia were chosen as a focus 
through the case study survey 
Company No. of survey No. of reply 
Sudi Basic Industries Corporation 
(SABIC) / HQ 
10 05 
Saudi Methanol Co. (AR-RAZI) 
05 02 
National Industries Gases Co (GAS) 
03 03 
Saudi European Petrochemical Co 
QBN ZAHR) 
05 02 
Arabian Industrial Fibers Co 
(IBN-RUSHD) 
05 04 
National Methanol Co. (IBN-SINA) 
05 01 
Saudi Petrochemical Co. (SADAF) 
05 03 
AL-Jubail Fertilizer Co. (SAMAD) 03 02 
Saudi Iron & Steel Co. (HADEED) 
Eastern Petrochemical Co. (SHARQ) 
05 02 
AL-Jubail Petrochemical Co. (KEMYA) 
05 05 
Saudi Yanbu Petrochemical Co. (YANPET 05 05 
Ibn-Hayyan Plastic Products Co. (TAYF) - 
National Plastic Co. (IBN-HAYYAN) -- 
Arabian Petrochemical Co., 
(PETROKEMYA) 
05 02 
National Chemical Fertilizer Co. 
(IBN AL-BAYTAR) 
03 01 
_ Saudi Arabian Fertilizer Co. (SAFCO) 03 02 
SABIC Terminal Services Co. 
(SABTANK) 
-- 
TOTAL 62 39 
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APPENDIX 3: 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF KING ABDUL AZIZ CITY FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
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King Abdul Aziz City for Science and Technology is an independent scientific organisation, 
established in 1977, for the purpose of implementing a national policy for the advancement of science 
and technology and to formulate the strategies. 
The City was primarily responsible for the introduction of scientific research programmes for 
development in the Kingdom, it also pioneered in the enhancement of various research programmes 
between the Kingdom and the international scientific research institutions. While the offering of 
scholarships and training courses in scientific research was one of its major projects, it also coordinated 
with departments, scientific institutions and research centre in the Kingdom for the purpose of research 
and data exchange. 
As research projects are carried out in different institutions throughout the Kingdom, the King Abdul 
Aziz City for Science and Technology (KACST) was vested with the responsibility of administration and 
supervision of all research projects in various scientific areas. KACST conducts ongoing research 
comparing solar-powered alternatives to diesel fuel. One experiment, HYSOLAR, is testing hydrogen as 
a fuel in rebuilt automobile engines, using internal combustion to convert the hydrogen. KACSTis also 
conducting a solar-cooling experiment and has designed a solar thermal cooker. It has also implemented 
solar-powered highway signs and lighting. Energy generated from wind and the peaceful uses of atomic 
energy are other possibilities being researched by KACST scientists. 
Another division of KACST, the Institute of Astronomical Research, signed an agreement with the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration(NASA) of the United States to track sand drifting, 
develop mapping and detect underground water. The highlight of this cooperative project came on June 
24,1985 at Edwards Air Force Base in California. The U. S. SpaceShuttle Discovery landed after 
finishing a successful space mission with a crew that included Prince Sultan Bin Salman Bin Abdul 
Aziz, the first Arab and Muslim astronaut. 
(*)Sources: KingAbdulAziz Cityfor Science and TechnoloUAnnita[Reports2001-2002, KACST, Riyadh Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, 2002 
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APPENDIX 4: ' List of Saudi Aramco patents (2002 tol976 ) 
Patent No. Title 
6,180,888 Pulsed voltage surge resistant magent wire 
6,156,827 Bituminous compositions prepared from thermoplatic polyolefins 
and their uses 
6,060,162 Pulsed voltage mirge resistant magnet wire 
6,056,995 Method of coating electrical conductors with corona resistant 
multi layer insulation 
5,861,578 Electrical conductors coated with corona resistant, multiplayer 
insulation system 
5,654,095 Pulsed Voltage surge resistant magnet wire 
5,476,681 Rigid polyurethane/polyisocyanurate of foams containing 
paraffinic based oils 
5,405,885 Rigid polyurethane/polyiosocyanate foams containing paraffinic 
based oils 
5,256,740 Amino substituted polymers and their use as additives for 
modifying the cold properties of middle hydrocarbon distillates 
5,112,937 Polymers derived from unsaturated polyesters by addition of 
compounds with a thiol function and their use as additives 
modifying the properties of petroleum middle distillates when 
cold 
5,106,515 Polymers derived from unsaturated polyesters by addition of 
compounds with a thiol function and their use as additives 
modifying the properties of petroleum middle distillates when 
cold 
5,037,945 Polymers derived from unsaturated polyesters by addition of 
compounds with an armine function and their use as additives 
modifying the properties of petroleum middle distillates when 
cold 
5,001,202 Polymers derived from unsaturated polyesters by addition of 
compounds with an amine function and their use as additives 
modifying the properties of petroleum middle distillates when 
cold 
4,956,492 Dialkyl furnarate, vinyl acetate copolymers useful as dewaxing 
aids 
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4,900,332 Nitrogenous copolymers, their preparation and use as additives for 
improving the pour properties of hydrocarbon middle distillates 
4,837,338 Removal of impurities from n methyl pyrolidone using highly I 
pure water washed activated alumina 
4,832,821 1 Catalyst reforming process 
4,813,027 1 Method and apparatus for enhancing seismic data 
4,766,099 Catalyst for oil hydrorefining or mild hydrocracking of heavy oil I 
charges to produce middle distillates 
4,731,095 Nitrogen containing copolymers useful as additives for lowering 
thye cloud 
point of hydrocarbon middle distillates and compositions 
containing them 
4,695,363 Crystal modification using dewaxing aids under agitated 
conditions 
4,678,555 Preparation of cellulose acertate membrane and its use for polar I 
solvent oil separation 
4,670,130 The use of dailyyl furnarate vinyl acetate copolyiners as dewaxing I 
aids 
4,652,273 Hydrocarbon middle distillates composition containing nitrogen I 
containing additives for decreasing its cloud point 
4,584,093 Process for the hydrotreatment of hydrocarbon oil employing I 
catalysts based on alumina, silica or silica alumina 
4,549,955 Process for stabilizing hydroprocessed lubricating oil stocks by I 
the addition of hydrogen sulfide 
4,541,972 Prerparation of cellulose acetate membrane and its use for polar I 
solvent oil separation 
4,537,875 Crushed catalysts containing alumina silica or silica alumina and I 
process for their manufacture 
4,514,280 Dewaxing waxy oil by dilution chilling employing static mixing I 
means 
4,511,369 Copolymers with nitrogen groups, useful as additives for 
decreasing the cloud point of hydrocarbon middle distillates and 
compositions containing them. 
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4,510,255 Process for manufacturing a supported catalyst for the 
hydrotreatment of hydrocarbon oils 
4,503,182 Copolymers useful as additives for lowering the cloud point of 
middle hydrocarbon distillates, and compositions of middle 
hydrocarbon distillates comprisingthern 
4,502,787 Agitated heat exchanger to chill solvent oil and wax slurry to wax I 
filtration temperature 
4,496,456 Method for preparing thin regenerated cellulose membranes of I 
high flux and selectivity for organic liquids separations 
4,464,494 Adhesive system for production of spiral wound membrane I 
elements for use in organic fluid mixture seperations 
4,461,698 Solvent dewaxing waxy hydrocarbon distillate oils using a 
combination wax naphthalene condensate poly dialky 
furmarate/vinyl acetate copolymer dewaxing aid 
4,451,353 Solvent dewaking waxy hydrocarbon distillates using a 
combination poly acrylate polymer and polymethacrylate polymer 
dewaxing aid 
4,444,648 Solvent dewaxing with methyl tertiary butyl ether 
4,441,987 Dewaxing process using agitated heat exchanger to chill solvent I 
oil and wax slurry to wax filtration temperature 
4,422,924 Solvent dewaxing waxy hydrocarbons using an alpha olefin I 
polymer olefin vinyl acetate copoloymer composite dewaxing aid 
4,421,634 Catalytic dewaxing with a hydrogen form zeolite L catlyst 
4,406,771 Solvent dewaxing waxy hydrocarbon oil distillates using a 
combination poly dialkyl fimarate vinyl acetate copolymer 
having pendent carbon side chain length of predominantly C. sub 
22 and polyalky (meth-) acrylate polymer dewaxing aid 
4,396,492 Method for retarding corrosion in petroleum processing operation 
using N-methy pyrrolidone 
4,377,467 Solvent dewaxing waxy hydrocarbon oils using dewaxing aid 
4,371,641 Bitumehn containing extended compositions 
4,368,112 Solvent recovery from foots oil using modified regenerated I 
cellulose membranes 
4,367,074 1 Novel filter aid compositions for inivrovin, (z the limiti 
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filterability temperature and inhibition of n-paraffin crystal 
formation during low temperature of middle distillates 
4,361,502 Catalyst for the pyrolysis of hydrocarbons 
4,359,325 Copolymedrs; from acrylate dicarboxylic compounds and 
disobutylene as oil additives 
4,354,003 Solvent dewaxing waxy hydrocarbons using an alpha-olefin 
polyer olefin vinyl acetate copolymer composite dewaxing aid 
4,334,978 Dewaxing and wax filterability by reducing scraper speed in 
scraped surface chilling units 
4,319,962 Continous autorefrigerative dewaxing apparatus 
4,285,804 Process for hydrotreating heavy hydrocarbons in liquid phase in 
the presence of a dispersed catalyst 
4,264,334 Heavy fuel-oil compositions having an improved stability under 
storage conditions 
Continous autoreffigerative dewaxing process and apparatus 4,217,203 
Combination dewaxing process 4,216,075 
Polyvinylpyrolidone dewaxing aid for bright stocks 4,181,597 
Residual oil desulfarization in multiple zones without 4,176,044 concomitant increase in hydrogen consumption 
4,172,816 Solvent dewaxing waxy hydrocarbon oils using dewaxing aid 
4,171,259 Method of stabilizing lube oils 
4,169,785 Process for alkylating waxy hydrocarbons with C. sub. 3-C. Sub. 5 
carbon atom secondary alcohols as catalyst 
4,169,039 Catalytic process for preparing olefins by hydrocarbon pyrolysis 
4,149,991 Reforming with multimetiallic catalysts 
4,148,758 Reforming with multimetallic catalyst's 
4,146,461 Dilution chilling dewaxing by modification of tower temperature 
profile 
4,145,275 Dilchill dewaxing using wash filtrate solvent dilution 
4,125,458 Simultaneous deasphalting-extraction process 
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4,124,489 Production of transformer oil feed stocks from waxy crudes 
4,11,790 Dilution chilling dewaxing solvent 
4,081,352 Combination of extraction-dewaxing of waxy petroleum oils 
4,076,613 Combined disulfurization and conversion with alkali metals 
4,057,491 Solvent recovery process for N-methyl-2-pyrrolidone in 
hydrocarbon extraction 
4,052,294 Method of solvent recovery in autorefrigerant/ketone dewaxing 
processes 
4,032,431 Shape selective naphtha processing 
4,021,207 Liquid hydrocarbon compositions of improved behaviour in the 
cold and containing diene polymers 
4,018,866 Process for producing low pour point transformer oils from 
parafrfinic crudes 
4,015,952 Liquid hydrocarbon compositions of improved behavior in the 
cold and containing diene polymers 
4,013,549 Lube extraction with NMP/Phenol/water mixtures 
4,013,542 Partial pre-dilution dilution chilling 
4,007,112 Method of controlling a distillation column for topping crude 
petroleum 
3,989 616 Production of lubricating oils 
blending stocks and selected 
, components for asphalt production 
3,984,687 
Shielded magnetic lens and deflection yoke structure for electron 
beam column 
3,979,279 
Treatment of lube stock for improvement of oxidative stability 
3,975,396 
Deasphalting process 
3,969,221 Iridium-containing reforming catalyst and process 
3,956,107 Nickel-containing reforming catalyst and process 
3,933,622 Trimetallic hvdrocarbon conversion catalvst 
Source: USA Patents Office, 2002 
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APPENDIX 5: Subsidiary companies owned by Saudi Aramco 
Aramco Services Company 
Aramco Services Company ASC is a U. S. corporation headquartered in Houston, 
Texas to provide a wide range of services to the parent company Saudi Aramco. ASC 
also recruits talented people from North America for Saudi Aramco and assists in 
relocating those people to Saudi Arabia. Aramco Services Company's Engineering 
Services is made up of four teams. The Engineering Unit provides engineering 
support to North America-based Project Management Teams and to Saudi Aramco. 
The Quality Systems Unit provides inspection support to Saudi Aramco's 
procurement and vendor inspection activities in North America and to PMTs. The 
New Technology Team seeks out the best new science and engineering. The 
Information and Image Services Unit operates the Corporate Information Centre, 
which provides the Drawing Management System and computer graphics support. 
These services include, but are not limited to, purchasing, expediting, and export 
shipping of materials in excess of over $100 million annually to support the 
operations of Saudi Aramco. In addition, P&T supports Saudi Aramco's Project 
Management Teams with logistic services, systems, procedures and training services 
as required. P&T also supports ASC's domestic purchasing and travel needs, as well 
as the sale of surplus materials of ASC and its affiliates. 
Saudi Aramco Shell Refinery Company (SASREF) 
Saudi Arainco and Shell are equal partners in SASREF. The refinery is located in 
Jubail City. The Refinery operations started in 1985 and its intake is 305 MBD 
Arabian Light crude oil. The main products are Chemical Feed Naphtha, Dual 
Purpose Kerosene, 0.5% Sulfur Gas oil and Fuel Oil (380 Cst) and their main 
destination is Asia. SASREF has recently boosted its competitive ability by building 
an advanced thermal cracking unit that enables the refinery to produce lighter more 
valuable products. The refinery currently employs about 616 employee which consist 
of 84% Saudis. A Saudi Aramco executive serves as SASREF's President & 
Managing Director. 
Saudi Aramco Mobil Refinery Company (SAMREF) 
Saudi Aramco and ExxonMobil are equal Partners in Samref, which owns and 
operates a refinery at Yanbu. The Yanbu facility refines 365 MBD of Arabian Light 
crude oil and was designed for maximizing gasoline production. Its product slate also 
includes kerosene, jet fuel, diesel and fuel oil. Samref products are sold in the 
Kingdom and exported. The Samref refinery operations began in 1984 and has current 
workforce of 877 employees, with a Saudisation rate of 84%. A Saudi Aramco 
executive serves as SAMREFs President & CEO. 
Saudi Aramco Lubrication Oil Reflning Company (LUBEREF) 
Luberef was established in 1968 as a joint venture between Petromin (70%) and 
Exxon Mobil (30%). In 1996 Petromin's interest in Luberef was assumed by Saudi 
Aramco. Its first refinery, Luberef -1 was constructed next to the Jeddah Oil Rcfinery 
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and has maximum capacity of 1.8 million barrels per year and which receives straight- 
run fuel oil from the Jeddah Oil Refinery and refines it into four base oils products. 
With combined capacity of 3.8 million barrels per year, Luberef is able to meet both 
domestic and overseas market demand. Key target markets for Luberef include the 
Middle East, Africa and Asia. Luberef-Il was built in 1997 at Yanbu and has a 
capacity of 2 million barrels per year. With the completion of Luberef-11, Saudi 
Arabia became self sufficient in its production of base oils, no longer having to import 
them to meet domestic demand: Luberef is a joint venture with Mobil in which Saudi 
Aramco holds a 70 per cent stake. When the Jeddah facility opened in 1978, it was the 
first lubricant refinery in the Middle East. Luberefs current workforce is 408, with a 
Saudisation rate of 83%. 
Arameo Gulf Operation Company (AGOC) 
The Aramco, Gulf Operations Company ("AGOC") was established in February 2000 
as a Saudi Arainco wholly owned subsidiary. AGOC successfully took control of the 
Saudi Government interest in the former Neutral Zone. AGOC is located in al-Khafji 
at the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia and engaged in activities relating to all phases 
of the oil industry and its other associate complementary industries in any area within 
the Kingdom or abroad, as may be authorized by the Government of the Kingdom 
from time to time. 
These activities include prospecting, exploring, manufacturing, refining, transporting, 
storing, exporting, marketing, purchasing, exchanging, trading and dealing in any way 
with hydrocarbon substances, including crude oil, natural gas, liquefied gas, asphalt, 
sulfur and any or all other hydrocarbon substance products, by products. Crude oil 
production is estimated around 150 MBD. AGOC current manpower is 1181, with a 
100% Saudization rate. 
A Saudi Aramco executive serves as President and CEO of AGOC. Saudi Arainco 
monitors world markets very closely for opportunities of joint ventures in refining and 
marketing. Up to date about Three billion barrels of Saudi oil have been marketed 
through the following overseas Saudi Aramco joint venture projects: 
Motiva Enterprise Companies in the United States 
In 1997, an agreement was signed to merge two Shell International refineries with the 
Star Enterprise project, which was established in 1988 and is jointly owned by Saudi 
Arainco and Texaco of USA. This project formed a strong partnership for refining 
and marketing in 26 American states in the eastern and the Gulf of Mexico costs. The 
Company assets include four refineries with a capacity of 820,000 bpd, over 53 
product distribution terminals and 14,000 service stations with total sale of 600,000 
bpd of motor fuel. Saudi Aramco owns through its Saudi Refining affiliate a 32.5% 
share in Motiva while Texaco and Shell own 32.5% and 35%, respectively. 
Sang Yong Oil Corporation in the Republic of South Korea 
South Korean refiner S-Oil, in which Saudi Aramco holds a 35 per cent stake, exports 
extra-low sulphur gas oil to Japan and Hong Kong ahead of stricter emissions 
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requirements in Japan, according to reports. S-Oil has the capacity to produce 10,000 
to 20,000 barrels per day (bpd Saudi Aramco bought its 35 per cent interest in the S- 
Oil Corporation - formerly known as Ssangyong - in 1991. The Korean company 
operates a 525,000 bpd refinery in Onsan, and has established a strong marketing 
position in the Pacific Rim region. The capacity of the plant was raised to its current 
level in 1994, while a $1.2 billion facility to convert heavy oil residue into higher 
value products was completed in 1997. 
Saudi Aramco is a leading foreign investor in South Korea, and the S-Oil refinery 
sources at least 70 per cent of its crude oil needs from the Kingdom, thus almost 
guaranteeing a ready market for Saudi oil. 
SIn 1999 Saudi Arainco, owns a 35% of S-Oil Corporation's shares. It is the biggest 
shareholder in this Company which has advanced petroleum refining installations 
with a production capacity of about 525,000 bpd, 90% of which is supplied by Saudi 
Aramco. Saudi Aramco's total crude oil sales in South Korea increased to more than 
720,000 bpd, nearly six times sales since the turn of the current decade. 
Petron Corporation in Philippines 
Saudi Aramco has, since 1994, had a 40 per cent interest in the Philippines' largest 
refiner, Petron. Petron operates 180,000 barrels per day (bpd) refinery at Bataan and 
markets products through more than 1,000 retail outlets. The company is one of the 
top three oil retailers in the Philippines. Saudi Aramco supplies the refinery with the 
majority of its crude oil needs, under a flexible crude purchases agreement with 
Petron. The agreement gives Petron wider latitude in its crude purchas5 in aggressive 
environments. Saudi Aramco owns a 40% share in Petron of the Philippines, which 
has a refining capacity of 160,000 bpd. The Company is seeking to increase this 
capacity to 180,000 bpd. 
Motor Oil (Hellas) in Greece 
Saudi Aramco signed an agreement with Fardioyanis Industrial Group in Greece to 
acquire a 50% share in Motor Oil (Hellas) Corinth Refineries and Avinoil Industrial 
Commercial and Maritime in March 1996. Saudi Aramco became the major supplier 
of the Company's crude oil requirements. Hellas is the largest private refining 
company in Greece and runs a conversion refinery with a capacity of 100,000 bpd. 
Arab Pipeline Company (SUMED) 
In Mid 1997, Saudi Aramco assumed Petromin's 15% share in Sumed in Egypt which 
is jointly owned and run by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and 
Qatar. Saudi Aramco is the largest user of Sumed Pipelines, which have a capacity of 
2.4 million bpd, and carries crude oil from the Gulf of Suez to the Mediterranean 
coast, thereby serving as a short cut to ports on the Mediterranean and in North 
Europe. 
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Vela International Marine 
Vela! s global shipping business complies with the highest international standards 
outlined by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Because the shipping 
industry is diverse and subject to many local as well as global regulations, the 
International Safety Management (ISM) code is designed for broad applications. But 
its focus is on the safe operation and handling of vessels and the prevention of 
environmental damage. Saudi Aramco crude transport subsidiary Vela International 
Marine is preparing for the future with a fleet upgrade, which includes four new very 
large crude carriers (VLCCs). The 300,000 deadweight ton vessels are due for 
delivery next year and 2003, and will complement Vela's current fleet of 21 VLCCs 
and Ultra Large Crude Carriers (ULCCs), and two petroleum product carriers. Each 
new VLCC will have the capacity to transport two million barrels of crude oil. Vela 
provides dependable crude delivery to customers in North America, Europe and the 
Far East. The economies of scale offered by the company's supertankers enables the 
company to maintain competitive rates for its crude oil. However, transporting more 
than a quarter of Saudi Aramco's annual crude oil exports is a mammoth job and one 
which requires the most stringent safety standards to be observed. 
A number of issues are taken into consideration with regards to safety at Vela, 
through its Marine Operations Department. Reconditioning of the fleet is a vital 
aspect of operations, according to the company, allowing a more thorough inspection 
of the ship's hull, propeller and rudder. Periodic dry-docking is a requirement of all 
carriers expecting to maintain international government and industry certification. In 
the interest of accident-free operations, these requirements impose strict standards or 
codes with which the owners and operators must comply. 
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APPENDIX 7: SABIC's joint ventures 
I. SABIC's joint ventures with the United States: 
SABIC81obil joint venture / Saudi Yanbu Petrochemical Company (Yanpet) 
As far back as 1946 Mobil came to the Kingdom to produce and distribute oil as a 
partner with Saudi Aramco. In August 1976 an agreement was signed between Mobil 
and SABIC to establish a joint-venture Saudi Yanbu Petrochemical Co. (Yanpet). On 
April 19,1980, the final agreement was signed by Chairman of Mobil Saudi Arabia 
(the wholly owned subsidiary of Mobil Oil Corporation), and SABIC. 
Profile of Saudi Yanbu Petrochemical Company (YANPET) 
Location: Yanbu Industrial City, Saudi Arabia 
Partnership: 50150 Joint venture between SABIC and MobilExxon. 
Capital investment: SR 7 billion (US$ 1.8 billion) 
Established: 1981 - Employees: 1575 ( 1214 Saudi, 361 non Saudi) 
Products Start-up Capacities Technolo Engineering 
Ethylene 1984 1,600,000 Lummus/Bechtel 
Propylene 1984 350,000 Lummus/Bechtel 
Ethylene glycol (EG) 1984 800,000 SD/Bechtel 
LLDPE/HDPE 1984 1,200,000 1 UCC/Bechtel, MHI 
Propylene 1 2000 260,000 UCC/MHI 
Pyrolysis gasoline 1 2000 116,000 Lummus/Lummus 
Feedstock Source 
Ethane Saudi Aramco 
Propane Saudi Aramco 
Light Naphtha Saudi Aramco 
I Oxygen GAS 
I Butene-I 
Markets: Mobil and SABIC Marketing Ltd market all products 
Source: based on information from YANPET, SABIC and Royal Commission for Jubail and 
Yanbu, October 2001. 
At this time, Minister of Industry Dr. Algosaibi identified this agreement as a major 
landmark in the Kingdom's industrial development history. (Joint Venture Agreement, 
1980) 
The SABIC-Mobil plant came on stream in 1985 to produce: 1,600,000 tons annually 
of ethylene using the Mobil process and Bechtel -engineering; 1,200,000 tons of 
low-density polyethylene (LDPE) using the Union Carbide process; 800,000 tons of 
ethylene glycol again using the Mobil process; and 150,000 tons of high density 
polyethylene (HDPE) once again using the Mobil process. The capital investment of 
this project was about SR 7 billion ($1.8 billion). Mobil and SABIC became partners, 
each holding 50 percent of the equity. Each partner provided 15 percent of the capital 
cost in cash. The remaining 60 percent was provided by Public Investment Fund of 
Saudi Arabia and 10 percent by private banks .A crude-oil entitlement was also being 
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made available by Saudi Arabia to Mobil as an added inducement to invest. About 
3,000 people were needed to staff this complex. 77 percent of the employees are 
Saudis and 23 percent expatriates. 
Yanbu started to market its products in Europe, along the eastern seaboard of the 
United States, in the Arab world, in Affica, and in Saudi Arabia itself. Tbree quarters 
of the sales were handled by Mobil. (Joint Venture Agreement, 1980) 
SABIC/Shell joint venture / Saudi Petrochemical Company (SADAIF) 
Saudi Petrochemical Co. (SADAF), was established in 1980 in a 50-50 joint venture 
with Shell Oil Co., U. S. A. to build one of the largest petrochemical complexes in the 
world-a "mega project. ". Using ethane and methane, this complex annually produced: 
1,100,000 tons of ethylene using the C. F. Braun of California process and 
engineering; 1,100,000 tons of styrene using the Mobile-Badger process and Badger 
engineering; 840,000 tons of ethylene dichloride using the Stauffer process and Dravo 
Corporation engineering; 300,000 tons of crude industrial ethanol using the Shell 
Development Company process and C. F. Braun engineering; 670,000 tons of caustic 
soda and 330,000 tons of chlorine using the Diamong Shamrock process and Davro 
for the engineering; and finally, 700,000 tons of MTBE using- UOP, CD Tech & 
SinamProgetti. 
This company began production of ethylene in 1984. Additional production units 
came on-stream in 1985. SABIC and Shell International Chemical, believed these 
ventures would be successful both for the Kingdom and for their partners. The capital 
investment of this complex reached SRI 4.2 billion ($3,800 million). SABIC and Shell 
each invested 12.5% in this venture. The balance was funded by the Public 
Investment Fund of the Saudi Ministry of Finance, which was prepared to make 
available 60 percent of the total cost of the complex with a grace period of five years 
and at a rate of interest between 3 and 6 percent. Commercial banks were being 
brought into the financing as well. The return on equity for this complex was some 15 
to 20 percent. This return depended on the price of such inputs as feedstock, fuel, 
electricity, and water as well as the world price of the products and the volume of 
sales. 
It was expected that the costs of the feedstock and the fuel would be much lower than 
in the industrialized countries and that the other variable costs would be at least 
comparable. 
Profile of Saudi Petrochemical Company ( SADAF) 
Location: AI-Jubail Industrial City, Saudi Arabia 
Partnership: A 50150 SABIC Joint Venture with Pacten Arabian Company 
(subsidiary of Shell) 
Capital investment: SR 14.2 billion (US$ 3.8 billion) 
Commercial operation: 1986 
Employees: 717 (663 Saudi, 54 Non-Saudi) 
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Product Start-up Capacity Technology/Engineenng 
Ethylene 1985 
. 
1,200,000 C. F. Braun/Flour, BRB 
Crude Ethanol 1985 300,000 Shell/Flour 
EDC 1985 560,000 Stauffer/DRAVO 
1997 280,000 EVC/Flour-BRB 
Ethylbenzene 1985 390,000 Badger/Flour 
1997 195,000 Badger/Flour 
Styrene 1985 360,000 UCC-Cosden-Badger/Flour 
1997 190,000 UCC-Cosden-Badger/Flour 
2000 500,000 ABB Lummus/Daelim 
MTBE/ETBE 1997 700,000 CD Tech/M. W. Kellogg-BRB 
NaOH 1985 450,000 Diamond Sharnrock/DRAVO 
1997 225,000 Uhde/Flour/BRB 
Chlorine 1985 
ý394,000 
Dimnond Sharnrock/DRAVO 
1997 197,000 UhdelFlour/BRB 
Feedstock Capacity Source 
Ethane 1,300 Saudi Aramco 
Salt 1,100 Salt Mine Jubail 
Benzene 450 SASRE 
Methanol 200 IB SINA 
Butane 1 400 Saudi Aramco 
Markets I KSA World 
1 (21%) 1 (79%) 
Sources : Based on information from SADAF, SABIC and Royal Commission for Jubail and 
Yanbu, October 2001. 
SABIC/Exxon joint venture / AI-Jubail Petrochemical Company ( KEI%IYA) 
Exxon, the world's largest company, first came to Saudi Arabia in 1946 as a partner 
with Saudi Aramco and the Kingdom soon became a major source of oil for Exxon. In 
the 1970s the possibility was raised by SABIC of a joint venture Al-Jubail 
Petrochemical Co. ( KEMYA) to produce low-density polyethylene (LDPE). After an 
agreement was signed in March of 1977, a number of feasibility studies were 
undertaken. A final agreement was signed on April 26,1980, between SABIC and 
Exxon Chemical Company of USA. 
This complex, used ethylene as a feedstock, which came from a cracker to be shared 
with the SABIC Shell joint venture /Saudi Petrochemical Co (SADAF). Using Union 
Carbide's new Unipol process to produce some 850,000 tons of LLDPE and using 
Exxon Chemical process to produce 220,000 tons of LDPE annually. The engineering 
was done by the Fluor Corporation. The investment of this project had been put as $ 
SR14,2 billion ( US$ 3.8 billion), with the equity being shared equally. As an 
additional incentive, Exxon received a commitment from Saudi Arabia to provide 
crude oil for the invested in the complex. From the beginning of the project, 
promising and qualified Saudis joined the team during the detailed engineering phase 
and during the construction and precommissioning phase. Each one of thcm was 
given a specific task and responsibility. Another aspect was to maximize the use of 
local materials and contractors, more than 50% was executed by local suppliers and 
contractors. The total personnel of this plant was about 350. When the plant startcd 
7-3 
up, 30% of the personnel were Saudis. A number of Saudis then were with Exxon in 
the United States for training, and their number gradually increased. Most of the 
production was marketed by Exxon. Abdulaziz AI-Zamil, former SABIC's Vice 
Chairman and the Managing Director, emphasized that the transfer of technology and 
management expertise was important what he deemed critical was the responsibility 
for marketing the products. Feeding the plants' production into Exxon's marketing 
network was the most significant portion of the agreement. The output of exports 
were channelled into world markets, including Europe. SABIC initially marketed the 
remaining of the production in Saudi Arabia and abroad. The proportion marketed by 
SABIC gradually increased. 
Profile of Al-Jubail Petrochemical Company (KEMYA) 
Location: AI-Jubail Industrial City, Saudi Arabia 
Partnership: A 50150 SABIC joint venture with MobilExxon. 
Capital investment: SR 7.87 billion (US$ 2.1 bill. ) 
Commercial operation: 1984 
Employees: 585 (470 Saudi, 115 Non-Saudi) 
Product Start-up Capacity Technology/Enginerering 
Ethylene 1985 700,000 Lummus/Lummus 
Propylene 2000 200,000 Lummus/Lummus 
LLDPE/HDPE 1985 850,000 UCC/Flour 
I LDPE 1 2000 1 220,000 1 Exxon/Tecnimont 
Feed Stock Capacity Source 
Ethylene SADAF &PETROKEMYA 
Butene- I PETROKEMYA 
Ethane, Propane Saudi Aramco' 
1 Hydrogen, Oxygen GAS 
MARKETS I KSA I GCC I WORLD 
13% 18% 189% 
Source : based on information from Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu October 2001. 
SABIC/Celanese-Texas Eastern joint venture/ National Methanol Company 
(IBN SINA) 
The Celanese Corporation and Texas Eastern of the United States and SABIC agreed 
to launch a joint-venture methanol plant in Jubail each holding 25 percent. National 
Methanol Co. (IBN SINA) was formed in 1981 at Al-Jubail and came on-stream in 
1984. Considerable progress was made since that time. It was decided to establish a 
world scale complex-one that would use local methane to produce 730,000 tons of 
methanol a year employing the Imperial Chemical Industries process. The engineering 
was done by C. F. Braun and Company. The investment of this plant was estimated at 
SR 4.2 billion ($1120 million). This venture seemed to have particularly good 
prospects. Methanol was becoming a key product for SABIC. Total demand in the 
United States, as expected by Celanese tripled over the next decade and production of 
the plant in Saudi Arabia was absorbed in the United States. Actual production levels 
increased 50 percent currently. (Feasibility Study of the joint venture 198 1) 
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Profile of National Methanol Company (IBN SINA) 
Location: Al-Jubail Industrial City, Saudi Arabia 
Partnership: (SABIC) 50% 
Celanese - USA 25% 
Duke Energy International - USA 25% 
Capital investment: SR 4.2 billion (US$ 1120 mil. ) 
Commercial operation: 1984 
Employee: 274 (255 Saudi, 19 non Saudi) 
Products Start-up Capaci ies Technology/Engineering 
Methanol 1984 1,050,000 ICI/C. F. Braun 
MTBE 1994 850,000 CID Tech/Flour Houdry/UOP 
Feedstock Capacity Source 
Methanol Plant: 
Methane Saudi Aramco 
C02 - IBN Al-BAYTAR 
MTBE Plant: 
Butane 695,000 TPY Saudi Aramco 
Methanol 324.000 TPY IBN SINA 
Markets KSA GCC World 
Methanol 22% 3% 76% 
MTBE 24% 3% 1 73% 
Source: based on information from IBN SINA, SABIC and Royal Commission for Jubail and 
Yanbu, October 2001. 
11. SABIC joint ventures with European Countries 
Saudi European Petrochemical Company (IBN ZAHR), SABIC's first joint venture 
company with European partners, began production of methyl teritiary butyl either 
(MTBE) in the second quarter of 1988 at Al Jubail. The company owned 70 percent 
by SABIC and 10 percent each by Fortum of Finland and Ecofuel of Italy. A third 
joint venture partner was the Arab Petroleum Investment Corp. (APICORP), with a 10 
percent share. IBN ZAHR had a production capacity of 1,500,000 mt/y. This is one of 
the largest MTBE complexes in the world. Methanol feedstock was supplied from 
other SABIC methanol producing affiliates. MTBE is a non-polluting, high-octane, 
oxygenated gasoline additive intended to replace tetraethyl lead in motor fuels. 
Consumption of MTBE was expected to increase dramatically in the next few years as 
the developed world particularly implements new environment protection policies to 
remove lead from gasoline in order to reduce lead emissions from automotive 
exhausts. ( Feasibility Study of the joint venture 1984) 
Profile of Saudi European Petrochemical Company (IBN ZAHR) 
Location: Al-Jubail Industrial City, Saudi Arabia 
Partnership: SABIC 70% Fortum (Finland) 
'10% 
Ecofuel (Italy)10% 
APICORP (Arab Petroleum Investment Corporation)10% 
Capital investment: SR 5.2 Billion (US$ 1386 mil. ) 
Commercial operation: 1989 
Employees: 599 (435 Saudi, 164 non-Saudi) 
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Products Start-up Capacities Technology/Engineering 
MTBE 1989 1,500,000 Snamprogetti/Snamprogetti 
Polypropylene 1995 640,000 UCC/Parsons 
Feedstock Capacity (TPY) Source 
Butane 1,150,000 Saudi Aramco 
Methanol 550.000 SABIC (IBN SINA) 
Propylene 720,000 Petrokernya / Kern a 
Markets KSA GCC Worl 
MTBE 13% 5% 74.50% 
1 PP 1 40% 10% 50% 
Source: based on information from Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu, October 2001. 
111. SABIC joint ventures with Asian Countries 
Asia, which rapidly became a major economic region in the world, accounted for 
many of the most dynamic economies: Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. With their 
lack of natural resources, these countries made outward-looking policies central to 
their overall economic strategy. These Asian states play a key role in Saudi Arabia! s 
petrochemical industry as Japan, the most industrially advanced country, provides 
technology and markets. Taiwan and South Korea provide technicians and markets. 
SABIC has arranged three joint-venture agreements with Asian countries, one of 
which is Taiwanese and the other, Japanese as follow: 
SABIC/ joint venture with Taiwan / Al -Jubail Fertilizer Company (SAMAD) 
Taiwan has virtually no oil and the most important source is Saudi Arabia. The close 
links between Saudi Arabia and Taiwan found a concrete expression in an agreement 
signed on December 4,1979, between SABIC and the Taiwan Fertilizer Company 
Limited (TFC) to establish the AI-Jubail Fertilizer Company (SANIAD) located in 
Jubail. 
This joint venture used methane to produce 500,000 mt/y of urea began in 1983. De- 
bottlenecking increased urea production by 20 percent to 630,000 mt/y. The total 
investment was estimated at SR 2.5 billion ($693 million). SABIC and the Taiwan 
Fertilizer Company each subscribed 50 percent of the shares of the Al-Jubail Fertilizer 
Company, putting up $100 million, with the balance being loaned by the Saudi Public 
Investment Fund (PIF). Some 60 percent of the output was marketed by the Taiwan 
Fertilizer Company in Taiwan and other places in the Far East. The other 40 percent 
was marketed jointly by the Taiwan Fertilizer Company and SABIC elsewhere. 
Ammonia, being a source of nitrogen -fertilizer, was closely linked to agricultural 
production. (The Feasibility Study of the JV 1979) 
While Taiwan had highly skilled engineers, technicians, and labor, they relied on 
U. S., European, and Japanese technology in petrochemicals. Thus, with the AI-Jubail 
Fertilizer Company (SAMAD), the Pullman Kellogg and Starnicarbon BV processes 
were being used while the construction-management services were the responsibility 
of Bakhsh-Pullman Kellogg. Design and engineering was partly carried out in the US 
offices of Pullman Kellogg. The actual construction on the site in Jubail started in 
June of 1980, and the plant went on stream in 1984. (SAMAD Reports 1980-1985) 
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Profile of Al-Jubail Fertilizer Company (SAMAD) 
Location: AI-Jubail Industrial City, Saudi Arabia 
Partnership: A 50150 SABIC joint venture with Taiwan Fertilizer (TFC) 
Capital investment 'SR 2.5 billion (US$ 693 mil. ) 
Commercial operation: 1984 
Employees : 429 (380 Saudi, 49 non-Saudi) 
Products Start-up Capacities Technology/Engineering 
Ammonia 1983 391,000 M. W. Kellog 
Urea 1983 650,000 Starnicarbon 
2-Ethyl hexanol 1995 150,000 Davy-UCC/John Brown 
Dioctyl phthalate DOP 1997 50,000 Mitsubishi Gas Chemical /MKK 
Feedstock Capacity Source 
Methane 30,500 MMSFY Saudi Aramco 
Ammonia 365 SAMAD 
Propylene 12 Petrokernya 
PA 17 Imported 
2-EH 33,500 SAMAD 
Markets KSA World 
Urea 15% 85% 
DOP 1 25% 75% 
2-EH I - 100% 
Source: based on information from Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu, October 2001. 
SABIC/ joint ventures with Japan 
Saudi economic relations with Japan developed rapidly. In December of 1973 the 
International Trade and Industry Minister, Yasuhiro Miko, visited the Kingdom. This 
visit led to the signing in 1975 of a Japan-Saudi Arabia economic and technological 
agreement, consisting of five articles: 
1. promotion of economic and technological cooperation; 
2. establishment ofjoint ventures and the contents of technological cooperation; 
3. supply of required services and facilities; 
4. encouragement of economic and technological cooperation between the 
peoples of the two nations; 
5. and encouragement of Japanese capital investment. 
The following year, joint committee offices were established in Riyadh. Saudi Arabia 
and Japan had much to gain from a close association. The Vice Chairman of 
Mitsubishi Corporation, Keizaturo Yamada, had observed that the Kingdom was 
interested in securing technology and complete turnkey projects in exchange for the 
export of Saudi oil. The Japanese technology for the petrochemical industry was 
almost on a par with the best in the United States and Europe. To secure Japanese 
technology and the much-needed channels, Saudi Arabia had recourse to the "sogo 
shosha" (general trading companies). These giant business owed their strength to 
close business connections. They were active in marketing, distribution, financing, 
and organizing large-scale plant construction. Mitsubishi realized that a chemical 
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company's success depended almost entirely on whether it had a solid link with a 
major feedstock supplier. This has led Mitsubishi and various other Japanese firms to 
look with increasing favour on joint ventures in the Kingdom. SABIC, and Mitsubishi 
both had strong mutual interests in strengthening cooperation in the development of 
the petrochemical industry in Saudi Arabia. (The Feasibility Study of the JV 1979) 
SABIC/Mitsubishi Gas joint venture 
SABIC/Mitsubishi Gas joint venture /Saudi Methanol Company (AR RAZI), formed 
in 1979, was the first of the SABIC Petrochemicals Companies to be created in a 50- 50 joint venture partnership with a group of Japanese companies headed by 
Mitsubishi Gas Chemical Co. On April 14,1980, Kisako Hori, the general manager of 
the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Limited, signed the agreement with SABIC to build 
the plant to produce methanol with design capacity of 600,000 mt/y using natural gas 
as a feedstock. Actual production levels increased 20 percent to 3,000,000 mt/y 
currently. This was the first venture by Japanese firms in methanol production outside 
of Japan. (Evaluation of SABIC- Japames Methanol Project 1979) 
Profile of Saudi Methanol Company (A 
' 
R-RAZI) 
Location: AI-Jubail Industrial City, Saudi Arabia 
Partnership: 50150 Joint venture between SABIC and JSMC (Japan Saudi 
Arabia Methanol Co. ) A consortium of Japanese 
companies headed by Mitsubishi Gas Chemicals 
Capital investment: SR 3.6 Billion 
Commercial operation: 1983 
Employees: 509 (459 Saudi, 50 non saudi 
Product Start-up = Capacity Technology/Engineering 
Methanol 1983 1 3,000,000 MGC/MHI 
Feedstock Capacity_ Source 
Methane 2.4 Saudi Aramco 
Markets KSA WORLD 
(20%) 1 (80%) 
Source: based on information from Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu, October 2001. 
SABIC/Mitsubishi Corporation joint venture/ Eastern Petrochemical Company 
(SIIARAQ) 
The most important joint venture with the Japanese is the giant petrochemical 
complex, SABIC/Mitsubishi Corporation 50-50 joint venture/ Eastern Petrochemical 
Co. (SHARAQ), located in Jubail. Using ethane as a feedstock, the plant had an 
annual capacity of 450,000 tons of ethylene, 250,000 tons of low-densitY polyethylene 
(LDPE), 450,000 tons of ethylene glycol, and 80,000 tons of high-density 
polyethylene (HDPE), according to tentative agreements. A great deal of capital was 
required-possibly some SR 8 Billion ($2 billion). Funding was by SABIC and a 
consortium of Japanese firms, grouped in the Saudi Petrochemical Development 
Corporation (SPDC), which was formed in 1979. The consortium was led by the 
Mitsubishi Corporation and fourteen other Mitsubishi companies as well as thirteen 
oil companies, nine power companies, eleven petrochemical companies, four banks, 
and two gas companies. 
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Profile of Eastern Petrochemical Company (SHARAQ) 
Location Al-Jubail Industrial City, Saudi Arabia, 
Partnership: 50150 Joint venture between SABIC and SPDC Ltd 
(A consortium of Japanese companies headed by Mitsubishi) 
Capital investment: SR 7.6 billion (US$2026 million) 
Commercial operation: 1987 
Employees: 819 (Saudi 638,181 non Saudi) 
Products Start-up Capacities 
- 
Technology/Engineering 
EG 1985 1,500,000 SIIELL/Chiyoda Petrostar (CPQ 
LLDPE 1985 750,000 UCC/CPL /Mitsubishi Ind. (MI II) 
Feedstock Capacity Source 
Ethylene 10.30 Petrokemya (Joint Ownership) 
Hydrogen 0.1 Petrokemya 
Methane 7 Petrokemya 
Oxygen 760 NIGC (GAS 
Butene-I 46 Petrokemya 
Markets KSA Gc World 
EG 1% - 0 vc L/ 99 0 
K 
LLDPE 11% 3% _8 6% 
Source: based on information from Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu October 2001. 
The Japanese corporate commitment was 7.5 percent of the capital investment. 
Another 7.5 percent came from the OECF, which classifies as "national. " This 
undertaking was the largest economic cooperation agreement yet between Japan and 
Saudi Arabia and that the Japanese government holds the realization of this project is 
of vital importance. Sharaq was formed in 1981 and came on-stream in 1987. De- 
bottlenecking and adjust plant operations to achieve maximum production capacity 
had increased output of LLDPE up 10 percent, and the output of EG up 15 percent. 
SABIC/ S. Korea joint venture /National Plastics Company (IBN IIAYYAN) 
National Plastics Co. (IBN HAYYAN) was the first of SABIC's downstream 
industries to enter production. It was formed in 1984 in a joint venture with the 
Lucky-Gold Star Group of South Korea. On-stream production of polyvinyl chloride 
(PVC) and vinyl chloride monomer (VCM) began in 1986. During 1987, the first 
complete year of operation, IBN HAYYAN's production reached design capacity of 
200,000 mt/y of PVC, destined mainly for domestic use. 
Profile of National Plastic Company (IBN HAYYAN) 
Location: AI-Jubail Industrial City, Saudi Arabia 
Partnership: Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) 86.5% 
National Industrialization Co. (NIC) 10.0% 
Saudi Plastic Product Co. Ltd. (SAPPCO) 2.0% 
Arabian Plastic Manufacturing Co. (APLACO) 1.5% 
Capital investment: SR 1.65 Billion (US$ 440 million) 
Commercial operation: 1986 
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Products Start-up Capacities 
- 
Technology/Engineering 
vCM 1986 400,000 Geon/Uhde, John Brown 
PVC 1986 3,00,000 Geon/Uhde, Budger 
PVC Paste 1995 24,000 EVC/TPL 
Feedstock Capacity Source 
Ethylene 93 Petrokemya 
Etylene dichloride 328 SADAF 
Markets KSA GCC World 
vCM 87% 13% 
PVC 51% 21% . 28% PVC Paste 4% 1% 95% 
d 
Source: based on information from Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu, October 2001. 
Profile of National Chemical Fertilizer Company (IBN AL-BAYTAR) 
Location: Al-Jubail, Saudi Arabia 
Partnership: Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) 50% 
Saudi Arabian Fertilizer Company (SAFCO) 50% 
Capital investment: SR 2 billion (US$ 533 million) 
Established: 1985 
Employees: 645 (580 Saudi, 56 non Saudi) 
Product Start-up CMacity Technology/Engineering 
Ammonia 1987 500,000 
Granual Urea 500,000 
NPK fertilizer 1991 500,000 
GTSP 1991 200,000 
DAP 1991 100,000 
Liquid NPK 1991 10,000 
M. W. Kellogg / TEC 
Snamprogetti / NSM / TEC 
Crosl/ TPL-Shinwha E&C 
Jacobs / TPL-Shinwha E&C 
Cros TPL-Shinwha E&C 
Cros TPL-Shinwha E&C 
Feedstock Cai)acitv Source 
Natural gas Saudi Aramco 
Phosphoric acid 200 Imported from Morocco/Tunisia 
Potassium sulphate 15 Imported from Europe 
Sulfuric acid 12 SAFCO 
Markets: All products are marketed by SABIC. 
. 
KSA GCC World 
Urea 15 %- 85% 
NPK fertilizer 87% 13% - 
DAP 80% 20% 
Liquid NPK 100% 
Source: based on information from Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu, October, 2001. 
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Arabian Petrochemical Company (PETROKEMY) 
Arabian Petrochemical Company (PETROKEMY) was formed in May 1981 as the 
first company a wholly owned by SABIC. The company initially went into production 
with support one ethylene plant with a design capacity of 500,000 MTPY, along with 
support facilities necessary for such a plant. This plant has design capacity of 50,000 
mtpy, and is considered to be the largest plant in the world. It was built with 
production technology of IFP of France. Soon after, polystyrene plants with design 
capacity 100,000 MTPY were built and started production in the first quarter of 1988. 
In addition, the ethylene plant was expanded by adding two more furnaces for a total 
of eight furnaces which increased the design capacity to 650,000 mtpy. In 1985 the 
total manpower was 443 employees. Since then the number of employees increased to 
over 600 to meet the requirement for the new project. PETROKEMYA also 
successfully increased the Saudization rate from 56% at the end of 1985 to 65% 2003. 
Profile of Arabian Petrochemical Company (PETROKEMYA) 
Location: AI-Jubail Industrial City, Saudi Arabia 
Partnership: A wholly-owned by SABIC 
(Dow Chemical withdraw in December 1982) 
Capital investment: SR 9.3 billion (US$ 2.48 billion) 
Commercial operation: 1985 
Employees : 1305 (1162 Saudi, 143 non Saudi 
Product Start-up Capacity 
-------- 
Technology/Engineering 
---------------------- - --------------------- 
Ethylene 
---------- 
1985 
------- --------- 
2,400,000 
- --------------------------- 
C. F. Braun/ Kellogg / MES /Chiyoda 
Propylene 1993 520,000 Kellogg/MES 
Butadiene 1993 130,000 BASF/MES 
Benzene 1993 150,000 Lummus-Houdry/MES 
Butene-I 1987 100,000 IFP/ SABIC-IFP / MES/ Chiyoda 
Polystyrene 1985 165,000 Fina/Chiyoda 
EPS 1985 25,000 CdF Chemie-CosderVChiyoda 
LLDPE/HDPE 2003 800,000 UCC (Unipol) 
--------------------- 
Feedstocks 
---------- ------- ----------------- --------------------------------------------------- 
Source 
---------------------- 
Ethane 
---------- ------ -------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Saudi Aramco 
Natural gasoline Saudi Aramco 
Butane Saudi Aramco 
Propane Saudi Aramco 
Sm SADAF 
---------------------- 
Markets ---------- ------- KSA ----------------- 
-------------------------------------------------- 
GCC World 
---------------------- 
Ethylene 
---------- ------- 
83% 
----------------- -------------------------------------------------- 
- 17% 
Propylene 84% - 16% 
Butadiene 5% - 95% 
Benzene 100% -- 
Polystyrene 45% 13% 42% 
Source: based on information from Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu, October, 2001. 
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The Arabian IndustriaI Fibres Company (IBN RUSHD) 
The Arabian Industrial Fibres Company (IBN RUSHD) is one of SABIC's joint 
ventures with the Saudi private sector established in Yanbu. In early operation, this 
company has a technical problems which affected the operation. In this regard SABIC 
signed a team from SABIC R&D and the licensor of the technology to examine the 
quality of the product and all the factors to increase the production. The cooperation 
between SABIC and UOP was facing the challenge to achieve targets for more than 2 
years. Today, improvements in production have reached more than 90% of capacity 
but the aim is to reach 100% capacity 
Profile of Arabian Industrial Fibres Company (IBN RUSHD) 
Location: Yanbu Industrial City, SAUDI ARABIA 
Partnership: SABIC (51.7%) and Saudi Private Sectors (48.3%) 
Capital investment: SR 3,550 million. (US$ 947 million) 
Established: 1993 
Employees: 1094 (467 Saudi, 627 non Saudi) 
Product 
------------------------- 
Start-up 
------------- 
Capacity 
--------- 
Technology/Engineering 
Polyester total 1997 
- -------------------- 
140,000 
-------------------------------------- 
Zimmer/Bechtel 
Staple fiber 1997 48,000 Zimmer/Bechtel 
POY 1997 32,000 Zimmer/Bechtel 
Carpet fiber 1997 20,000 Zimmer/Bechtel 
Bottle grade (chip) 1997 40,000 Zinimer/Bechtel 
Textile chip 1997 10,000 Zimmer/Bechtel 
PTA 1999 350,000 Enicheni/Tecnimont 
Benzene 1999 350,000 UOP, BP(Cyclao/Chiyoda 
p-Xylene 1999 375,000 UOP, BP(Cyclao/Chiyoda 
o-Xylene 1999 45,000 UOP, BP(Cyclao/Chiyoda 
m-Xylene 
--- ---------------------- 
1998 
------------ 
36,000 
---- 
Planning stage 
------------ 
Feedstock 
--------------------------- 
Source 
------------------------- 
-------------------------- 
PTA 
------------ ------------------------------- 
IBN RUSHD 
------------------------------------- 
MEG YANPET 
PX (235,000tly) IBN RUSHD 
LPG Saudi Aramco 
Source: Based on information from Royal Commission Jubail and Yanbu, October, 2001. 
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Appendix 8 
Organisational Chart for 
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